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THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

INSTITUTIONS TOWARD DEVELOPING

A

GLOBAL PLAN OF ACTION ON POPULATION
VED P. NANDA*

I. THE PROBLEM
There is considerable difficulty in defining and assessing
the precise nature of the population problem, for even basic
demographic statistics designed to measure levels and trends
of fertility still are highly unsatisfactory.' Additionally, estimates of future population growth usually suffer from inaccuracy, needing periodic revisions, 2 for there is no agreement
on how to choose and what weight to give the intervening
economic, social, and cultural variables which influence family
size limitations.
However, the observation is inescapable that there is a
problem, for the overwhelming rise in the world's population
during the 1960's 3 has had considerable negative impact on the
efforts of many developing countries to improve their standards
*

Professor of Law and Director of International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver College of Law. The author is grateful to his
colleagues, Lawrence P. Tiffany and Thompson G. Marsh, and
Howard Holmes, Esq. of Denver for reading the original manuscript and making valuable suggestions, and to Ms. Karen Alderson
of the Denver Public Library and Ms. Dorothy Herbert of Washington, D.C. for making available the relevant U.N. and U.S. documents respectively.
' See, e.g., Demographic Yearbook, 1969 t21st ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as 1969 Demographic Yearbook] at 1, "At present, only a minority,
roughly one third of the world's population, is covered by adequate
demographic statistics, and these inhabitants live for the most part in
developed countries." See also U.N. Doc. E/5107, at 40 (1972); Demographic Yearbook, 1971, at 7-12 (23d ed. 1972)
2
See, e.g., World Population Prospects, 1965-1985, Assessed in 1968,
at 7 (U.N. Population Division Working Paper No. 30, 1969) for the
revisions inside the U.N. estimates between 1963 and 1968. On the
recent revision by the United States Census Bureau of its estimates of
future population growth in the United States, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 18,
1972, at 1, col. 1; Washington Post, Dec. 18, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
3For a study of the population trends during the 1960's see U.N. ECOSOC,
Population Commission, 15th Sess., Geneva, 3-14 November 1969, Item 5
of the provisional agenda, Note by the Secretary-General - World
Population Situation, U.N. Doc. E/CN.9/231 .(1969) [hereinafter cited as
1969 Worl4 Population Situation], at 11-12; U.N. ECOSOC, Commission
for Social Development, 22nd Sess. 1-19 March 1971, Item 4 of the provisional agenda, 1970 Report on the World Social Situation, Addendum
VIII - World Population Situation, U.N. Doc. E/CN.5/456/Add. 8, 10
October 1970, and id. Corr. 1 11 February 1971 [hereinafter cited as 1970
World Population Situation], at 2-5; Demographic Yearbook, 1970 (22nd
ed. 1971) [hereafter cited as 1970 Demographic Yearbook], at 105; 1969
DemographicYearbook at 1115. For a study of population trends during
the period 1920-1960 sec Demographic Yearbook, 1960 (12th ed. 1970).
See also Tables 1-4 infra.
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of living.4 The challenge posed is succinctly outlined in a recent report of the Commission on International Development:
No other phenomenon casts a darker shadow over the prospects for international development than the staggering growth
of population. It is evident that it is a major cause of the large
discrepancy between rates of economic improvement In rich and
poor countries. On the other hand, the likelihood of a rapid
slowing down of population growth is not great, alhough some
countries are in a far more favorable position than others in
5
this respect.

To meet the challenge, the Commission has urged the world
community to take appropriate measures to slow down population growth. 6
For analytical and prescriptive purposes, the discussion of
the population situation in terms of either absolute numbers
or man-area ratio is likely to lead to inaccurate conclusions,
for at least two reasons: (1) many parts of the world are still
sparsely populated, and (2) resource depletion and environmental degradation are not caused solely by population growth.
But it might be useful to identify an area as a population problem area if therein the population is too large in proportion
to available resources and effective institutional arrangements
to utilize them effectively, thereby causing low per capita output, low per capita real income and consequent loss of wellbeing. 7 The problem was recognized in a recent recommendation
of an African Seminar on Application of Demographic Data and
Analysis to Development Planning, that
Though population densities are generally low in Africa, this
should not be over-emphasized in dealing with African populations problems. Simple measures of density in terms of total
land area are misleading, since they do not take into account
non-arable land and development potential. 8
4

See 1970 World Population Situation, at 22-23; U.N., Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Report of the Committee for Development
Planning, United Nations Development Decade, Towards Accelerated
Development -Proposals for the Second United Nations Development
Decade, at 1-3, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/128 (1970). The U.N. General Assembly had designated the 1960's as the first U.N. Development Decade.
See G.A. Res. 1710, GAOR Supp. 17, at 17-18, U.N. Doc. A/5100(1962).

5

L.

PEARSON, PARTNERS IN

DEVELOPMENT: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ON

55 (1969). The Commission, appointed by

the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

(World

Bank), was charged to study "the consequence of twenty years of development assistance, assess the results, clarify the errors and propose
policies which will work better in the future." Id. at vii.
6 See id. at 206-207. See generally id. at 55-63, 194-207.
7 These criteria are used by J. HERTZLER, THE CRISIS IN WORLD POPULATION:

A

SOCIOLOGICAL EXAMINATION wrrIT

SPECIAL REFERENCE.TO THE UN-

AREAS 94 (1956) to define overpopulation.
8Reported in U.N. ECOSOC, Economic Commission for Africa, Report of
DERDEVELOPED

the Third Session of the Conference of African Planners (Adis Abbaba,

20-29 May 1970). U.N. Doc./E/CN.14/481; E/CN.14/CAP. 3/20, at 26-27
(1970).
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Accordingly, to comprehend fully and to appreciate the nature and intenstiy of the population problem, it seems desirable
to study it in a broader perspective by reviewing its component
parts which include: (a) food and nutrition; (b) resources,
energy, and environment; (c) economic and social aspects; and
(d) global fertility trends and family planning programs.
A.

Food and Nutrition

The initial success of the Green Revolution ' has created
guarded optimism that the world can avert the feared "catastrophic collision" between growing population and limited food
supply.' However, the suggestion still is being made that we
may already have permanently impaired the carrying capacity
of the planet to support human life and that mass famines lie
ahead in the years to come." Since total world supply of arable
land is limited, and "almost all the land that can be cultivated
under today's economic circumstances is now under cultivation,' 2 the future needs might necessitate the utilization of
9 See,

e.g., L. BROWN, SEEDS OF CHANGE: THE GREEN REVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1970's (1970); Borlaug, The Green Revolution Peace
and Humanity, PRB Selection No. 35, published by the Population Refer-

ence Bureau, Inc., Wash. D.C., Jan. 1971. See also Brown, The Social Impact of the Green Revolution. INT'L CONCILIATION (January 1971). On
the possible adverse effects of the green revolution see Wilkes & Wilkes,
The Green Revolution, 14 ENVIRONMENT, Oct. 1972, 32-39; Paddock, How

Green is the Green Revolution? 20 Bio SCIENCE 897 (1970); Erlich,
Ecology and the War on Hunger, WAR ON HUNGER: A REPORT FROM THE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Vol. IV, No. 12, at (Dec. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as WAR ON HUNGER REPoTr]: Myrdal, cited in 4 WAR
ON HUNGER REPORT No. 11, at 1, 17 (Nov. 1970) (exerpts from a paper
presented by Myrdal at the Third International Congress of Food
Sciences and Technology held in Washington, D.C.. August 14, 1970.
See also Cepede, The Green Revolution and Employment, 105 INT'L
LABOR REV. 1 (1972); Ahmad, The Social and Economic Implications

of the Green Revolution in Asia, id. at 9; Gaud, The Green Revolution:
Accomplishments and Apprehensions in INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
1

1968, at 236-42 (J. Adler ed., 1969).

OSee, e.g., W. COCHRANE, THE WORLD FOOD PROBLEM: A GUARDEDLY OPTI-

MIsTIC VIEW (1969); G. BR=NGER & M. SOISSONS, FAMINE IN RETREAT?
, (1970); The Food Problem of Developing Countries 81-91 (Report of the
Secretary General of the OECD, Jan. 1968). However, for a representative selection of studies predicting such collision see P. EHRLICH, THE
POPULATION BOMB (1968); W. PADDOCK & P. PADDOCK, FAMINE NINETEEN
SEVENTY-FIVE: AMERICA'S DECISION, WHO WILL SURVIVE? (1967); C. SNOW,
THE STATE OF SEIGE (1969); G. BORGSTROM, THE HUNGRY PLANET (rev.
ed. 1967); G. BORGSTROM, Too MANY: THE BIOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS OF
OUR EARTH (1969); R. DUMONT & B. ROSIER, THE HUNGRY FUTURE (1969);
Sen, To Be or Not to Be - Tht Will Be the Question, 19 UNESCO COURIER
10, 13-14 (Feb. 1966); B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971); P.
EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENTS ISSUES IN
HUMAN ECOLOGY (1970); G. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB (1968);
D. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS & W. BEHRENS III, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (A
Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind
(1972) [hereinafter cited as THE LIMITS TO GROWTH].
It See, e.g., G. TAYLOR, THE DOOMSDAY BOOK: CAN THE WORLD SURVIVE?
(1970). For other sources suggesting the earth's limitations in this regard
see works cited in supra note 10.
12 p. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, supra note 10, at 91. See generally id. at 91-96;
THE LIMITS TO GROWTH, at 48-54.
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potentially arable land for food production. However, the feasibility of using such land which suffers from poor quality of
soil in tropical areas such as the jungles of Central America
and from the lack of available supplies of water in dry interiors
such as the grasslands of Africa and Australia will necessarily
depend upon factors such as the availability of sufficient capital and labor and the capability of science and technology to
overcome these handicaps. And even if it were correct that
"the technical capability exists, or can be brought into being,
to produce the kinds and quantities of food that will be demanded" in the next decade or two,'3 our ability to meet the
food and nutrition demands of an unrestrained population
growth still is uncertain.14 To illustrate, 1970 Nobel Peace Prize
winner, Dr. Norman Borlaug, who was honored for his contribution in realizing the Green Revolution, aptly stated in his
acceptance address that:
[t]he green revolution has won a temporary success in man's war
against hunger and deprivation; it has given man a breathing
space. If fully implemented, the revolution can provide sufficient food for sustenance during the next three decades. But
the frightening power of human reproduction must also be
curbed; otherwise, the success of the green revolution will be
ephemeral only. 15

Earlier, in 1967, the President's Science Advisory Committee
reported that unless population growth could be sharply diminished, "all efforts to augment agricultural production will merely
postpone the time of mass starvation, and increase its agony
when it inevitably occurs."1 6 And even if starvation could be
averted by overcoming the quantitative calorie deficiencies, protein deficiency and malnutrition will continue to be critical
problems. 7
13 W. COCHRANE, supra note 10, at 307.
14But see C. WILSON, THE FIGHT AGAINST HUNGER (1969); Freire, Population Growth and Food Supply (Abstract), INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT - 1968, supra note 9, at 78-79.
15 Borlaug, supra note 9, at 8.
16 U.S. Panel on the World Food Supply, 1 THE WORLD FOOD PROBLEM A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITrEE 44 (1967).

For a similar conclusion stated by Lester Brown, former Administrator
of the International Development Service of the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture see Brown. New Directions in World Agriculture, 32 STUDIES IN
FAMILY PLANNING, June 1968, at 1, 6; Brown, Population Explosion and
the Agricultural Revolution, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT - 1968,
supra note 9, at 126-28. The Director-General of the United Nations
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has recently "pointed out
the extremely serious situation caused to the developing regions" by
two successive failures of crops in 1971 and 1972 which, he added,
"could not be considered a temporary misfortune." 9 U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE No. 11, Dec. 1972, at 105.
17 See, e.g., Report to the Economic and Social Council of the Advisory
Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development, International Action to Avert The Impending Protein Crisis, U.N.

1973

DEVELOPING GLOBAL ACTION ON POPULATION

5

Resources, Energy and Environment
The needs of a growing population, the demands of industry
in developed countries and the process of industrialization in
the developing world are causing concern among the environmentalists who fear that "exponential increase in resource consumption can rapidly diminish a fixed store of resources ....
However, even if the environmentalists were to be criticized
for being unduly pessimistic,1 9 there is no gain-saying that the
increasing demands on water and some minerals such as lead,
zinc, platinum, tin and uranium can be met only by "new discoveries, new substitution possibilities, and new technological
developments. ' 2 0 Moreover, as the environmentalists warn their
critics, needed technological advances may face major constraints because of the impending energy crisis, 21 for they argue
that fuels which produce energy are in short supply. This includes not only fossil fuels - coal, natural gas and oil - hydroelectric power, and geothermal power, but even uranium and
thorium based nuclear power.
Assuming, however, that unlimited resources were available, and man's future energy needs were to be met by a
combination of coal, nuclear power, solar energy and "the use
of technologies not yet known to be feasible, let alone economic, '22 there might still be limits on the capacity of these
resources and energy to support unrestrained population
growth. 23 Furthermore, limits on technology and growth may
B.

Doc. E/4343/Rev. 1, E/4592 (1968); Myrdal, Are the Developing Countries Really Developing?, 27 BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS No. 1, at 5
(1971);

Pokrovsky, Qualitative and Quantitative Aspects of

Nutri-

tion, 20 IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON SOCIETY (UNESCO, Paris) 219-234
(1970); Copalan, Nutrition and Family Planning, 12 POPULATION REVIEW
Nos. 1 & 2, at 33 (1968); FAO/WHO/UNICEF Protein Advisory Board,
Lives in Peril; Protein and the Child, WORLD FooD PROBLEMS, No. 12;
FAO, World Agriculture the Last Quarter Century, WORLD FOOD PROB-

LEMS (1970). For the latest General Assembly resolutions on the subject, adopted at its 25th and 26th sessions, see G.A. Res. 2684, 25 GAOR,
Supp. at 56 (1971) and G.A. Res. 2848, 26 GAOR, Supp. 29 at 68 (1972).
18 THE LnvIrrs TO GROWTH at 55. See generally id. at 54-69. See also P.
EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, supra note 10, at 58-63.
19 See generally J. MADDOX, THE DOOMSDAY SYNDROME - An Attack on
Pessimism (1972).
20 Choucri & Bennett, Population,Resources and Technology: Political Implications of the Environmental Crisis, 26 INT'L. ORGANIZATION 175, 193
(1972).
21 See generally THE LIMITS TO GROWTH, at 131-33; P. EHRLICH & A.
EHRLICH, supra note 10, at 53-58; L. ROCKS & R. RUNYON, THE ENERGY
CIsIS (1972).
Cook, Energy for Millenium Three, 75 TECHNOLOGY REV. No. 2, at 16, 23
(1972).
2:1See, e.g., G. TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 201-10. See also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESOURCES AND MAN:
A STUDY AND RECOMMENDATION BY THE COMMIrrEE ON RESOURCES AND

MAN (1969); B. SKINNER, EARTH RESOURCES (1969); C. PARK,JR., AFFLU-
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be imposed "by rising pollution," 24 for compounding the limitations mentioned earlier is the correlation between industrialization and pollution. Not only are the industrially advanced countries disproportionately consuming the world's available resources -more than 50 percent are estimated to be consumed
by 7 percent of the world's population in North America25 2
but they are also causing immense environmental problems,
the nature and extent of which may not even be comprehended
at present.
C. Economic and Social Aspects
The relationship between population growth and economic
development has been a subject of intensive study.2 7 One such
study shows that while a representative sample of developing
countries devoted 65 percent of total investment to maintaining
per capita income at a constant level, the corresponding figure
for a sample of developed countries was less than 25 percent. 2
This difference in spending on maintenance of the status quo (40
percent more investment by developing nations) reflects in
part the increase in rate of population growth in developing
countries, and if the current rate of population growth is not
significantly slowed, it will be impossible to achieve the goal
ENCE IN

JEOPARDY: MINERALS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

(1968).

But

see Dubos, Second Edition/Does Man Have a Future?, 4 THE CENTER
MAGAZINE, No. 2, at 56, 58 (1971). "The potentialities of technology are
so great that shortages of raw materials and of energy sources do not
seem likely to be limiting factors to population growth for many
decades."
24 See generally, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH, at 71-80; 132-33; E. GOLDSMITH,
THE ECOLOGY EDITORS,

A

BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL

(1972).

25 Draser, The End of the World Is at Hand, 85 HUMANIST (London)

364,

365 (1970).
26 Fisher, Observations on the Environmental Crisis, RESOURCES FOR THE
FUTURE, INC., -ANNUAL
REPORT 1970, at 3, 7 (Dec. 1970), "Pollution
and environmental deterioration seem to be more closely connected
with technology and the production and consumption of goods than with
population directly." See, e.g., Nicholson, International Economic Development and the Environment, 24 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
272 (1970). See also M. NICHOLSON, THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION
(1970);

CHALLENGE FOR SURVIVAL: LAND, AIR AND WATER FOR MAN IN
MEGALOPOLIS (P. DANSERAN ed. 1970); International Development Can

27

Destroy the Environment, 11 INT'L DEVELOPMENT 22 (1969).
See, e.g., A COALE & E. HOOVER, POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN Low INCOME COUNTIES (1958); Zaidan, Population
Growth and Economic Development, 42 STUDIES IN FAMILY PLANNING
1-6 (1969); Coale, Population and Economic Development, THE POPULATION DILEMMA 46-69 (P. HAUSER ed. 1963); Stockwell, The Relationship Between Population Growth and Economic Development, 27 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 250 (1962); Spengler, The Economics of Population
Growth, THE POPULATION CRISIS AND THE USE OF WORLD RESOURCES 73-93
(S. MUDD ed. 1964): R. Amundson, Population Growth, Economic Development, and Cultural Change (a paper presented at the India Seminar of the Colorado Association for International Education in Denver,

28

Colo. on February 26, 1971).
G. Zaidan, supra note 27, at 1.
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set in the Second United Nations Development Decade, of an
average annual growth rate of "at least 6 percent in the gross
product of developing countries. ' 21 1 In another recent study, an
economist uses a new demographic model to compare the "costs
and requirement of an effective program to reduce fertility
with the costs and requirements of additional health, education,
transportation and other public services demanded by unchecked
population increase."' ' 0 He concludes that the "high fertility
rates which accompany high growth rates result in a large
portion of the population being too young to be in the labor
force. . . . With slower growth, there is a larger capital stock,
more capital per labor (meaning higher wages per worker), a
smaller population, a higher savings from GNP rate, and a
smaller fraction of children by the time the population goal
31
has been achieved."
Adequate housing, transportation, health facilities, productive and renumerative employment and decent education are
but a few of the essentials that presently are in short supply,
especially in developing countries,3 2 and are affected directly
by the population increase as well as the trend toward urbanization.3 3 Ren6 Dubos graphically describes that even if technology could feed and clothe further increases in population,
because of overcrowding,
nobody wotld be able to move without impediment and irritating interference. Eventually half of the population would have
to be doctors, nurses, or psychiatrists tending to the physical ailments and neuroses of the other half. To this futuce population,
the bomb may no longer be a threat 34but a temptation: it may
appear as the salvation from all evil.
Under such conditions "the type of human beings more likely
to prosper will be those willing to accept a regimented and
29 G. A. Res. 2626, para. 16 (adopted without vote on Oct. 24, 1970).
30 S. Enke, Economic Benefits of Slowing Population Growth, 4 WAR ON
HUNGER REPoRT No. 3, at 12 (1970). See also Enke, Birth Control for
Economic Development, 164 SCIENCE No. 3881, at 798 (1969).
31 S. Enke, Economic Benefits of Slowing Population Growth, supra note
30, at 16.
32 See, e.g., 1970 World Population Situation, at 25-31 and the sources cited
there. Former President cf the World Bank, Eugene R. Black, has
recently stated, "If the maturing population is considered en masse as
a labor force, much higher rates of growth, more like 10 per cent than
5 per cent, will be needed in the 1970's just to keep the percentage of
employment about where P was in the 1960's." Black, Development
Revisited, 47 VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REV. No. 1, at 1, 2 (1970). Urban unemployment is considered as "one of Latin America's most urgent problems over the next decade." 23 AMERICAS, No. 1-2, at 42 (1971).
: 3 For a recent study of the trend toward urbanization see Growth of the
World's Urban and Rural Population, 1920-2000, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/
Series A/44; Urbanization in the Second United Nations Development
Decade (U.N. Pub. Pub., Sales No. E.70.IV.15, 1970).
34 Dubos, supra note 23, at 59.
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.",5
sheltered way of life in a teeming and polluted world ...
Philip Handler, President, National Academy of Sciences, has
succinctly stated the problem recently as follows:
Many of the most tragic ills of human existence find their origin
in population growth. Hunger; pollution; crime; despoilation of
the natural beauty of the planet; extermination of countless
species of plants and animals; overlarge, dirty, overcrowded
cities with their paradoxical loneliness; continual erosion of
limited natural resources, and the seething unrest which engenders the political instability that leads to international conflicts and wars - all these derive from the unbridled growth of
36
populations.

D. Global Fertility Trends and Family Planning Programs
Global fertility trends show a continuous downward trend
in the more developed countries, the average crude birth rate
having declined from 21 per 1,000 population in 1960 to 18 in
1965, and the corresponding gross reproduction rate from 1.4
to 1.2.3 But in the developing countries recent trends are mixed,
with increases occurring in some countries and decreases in
others, resulting in an average crude birth rate in 1965 of 40-41 per
1,000 population and the gross reproduction rate of 2.5-2.7.2
Based upon the available data for the developing countries,
which are considered generally poor, the U.N. prediction is for
a continuance of the recent trends: "[flor the near future at
least, fertility will increase in some countries, and not in others,
' 39
while remaining stable in most of them.
National programs of family planning and population control in developing countries vary in the scope and effectiveness
of their efforts. Also, significant differences relating to the proportion of the population reached and the quality of services
rendered occur not only among countries but within countries
as well. Specifically, birth rates have declined considerably in
a few Asian countries, notably Taiwan, Hong Kong, Republic
of Korea, Singapore, and Ryuku Islands, according to the 1969
Demographic Yearbook.4 0 It also reports that the "changing. at35 Id. at 58.
:; Quoted in 5 WAR ON HUNGER REPORT No. 1, at 18

(1971). Compare
a recent statement by Dr. Hendrick Houthakker, a member of the
Council of Economic Advisors: "What is, of course, more serious [than
the feared shortage of foouc supply] is that overpopulation may lead to
a degradation of the social and physical environment, but this appears
to be more a matter of the proper distribution of population t~han of
total numbers. Much can bc done to improve the environment without
attempting to influence population trends." Quoted in 4 id. No. 6, at 6
(1970). See also N. CHAMBERLAIN, BEYOND MALTHUS (1970).
:17 1969 Demographic Yearbook, at 2.
:38 Id.

39 Id.
40 Id. at 3.
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titudes and official national policies toward family size and
adoption of fertility regulation methods is probably having some
effect in this region."'4' The decline has been marked in Hong
Kong (from 36.0 per 1,000 in 1960 to 24.6 in 1967) and in Taiwan
(from 39.5 in 1960 to 28.5 in 1967) .4 2 Some decreases in birth
43
rates have also occurred in Latin America.
Although for a variety of reasons it is still not possible
to assess the demographic impact of family planning programs
upon crude birth rates, it is considered "unlikely that in the
smaller countries, particularly, these schemes will not eventually influence national reproductive performances." 44 However, with regard to the larger countries, "the prospective future changes of birth rates and the conditions that may pre'45
cipitate them are considerably more problematic.
An illustration of the impact of official national policy is,
however, provided by Romahia's 1966 law, under which abortions were rendered illegal. The crude birth rate there is reported to have almost doubled in one year: from 14.3 per 1,000
population in 1966 to 27.4 in 1967. The figure is reported "only
slightly lower" in 1968.46
A recent U.N. report evaluating the family planning program in India has concluded that "the rapid and encouraging
decline in death rates in India over the last 20 years. . . has
not been matched by a similar reduction in birth rates.14T In
a comment on the report, a pertinent question is posed in a
recent issue of Population Bulletin: "If that is the result of
two decades of the world's most elaborate family planning program, what can be expected from less energetic efforts in other
48
developing countries?

II.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Given the interdependent nature of today's world, the first
essential step toward the slowing of population growth would
41

42

Id. In 1969 the Population Council and the International Institute for the
Study of Human Reproduction started publishing a series on the family
planning programs of various countries. The series, "Country Profiles,"
has covered among others the following states: Hong Kong, Taiwa.n,
Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Sierra Leone and United Arab
Republic. Reports on various countries are also contained in Nos. 31,
32, 35, 38 and 39 Supp., 40-50.
1969 Demographic Yearbook.. at 3.

43 Id.
44

Id.

45 Id.
46

Id.

Cited in 26 POPULATION BULLETIN, No. 6, at 23 (Dec. 1970).
48 Id.
47
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be to formulate a population policy, international in scope and
consisting of global population strategies and programs. 49 Ideally,
the policy should provide answers to such controversial questions as whether or not the proposed global population plan
of action should consist entirely of voluntary family planning
programs; if it should include state encouragement of family
planning, international organizational encouragement of family
planning (despite state indifference or state opposition); and if
consideration should be given even to mandatory population
control measures devised and implemented by the state and/or
international bodies. Also, it should settle upon what institutional measures, including the necessary changes in the existing
institutional structures, would be needed to affect the proposed
programs. For the international lawyer, however, there are no
precise or easy answers to these and other questions; first, because nation states remain uncompromisingly stubborn concerning their sovereignty, and second, because religious, ideological, cultural, economic, ethical, and moral considerations
strongly influence family habits. These factors may vary even
within national boundaries, thus further confounding the problem.
However, as a first step, the need is evident to encourage
low fertility rates, especially in developing countries with a
relatively high rate of population growth, for an increase in
the mortality rate is not a desirable alternative, nor does the
answer lie in large scale immigration, or abstention. Necessary
49Falk, World Population and International Law, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 514
(1969) has urged international lawyers to assist in clarifying relevant
issues of the population problem. Professor Falk has recently elaborated
his statements in an excellent study. See R. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED
See
PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL (1971).
also Claxton, Population and Law, 5 INT'L

LAWYER

1, 19

(1971).

For a perceptive essay on the subject see Gardner, Toward a World
Population Program, THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 332-361 (R. GARDNER & M. MILLIKAN
eds. 1968).

Three other noteworthy reports are:

World Population-

A Challenge to the United Nations and Its System of Agencies,
A Report of a National Policy Panel, established by the U.N.
Association of the United States, May 1969; Ditchley Foundation,, Population Growth: The Impact of Advances in Agriculture and Medicine,
Ditchley Paper No. 17, 1969, and The United Nations Faces the Population
Crisis (Report No. 15 of the Victor-Bostrom Fund for the International
Planned Parenthood Federaticn, Winter 1971-72) [hereinafter cited as
IPPF Report]. A recent United Nations report outlines a recommended
five-year program for expanded U.N. activities in the field of population: Human Fertility and National Development: A Challenge to Science
and Technology, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/138, at 111-26 (1971). It is evident
that popular writing on population does not even comprehend the
nature and complexity of the issues involved in devising a global population policy. As an illustration see P. EHRLICH & R. HARRIMAN, How To
BE A SURVIVOR: A PLAN TO SAVE SPACESHIP FARTH (1971), especially Ch.
VI, at 102-23, entitled "Control Systems."
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prerequisites, both on national and international levels to induce voluntary efforts toward that end include:
I. gathering and disseminating reliable data on the dimensions
and consequences of national and global population pressure
and population programs;
2. research on the determinants of family size and research
concerning inexpensive, safe and convenient contraceptives;
3. initiating and promoting family planning programs in addition to and as a part of adequate national health service
programs; and
4. modifying, refining and strengthening institutions, proceddures, and norms.

This might necessitate the repeal of old legislation and the enactment in its place of new laws on abortion, adoption, and
sterilization, and prescription of control measures such as incentives, penalties and other rewards and deprivations.
It is equally important that national family planning programs should not be restricted in the scope of their activities
to just imparting the dissemination of contraceptive techniques.
Such technical emphasis is likely to overshadow the all-embracing need to study population in the broader context of
socio-economic environment, for, after all, it is eventually
through the manipulation of this environment that the objective
of low fertility will be realized.50 Issues related to population
such as urban and regional planning and development, the
development of human resources, improvement in the standard
of living, and various economic, social and political ramifications of high fertility should be explored.
And finally, the desired objective should be stated: to
formulate a global population policy, the implementation of
which would eventually lead to an optimum size of the world
population, living in an ecological balance and enjoying what
Professors McDougal and Lasswell call "a universal order of
human dignity."' 5' Since the overriding goal is postulated as a
world order which promotes the widest shaping and sharing of
values,i ' the proposed population policy will take into account
the following considerations among others:
1. the size, composition, and distribution of population in each
country;
2. the relative per capita consumption of resources, the per
50See, e.g., Commission for Sucial Development, 22d Sess., 1-19 March
1971, Item 4 of the provisional agenda. 1970 Report on the World Social
Situation, Addendum I- Social Development in Asia, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.5/456/Add. 1, at 24-25 (1970).
5t McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 Am.J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1959).
52Id. at 11-13.
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capita pollution and degradation of the environment viewed in
terms of the minimization of environmental hazards and
eventual maximization and equitable distribution of re-

sources; and
3. the relative economic and technological development of a
country and its people, which implies an evaluation of the
current international machinery for aid, trade, investment,
and development and the need of the developing countries
for economic growth, development and well-being.
It is the purpose of this paper to clarify and aid in the
formulation of such a global population policy. Toward this
end, the following discussion will highlight some selected measures already undertaken nationally and internationally to slow
population growth and it will conclude, after briefly evaluating
these measures, with a set of recommendations for further
action.
III.

TRENDS

In this section, governmental and nongovernmental activities related to population will be briefly reviewed under the
following headings: (a) U.N. General Assembly's involvement;
(b) U.N. Fund for Population Activities; (c) Activities of the
U.N. Economic and Social Council, U.N. Specialized Agencies,
U.N. Secretariat and regional organizations; (d) Changing national policies on family planning and bilateral assistance; and
(e) Nongovernmental activities. This review will be followed
by a brief discussion of the arguments against any international
action on population under the following headings: (a) Article
2(7) of the U.N. charter; and (b) Ideological and religious opposition.
A. Governmental and Nongovernmental Activities
1.

The U.N. General Assembly's Involvement

Although the United Nations was urged at its inception to
'3
"face and at least partly solve world population problems,'
and a United Nations Population Commission was established
by the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as early
as October 1946,54 the first General Assembly resolution actually
dealing with the subject was not adopted until its 12th session
in December 1957."" It was then that the Assembly recognized
• Stated in a postscript by Walter B. Pitkin in G. BURCH & E. PENDELL,
POPULATION ROADS TO PEACE AND WAR 133 (1945).
54 3 ECOSOC 137, U.N. Doe. E/190/Rev. 1 (1946); id., Supp. 7, Annex 17,
at 66. See also ECOSOC Res. 150 (VII) of August 10, 1948.
-5G.A.Res. 1217, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957).
For the discussion in the General Assembly see id., Annexes, Agenda
Item No. 28, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/3882 (1957).
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the close relationship between "economic problems and population problems, especially with regard to countries which are
in the process of economic development," and invited its member states "to follow as closely as possible the interrelationships existing between economic and population changes."
Five years later in December 1962, the Assembly adopted
a resolution entitled "Population Growth and Economic Development."5 " Still recognizing the existence of the close relationship between economic development and population growth,
and acknowledging "the responsibility of each Government to
decide on its own policies and devise its own programmes of
action for dealing with the problems of population and economic and social progress," the General Assembly asked the
United Nations to "encourage and assist Governments, especially
those of the less developed countries, in obtaining basic data
and in carrying out essential studies of the demographic aspects,
as well as other aspects, of their economic and social development problems." However, on an oral roll-call vote, the General Assembly rejected a provision under which the United
Nations would have been asked to "give technical assistance
as requested by governments for national projects and pro' 57
grammes dealing with the problems of population.
During the next four years following 1962, several major
developments necessitated the involvement of the United Nations in the population field. One such development was the
alarming rate of population growth as shown in several demographic studies, including the Provisional Report on World
Population Prospects, as Assessed in 1963,58 the reports of the
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and of
the 1963 Asian Population Conference,59 and the summary report of the 1965 World Population Conference, entitled "World
Population: Challenge to Development. ' 60 A second cause was
the recommendation in 1964 of an ad hoc committee convened
to advise the Secretary-General on long range population plan.
ning that the U.N. and its specialized agencies should extend
5"G.A. Res. 1838, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 25-26, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962). For the Committee Report see 17 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda
Item No. 38, at 2-7 (1963).
57 17 U.N. GAOR 1178 (1962). For the views of the delegates opposing this
provision see id. at 1171-79.
5sU.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SER.R/7 (1964). For a later report see World
Population Prospects as Assessed in 1963, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/Ser.A/41
(1966).
59 35 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 2; U.N. Doc. E/3723/Rev. 1.; E/CN.9/181/Rev.
1 (1963).
Co U.N. Doc. E/CONF./41/1 (1966).
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the scope of their work on the subject, including the intensification of their work on demographic statistics, and the study
of relationships between trends of population and economic
and social factors. 61 Finally, the disappointing trends in the
food production in the 1950's and 1960's as evidenced by the
rise in net imports of grains into the less developed countries
from about 3 million tons a year in the 1948-52 period to about
17 million tons in 1965,62 was causing serious concern among
the developing countries, a concern voiced by many governments in response to a U.N. inquiry on problems arising from
the interaction between economic development and population
changes.' 3
In the meantime, this growing concern had caused several
U.N. agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO),
United National Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the United Nations Children Fund
(UNICEF) to appraise the possibilities of providing assistance
in population planning to requesting governments. 4 Also, the
U.N. Population Commission, at its 13th session, set forth a
work program for the period 1965 to 1980, which consisted of
research and technical work on fertility, mortality and immigration, and on demographic aspects of economic and social developments. 65 Endorsing the program, the Economic and Social
Council invited the regional economic commissions and specialized agencies to consider "modifying and expanding their activities in the population fields" in accordance with the Population Commission's recommended program. It also requested
that the Secretary-General provide "advisory services and training" on action programs in the population field to the govern6
ments requesting such assistance.
Thus, in December 1966, the stage was set for the unanimous
adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2211 (XXI), entitled
61U.N. Doc. E/CN.9/182 & Add. 1 (1964).
62
Boerma, FAO Supports Better Family Living, IPPF Report, supra note
49, at 34.
63 U.N. Doc. E/3895/Rev. 1 & Corr. 1 & Add. 1 (1964).
64 For the 1965 discussion of the UNICEF role in the family planning programs see Report of the Economic and Social Council, 1 August 1965August 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 3, at 60-61, U.N. Doc. A/6303 (1966).
The WHO and UNESCO actions are referred to in G.A. Res. 2211, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 41 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
65 For the report of the Population Commission on its 13th Session see 39
U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. E/4019 (1965).
'; Res. 1084 (XXIX) of 30 July 1965. For a short report on the Council
action see 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 3, at 64-66. U.N. Doc. A/6003 (1965);
Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1965-15 June 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 92-94, U.N.
Doc. A/6301 (1966).
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"Population Growth and Economic Development. ")' 7 Former Secretary-General U Thant has called this action a "turning point"
in the Uinted Nations attitude toward population questions,
since in his words, "there was recognition of the gravity of
population problems and the necessity for accelerated action

to implement the expanded programme recommended by the
Commission."16 8 In the operational part of Resolution 2211 (XXI), the General Assembly requested the SecretaryGeneral to pursue "the implementation of the work programmes

Population

[recommended earlier by the Population Commission] covering
training, research, information and advisory services in the
field of population" and also called upon the Economic and

Social Council, the Population Commission, the regional economic commisions,

the U.N. Economic and Social

Office

in

Beirut (UNESOB) and the specialized agencies to "assist, when
requested, in further developing and strengthening national
and regional facilities for training, research, information and
advisory services in the field of population."'"' Of course, the
General Assembly recognized in an introductory paragraph "the
sovereignty of nations in formulating and promoting their own
population policies, with due regard to the principle that the
size of the family should be the choice of each individual

family."
In December 1966, the Heads of State of 12 countries issued
a statement (later signed by 18 more Heads of State or Government) 70 on family planning.7 Recognizing the seriousness of
the problem caused by unrestrained population growth and
the common interest of both nation and family in family planning, they expressed their belief that "the great majority of
parents desire to have the knowledge and means to plan their
families," and that "the opportunity to decide the number and
72
spacing of children is a basic human right."
Adopted on 17 Dec. 1966. 2 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 41, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1967).
1S Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the
Work of the Organization, September 1968, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1A, at
8, U.N. Doc. A/7201/Add. 1 (1968).
69G.A. Res. 2211, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 41-42, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967). See also 21 U.N. GAOR, 2 Annexes (20 September-20 December 1966), Agenda Item No. 46 ('1968) ; 21 U.N. GAOR, 2d Comm. 439-46
(1967).
7
"See Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran,
22 April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 1968 [hereinafter
cited as Final Act, Teheran Conference], at 15.
71 For a brief report see Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the
Wcrk of the Organization, 16 June 1966-15 June 1967, 22 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 1, at 97, U.N. Doc. A/6701 (1967).
721d.
67
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Subsequently, two international conferences recognized the
urgency of the problem: the 1968 Teheran Conference on Human
Rights and the 1970 World Youth Assembly which met in New
York. While observing that "the present rapid rate of population growth in some areas of the world hampers the struggle
against hunger and poverty," and considering that "couples
have a basic human right to decide freely and responsibly on
the number and spacing of their children and a right to adequate education and information in this respect," the Teheran
Conference urged the United Nations and its member states
to "give close attention to the implications for the exercise
of human rights of the present rapid increase in world population. ' 73 The commission established by the Youth Assembly
to discuss the item on population considered "the long term
need to control population expansion," recommended that "a
zero growth rate for natural population increase be adopted
as an immediate objective for the world population as a
whole. ' 74 It also recommended that
[flurther research be urgently undertaken to determine the concept of optimum population, taking into account not only the
relation of population numbers to economic development, resource availability or space, but for the maintenance of a high

quality environment and the requirements for personal human
happiness. 75

On family planning, the Commission expressed its belief that
[t]he adoption of family planning should be a matter for personal conscience and be readily available to each individual
without economic, poiltical, social, educational or cultural limitations ....76

The Commission stated its "wish to recommend: (a) an intensification and expansion of all the present programs to limit
the growth of world population as a matter of absolute urgency
for mankind . .

.

. (c)

that contraceptive methods and infor-

mation on family planning be available without cost to all
77
people regardless of social or marital status.1
During its 24th and 25th Sessions, the General Assembly
adopted several resolutions of special significance on the sub73 For the text of the resolution, adopted on 12 May 1968 see Final Act,
Teheran Conference, at 14-15.
74 The Assembly had established four commissions. Quoted in POPULATION
NFWSLETTER No. 10, September 1970, at 17. Issued by the Population
Division of the Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations,
New York [hereinafter cited as POPULATION NEWSLETTER]. For a full report see 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE No. 8, § 1, Aug.-Sept. 1970, at
109-138.
75 POPULATION NEWSLETTER No. 10 September 1970, at 17-18.
7(;
Id.
77

Id. at 18.
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ject of population. For instance, in December 1969 the Assembly
adopted a "Declaration on Social Development," proclaiming
that families should have "the knowledge and means necessary
to enable them to exercise their right to determine freely and
responsibly the number and spacing of their children. '7 8 This
declaration, calling for "national and international action for
its use as a common basis for social development policies,"
is the first explicit utterance by the general Assembly sanctioning family planning.
In December 1970, the General Assembly adopted two
additional resolutions that have a bearing on population. On
December 11, it designated 1974 as "World Population Year,"
with a view to focusing international attention on the population problem so that "Member States and international organizations [would devote the year especially] to appropriate
efforts and undertakings in the field of population in the con7' 9
It
text of their respective needs and areas of competence.
acknowledged national competence to formulate and implement
population policies and programs, consequently stating that
"international action in the population sphere should be responsive to the varied needs and requests of the individual
Member States." In another operative paragraph, the resolution
stressed that
assistance from organizations of the United Nations system
and interested Member States should continue to be available
upon request for evolving and implementing a dynamic population policy to cope with all problems emanating from different
population levels, characteristics and trends, including assistance in developing a comprehensive demographic research and
studies program, training programs and providing advisory
80
services in this field.

Earlier, on October 24, the General Assembly had
adopted a resolution on the International Development Strategy
for the second United Nations Development Decade,8' which
contained the following provision:
Those developing countries which consider that their rate of
population growth hampers their development will adopt measures which they deem necessary in accordance with their concept of development. Developed countries, consistent with their
national policies, will upon request provide support through the
78 G.A. Res. 2542, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 49-53, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969)
See especially articles 4 and 22, id. at 50 and 52 respectively.
71) G.A. Res. 2683, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 55 (1971).
For the Second
Committee's report, see U.N. General Assembly, 25th Sess., Agenda
Item 12, Report of the Economic and Social Council -. Report of the
Second Committee (part II). U.N. Doc. A/8203/Add. 1, at 7-9 (1970).
80

Id.

81

G.A. Res. 2626, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 39-49 (1971).
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supply of means for family planning and further research. International organizations concerned will continue to provide,
when appropriate, the assistance that may be requested by interested Governments. Such support or assistance will not be a
82
substitute for other forms of development assistance.

It should, however, be noted that the text suggested by the
U.N. Economic and Social Council (on the recommendation of
the Population Commission)s' was much stronger than the one
adopted. The proposed text read:
In parts of the world, efforts during the Second United Nations
Development Decade to promote long-term economic and social
development adequate to improve the quality of life could be
frustrated by the continuance of present high rates of population growth. In such cases, for countries which consider it appropriate and in accordance with the special needs of each country, national policies aimed at the achievement of more desirable
rates of population growth and at the acceptance by parents
of a voluntary basis of smaller families should be regarded as
among the essential aspects of development* strategy for the
growth,
eventual achievement of satisfactory per capita economic
84
which would promote human welfare and dignity.

In its resolution of December 15, 1970,85 the General Assembly identified, as a minimum target for the second U.N.
Development Decade, the availability of all necessary information and advice to all persons who so desire it to enable
them to decide freely and responsibly on the number and
spacing of their children and to prepare them for responsible
parenthood.
The General Assembly activities at its 26th and 27th sessions
will be briefly discussed in the review of the activities of the
82
83

Id. at 47.
Population Commission, Report of the 15th Sess. (3-14 Nov. 1969), 48
U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 3, at 15, U.N. Doc. E/4768, E/CN.9/235 (1970).
Among other recommendations of the Population Commission endorsed
by ECOSOC was the one to hold the third World Conference on Population in 1974. For the recommendation of the Population Commission
see id. at 51-52. For ECOSOC see Res. 1483 (XLVIII) of 3 April 1970,
48 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 2 (1970). Report of the Economic and
Social Council, 9 August 1969-31 July 1970, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 3, at
42, 43, U.N. Doc. A/8003 (1970). For a summary report of the earlier
World Population Conference in 1965 see World Population -Challenge to Development, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.41/1 (1966. For a full report
see UN=T

NATIONS, PROCEEDINGS AT THE WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE,

Belgrade, 30 Aug.-10 Sept. 1965 (1966, 1967).
84Population Commission, supra note 83 at 50-51. Opposition by some
states prevented the Preparatory Committee for the second U.N. Development Decade from adopting this text. For example, the Brazilian
representative stated in the- preparatory committee that underdevlopment should be attacked rather than overpopulation which is a symptom of underdevelopment. U.N. Doc. A/ACjl41/SR. 19-33, at 90-91
(1969). The preparatory committee's draft which was finally adopted by
the General Assembly as paragraph 65 in Res. 2626 is contained in U.N.
Doc. A/7982, at 15 (para. 62) (1970).
85 G.A. Res. 2716 Annex § II.C.4, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 81, 82 (1971).
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United Nations Fund for Population Activities and of the Economic and Social Council.
2. The United Nations Fund for Population Activities
In response to the 1966 General Assembly resolution
2211 (XXI), 0 which called upon the United Nations system to
provide assistance to government-sponsored population programs, the Secretary-General established in 1967 the United
Nations Fund for Population Activities (the Fund) and invited
voluntary contributions . 7 The Fund was designed to
provide systematic and sustained assistance to countries desiring
it to assess and cope with their population problems- and thus
to develop competence and institutional capacity in those countries; to enable the United Nations and its related agencies to
respond effectively to the needs of member States for assistance
with population problems; and to help in co-ordinating population programs among the various organizations of the United
Nations system in so far as they are supported by the Fund.88

It is encouraging that as of December 1972, the Fund received contributions and pledges from 52 countries which include a number of low-income states in Asia, Africa and Latin
America as well.1 ! The Secretary-General has recently reported
a rise in the annual contributions to the Fund: $15.3 million
in 1970; $28.6 million in 1971, and $36 million in 1972, compared
with a total of $5.1 million for the years 1967 to 1969.90 At
present, the Fund (administered since 1969 by the Administrator
of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is
supporting population projects and programs "in 75 Member
countries, in addition to research projects and other activities
of a regional or global character. ' "' Since the Fund has grown
in size and is undertaking a range of activities, the SecretaryGeneral has recommended that the "character of the Fund
[be changed] from a trust fund of the Secretary-General into
a fund established under the authority of the General Assembly,
''
to be called the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF). 2
8"Supra note 69.
87 For a short report see Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Organization, supra note 68, at 8.
8 POPULATION NEWSLETTER

No. 8, March 1970, at 10.

Report of the Economic and Social Council at the 27th Session of the
U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Second Committee, Agenda Item
No. 12, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/8963 (1972); Note by the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/8899 (1972). For an earlier report see Pre-Investment
News, published by United Nations Development Program (UNDP),
New York, February 1971 [hereinafter cited as Pre-Investment News],
at 8. For a ,report on the second session of the Advisory Board of the
Fund see POPULATION NEWSLETTER No. 9, June 1970, at 20-21.
: Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/8899, at 1 (1972).
'i"

91

Id.

92

Id. at 2.
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He has further recommended that the Fund "should report
to the Governing Council of UNDP and be guided by it." '
3. Activities of the U.N. Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), U.N. specialized agencies, U.N. Secretariat,
4
and regional organizations
ECOSOC's concern with various aspects of population arises
in part from the activities of its Committee for Programme and
Co-ordination, and in part from its supervision of the United
Nations Population Commission which it had established in
1946. " 5)Its active interest in recent years in population activities
reflects its endorsement of the leadership role of the Population
Commission initially in recommending to hold a world Population Conference in 197416 and subsequently in taking a leading
role in proposing programs and arrangements for the Conference 97 and for the World Population Year, 1974.98 However,
ECOSOC's most far-reaching resolution to date is the one it
adopted in June 1972, 99 which after expressing concern "with the
immediate and long-range economic and social implications of
rapid population growth as revealed in the projections of the
United Nations" urges U.N. members: (a) to "give full attention
to their demographic obpectives and measures" - and to take
steps to improve demographic statistics, research and planning
machinery needed for development of population policies and
programs; (b) to "cooperate in achieving a substantial reduction of the rate of population growth in those countries which
consider their present rate of growth is too high and in exploring the possibility for the setting of targets for such a
reduction in those countries"; and (c) to "ensure, in accordance with their national policies and needs, that information
and education about family planning, as well as the means to
practice family planning effectively, are made available to all
individuals by the end of the Second United Nations Develop93 Id. at 3.
94
See generally R. SYMONDS & M. CAREu,
THE UNrIED NATIONS AND THE
POPULATION QUESTION, Part VI (1973) [this work was not consulted for
the writing of this paper).
95 Res. 3 (III) of ECOSOC (1946).
96 The resolution making the iecommendation is contained in 48 U.N.
ECOSOC Supp. 3, at 51-52, U.N. Doc. E/4768, E/CN.9/235 (1970).
97
See 52 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 3, at 19-26, U.N. Doc. E/5090 & Add 1
(1972). See also U.N. Doc. E/CN.9/265 (1972).
98See 52 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 3, at 49-72, U.N. Doc. E/5090 & Add. 1
(1972).
99
Res. 1672 (LII) of June 2, 1972, 52 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 6, U.N.
Doc. E/5183 (1972). See also the 1970 resolutions adopted by ECOSOC:
Res. 1483 (XLVIII) of population policies and the Second U.N. Development Decade on the subject contained in 48 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 2
(1970), and the other Res. 1486 (XLVIII) on work programs and

priorities in the field of population, contained in id. at 3.
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ment Decade." The resolution also calls upon all countries to
give further assistance to the Fund, and calls upon the developed
countries to provide assistance in the population field. It should
also be noted that during the period January 1, 1969 to June
30, 1971 the Population Division of the Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, U.N. Secretariat "had made arrangements for
282 projects of technical co-operation for the benefit of all the
regions of the world, including direct assistance to some 80
countries."'0" The Population Commission has recently adopted
extensive work programs for 1972-73 and 1972-76.101 The proposed
projects fall into five broad categories: (1) Continuing Service
Functions; I"' - (2) Technical Cooperation; 0 3 (3) Research and
Technical Work;' 14 (4) Population Policies; 0 5 (5) Conferences; 0 6
(6) Improvement of Demographic Statistics; 0 7 and (7) Proposals for Establishing a United Nations World Population
Training Institute."'
In addition to the General ssembly, the Fund, the Population
Commission, and ECOSOC, several other U.N. policy-making
bodies have been actively interested in various aspects of
population. They include the Statistical Commission, the Commission for Social Development, the Commission on the Status
of Women, the Committee on Development Planning, the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development, the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization,
and the regional economic commissions." 9
Similarly, various U.N. specialized agencies are actively
associated with population activities. To illustrate, the Preparatory Committee for the World Population Conference is composed of representatives of the United Nations including the
regional economic commissions for Europe, Asia and Far East,
Latin America, Africa and the United Nations Economic and
Social Office in Beirut (UNESOB); UNDP, Fund, International
100 52 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 3, at 7 (1972).
101 Id. at 27-42.

Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30-33.
104 Id. at 33-39.
102
103

105 Id. at 39-40.

106 Id. at 41.

Id.
Id. at 41-42. See also Report of UN/UNESCO/WHO Mission, The Feasibility of Establishing a World Population Institute, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/
SER.R.12 (1971).
D"' For a short discussion of their activities on populations see U.N. Doc.
E/5107, at 36-7 (1972).
307
108
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Labor Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO),
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); and
two non-governmental organizations - International Planned
Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and International Union for the
Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP). 11( A similar broad
range of involvement by various U.N. specialized agencies is
evident by their participation in the work of the Subcommittee
on Population of the Administrative Committee of Coordination"' and the Interagency Consultative Committee of the
Fund. 112 Several agencies are involved in the Fund's projects
of providing assistance in government-sponsored family planning programs.11 3 Finally, a recent report prepared for the
U.N. Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and
Technology to Development illustrates the nature and scope of
interest by the U.N. specialized agencies in the population field.
The report, Human Fertility and National Development,1 14 was
coordinated by a staff member of the Fund, with contributions
from the UN, UNICEF, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, and WHO.
A notable event was the World Bank's loan in June 1970
to Jamaica to support the government's family planning program. This is the first loan the World Bank had granted to
assist a national effort in slowing the growth rate of a country's population. 115 Since then, it has made two more loansto Tunisia and Trinidad and Tobago. 116 In September 1968,
11052 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 3, at 19 note 12, U.N. Doc. E/5090 (1972); 53
U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 12, at 2 note 3, U.N. Doc. E/5212 (1972).
111 In attendance, among others, were representatives from the U.N.,
UNESOB, United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)
and from the following specialized agencies: UNICEF, ILO, FAO,
UNESCO, WHO and the World Bank. Reported in POPULATION NEwsTTrmR, No. 9, June 1970, at 22.

112 See id. No. 11, Dec. 1970, at 26.
113 For instance, in August 1970, an agreement was reached between the
Government of Pakistan and the Fund concerning the Fund's assistance
in Pakistan's family planning program. Besides assistance from the
U.N., the agreement provides for the assistance of UNICEF, ILO,
UNESCO, WHO and other appropriate organizations in the U.N. system
in procuring consultants and advisors; training, research and evaluation;
clinical and medical research; supplies and equipment; and post-partum
programs. The Pakistan government aims at reducing the birth rate in
Pakistan from 43 to 33.2 per 1,000. Reported in POPULATION NEWSLETrER,
No. 10, Sept. 1970, at 3.
114 Human Fertility and National Development: A Challenge to Science and
Technology, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/138 (1971). A report on the development and financing of population programs in the United Nations is contained in id. at 127-39.
115 For a short report see POPULATION NEWSLE rrE, No. 9, June 1970, at 18.
"McNamara, The World Bank and Population, in IPPF Report, supra
note 49, at 13, 14.
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World Bank President Robert MacNamara already had stated
that the control of population growth was "yet another area
where the Bank needs to take new initiatives.' 1 17 Acknowledging that it was a "thorny subject which it would be very much
more convenient to leave alone," MacNamara said that he could
not do so because "the World Bank is concerned above all with
economic development, and the rapid growth of population is
one of the greatest barriers to the economic growth and social
well-being of our member states."" 8 In 1971, he reported that
over the past three years
"the World Bank has organized and expanded its capability to
serve its member developing countries in the population field. We
have established a wholly new department: a Population Projects Department, and are staffing it with the most qualified
and experienced international personnel we can find.
Further, we have added population analysis as an integral
part of our Country Economic Reports, and are assisting gov-

ernments in assessing the implications of population policy on
their overall development plans."119
In actuality, it is only during the last five years that the
World Bank and several of the specialized agencies mentioned
above have seriously discussed population problems and received mandates from their governing boards to play an active
role within their areas of competence. For example, the Executive Director of UNICEF, in his March, 1971 General Progress
Report, 120 explained that UNICEF was principally concerned
with family planning in the context of maternal and child
health services because "the health, welfare and development
of children is deeply affected by responsible parenthood and
family size."' 21 He reports: "The countries receiving some form
of UNICEF assistance have a child population of 793 million;
more than half of these children, 573 million, live in countries
which either have official family planning programs or support
non-governmental family planning activities."'122 He has urged
more bilateral and international support and resources to reach
national goals for providing maternal and child health serv1 23
ices.
Similarly, in the context of health services, WHO is exReported in POPULATION NEWSLETrER, No. 7, OcT. 1968, at 20.
118 Id.
19 McNamara, supra note 107, at 14.
120 U.N. ECOSOC, United Nations Children's Fund, General Progress Report of the Executive Director, U.N. Doc. E/ICEF/608 (1971).
121 For his statements on population see id. at 16-17, 37-39.
'2 Id. at 37.
123 Id. at 39.
117
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tending assistance in the development of family planning projects by providing advisory, training and evaluation services.
According to the report of the Director-General of WHO for
1969, the organization had actively assisted various countries
"'in the health aspects of human reproduction, family planning
and population dynamics."' 2 4 He added:
All the resources available to the Organization within the related fields of maternal .and child health, human reproduction
and human genetics will have to be combined if we are to bring
effective assistance to the growing number of countries that want
to carry out family planning programmes within the framework
125
of their general health services.
The Governing Body of the International Labor Office
(ILO) has favorably considered action "to induce and help
developing countries to moderate their rate of population growth
in appropriate cases."' 126 In particular, ILO could
assist social security institutions in extending family planning
services to workers' families protected by them in accordance
with the wishes of the workers and the varying national conditions.127

While the General Conference of UNESCO has described
its competence in the field of education, social sciences, and
communication to provide assistance in family planinng programs "within the over-all activities of the United Nations
family," 128 UNESCO has, thus far, confined its activities to un-

dertaking studies on different aspects of population. The World
Food Program (WFP), jointly administered by FAO and
ECOSOC, is planning "to make available its global food distribution system in support of family planning programs by
channeling contraceptives and educational materials to such
29

programs."1

The emphasis on more regional and national action is indicated in a resolution adopted in an ECAFE meeting in April
1970,130 in the operative part of which ECAFE invited the
Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme
124

Reported in POPULATION NzwSL'rrER, No. 9, June 1970, at 14-15.

125

Id. at 16.

1

1

26

27

POPULATION NEWSLE=rr,
Id. at 21.

No. 4, Feb. 1969, at 19, 20.

Id. at 23. At the 49th session of the Economic and Social Council, the
UNESCO representative responded to criticism that UNESCO was "not
doing enough in the matter of family planning," but what further
action would be taken was not indicated. For his comments, see 49 U.N.
ECOSOC, Coordination Committee, Vol. 1, meetings held in Geneva,
from 9 to 20 July 1970, U.N. Doc. E/AC. 24/SR. 387-398, at 34 (1970).
129 Reported in POPULATION CRisis, May-June 1970, at 5 (a newsletter issued
periodically by the Population Crisis Committee, Washington, D.C.).
130 Reported in POPULATION NEwsLETER,
No. 9, June 1970, at 26.
128
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in allocating its resources and those of the United Nations Fund
for Population Activities, to attach importance to collaborative
efforts in the field of population at the regional, sub-regional
and national levels, through which ECAFE co-operates in the
application of the combined skills and knowledge of several
3
agencies within the United Nations system.' '

The activities of the Commission include holding regional population conferences and seminars, directing population studies,
and coordinating the activities of several agencies in assisting
national efforts. ' : 2 Other regional commissions are equally interested in regional and national population programs and poli33
cies.1
Advisory services are available to requesting governments
in the form of special U.N. missions, composed jointly of experts from the United Nations and appropriate specialized
agencies. These missions provide assistance in setting up family
planning programs, assisting the personnel and financial needs
of establishing such a program, and clarifying the relationship
4
between demographic conditions and economic development.1
The U.N. population program officers are equally active.
U Thant reported that during June 1969 to June 1970 they
"continued their task of promoting the development of programs and projects in the forty-six countries they coveredin collaboration with Governments, the specialized agencies
and the Resident Representatives of UNDP--and of implementing them with assistance from the United Nations system."'1 35 The Population Commission at its 16th Session noted
that during 1970 and 1971 the population program officers had
visited 84 countries and had actively cooperated with govern13 6
ments in designing projects.
A 1970 study"17 undertaken by the United Nations Secre131

Id.

132 For various reports on regional commissions see e.g., id. No. 10, at 19-24;

id. No. 9, at 3-13; id. No. 8, at 14-21; id. No. 7, at 21-22; id. No. 6, at 1617; id. No. 5, at 3-11, 22-24; Report of the Economic and Social Council,
9 August 1969-31 July 1970, supra no:e 83, at 44.
13 See U.N. Docs. E/CN.253, 214, 259; E/5107 at 37; 52 U.N. ECOSOC Supp.
3, at 3 (1972).
134 See Annual Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1969-15 June 1970, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 126, U.N.
Doc. A/8001 (1970). For a report on a six-man advisory mission to Iran
see PRE-INVESTMENT

NEWS,

January 1971, at 3.

1"5 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 126, U.N. Doc. A/8001 (1970). For another
brief report see POPULATION NEWSLETTER No. 11, Dec. 1970, at 11-15.
13652 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 3, at 9 (1972).
1:7 U.N. ECOSOC, Commission for Social Development, 22nd Sess., 1-19
March 1971, Provisional Agenda Item No. 4, 1970 Report on the World
Social Situation - Addendum IX, U.N. Doc. E/CN.5/456/Add.9 (1970).
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Report on the World Social Situation - Addendum IX].
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tariat on the effects of various family planning programs illustrates the secretariat's involvement in the field now that there
is heightened appreciation and wider acceptance of national
efforts to moderate fertility. Also, the study was intended to
examine how social and cultural conditions, as well as the
level of science and technology affect the implementation and
effectiveness of fertility-oriented policies. The report, entitled
Measures, Policies and Programmes Affecting Fertility, with
ParticularReference to National Family Planning Programmes,
covered the following areas:
(a) social, economic and demographic measures that affect
fertility;
(b) types of official policies in respect to population matters,
with emphasis upon their formulation and objectives;
(c) health aspects of programs and methods of fertility
regulation;
(d) the communications strategy for motivating a population to accept and practice fertility regulation;
(e) social, cultural and political factors influencing family
size limitation; and
(f) the organization, structure and evaluation of national
3
family planning programs.'
The results "dramatized the wide gaps in knowledge of the
subjects that it addressed and focused on the pressing need for
additional information.' 1 9 For instance we know very little
about why individuals do not regulate family size, that is,
under what conditions will individuals adjust their behavior in
order to reduce fertility. "[V]ery few scholarly efforts seem
to have been devoted to studying the ways in which a culture
influences decisions as to whether and how fertility should be
regulated.' 140 Research is also needed to develop safe, inexpensive, effective and uncomplicated methods of fertility regulation.1 4 1 Also, techniques of abortion and sterilization need to
be perfected. Only then will methods of fertility control be
effective in terms of their acceptance in different parts of the
142
world.
138

Id. at 4.

139 Id.
4
1 0 Id.

at 10.

141 Id. at 13.
142 For a recent

report see Ravenholdt, Piotrow & Speidel, Use of Oral
Contraceptives: A Decade of Controversy, 8 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY &
OBsTETIcs 941 (1970).
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The report identified several factors which seem to have
facilitated the acceptance of family planning programs as official government policy:
the general climate of increased awareness with regard to population problems; improvements in contraceptive technology;
results of surveys on knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP)
with respect to methods of family limitation; and an increase
in the reservoir of technical competence and in resources for
143
bilateral and multilateral technical assistance in this field.

It also noted that government measures, which favor high
fertility or declining fertility, essentially fall into four categories:
(a) measures related to the family, such as family allowance programs, systems of taxation on income, aid to
maternity and rewards to mothers;
(b) measures of social reform, including compulsory education and child health laws, social security programs,
and laws and programs intended to improve the status
of women;
(c)

laws relating to abortion, contraception and sterilization; and
44
(d) laws relating to marriage and divorce.
Also outlined were various factors which might either facilitate or hamper the progress of these programs: economic, social
and cultural factors such as socio-economic status: "religious
beliefs and institutions, various mores and superstitions and
the role of women in society; '145 levels of literacy; rural-urban
residence; the education of husband and wife; the type of family organization; customs on marriage, divorce and widowhood;
and the organization, structure and administration of these
programs.
It concluded that:
Among the activities most crucial for the success of family planning programmes are those aimed directly at motivating individuals to regulate fertility. The effectiveness of these communication schemes depends upon the extent to which administrators
are able to adjust their information program to conditions of
literacy, the educational level of the population, the status of
women and other related factors. Apart from consistent recognition of the need to make some adjustments to distinctively
local conditions, there have not as yet been developed any guidelines or general principles in this field. If satisfactory standards
could be developed, their application would reduce the amount
1970 Report on the World Social Situation144 Id. at 4.
145 Id. at 10.
14:

Addendum IX, at 8.
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of trial and error experienced in national programmes of communication for motivation in family planning and the attendant
loss of time and waste of resources, while at the same time
allowing for adjustments required in view of certain national
and cultural characteristics. Advancements of this order would
greatly enhance the quality and efficiency of family planning
146
programmes.

Finally, just to mention one regional governmental effort,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) has since 1968 set up a Population Unit within its
Development Center. The purpose of the Unit is to
promote awareness, among donor and recipient countries, of the
importance of the population factor in economic development
and to disseminate information on latest developments, foster
coordination among aid programs, and enhance the dialogue
between developed and developing countries in aid problems in
147
the population field.

4. Changing National Policies on Family
Planning and Bilateral Assistance
Until recently, nation states were hesitant in undertaking
foreign assistance programs in family planning. Their hesitation
may have stemmed in part from the lack of a defined internal
policy to slow down their own population growth. Also, these
donor states might have been afraid of possible adverse reactions in the recipient countries caused by the offer of assistance for controlling populations in developing countries, for
such assistance could perhaps be construed as a neo-imperialist
racial design to curb non-white population growth. To illustrate,
until 1965 the United States was not actively pursuing an official population policy either at home or abroad. President
Eisenhower stated in 1959 that population was not considered
a fit subject for "political or governmental activity or function
or responsibility.' ' 4 However, since the mid-sixties, a major
shift has occurred in U.S. policy, and family planning services
are now provided both within the country and abroad. Various
presidential statements, messages and reports to Congress146 Id. at 12
147 Reported in A.I.D., BUREAU FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, OFFICE OF POPULATION, POPULATION PROGRAM ASSISTANCE 46 (October 1970). [Hereinafter cited as POPULATION PROGRAM ASSISTANCE REPORT].
148 N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1959, at 18, cited in GARDNER supra note 49, at 34647; P. APPLEMAN, THE SILENT ExPLOSION 112 (1965). Later, President
Eisenhower changed his mind. See R. THOMLINSON, DEMOGRAPHIC
CONTROVERSY OVER POP'ULATION CONTROL 110-11 (1967).
However, President Eisenhower's statement of 1965 was not necessarily
reflective of national opinion, for as early as 1960, a survey showed
that 81 percent of white and 76 percent of non-white couples had used
PROBLEMS:

or expected to use contraception. For this report see P.
& J. PATTERSON, FERTILITY
Uxrrw STATES 353-54 (1966).
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both by Presidents Johnson"" and Nixon' 5" have stressed the
need for such a shift. And as the following discussion shows,
legislature measures have accompanied the executive initiatives.
In 1968, President Johnson appointed a Committee on Population and Family Planning to "make a careful review of Federal policies and programs in relation to world-wide and domestic needs in the area of population and family planning." 15 1 In
its report,' 5 2 the Committee proposed specific action by the Federal Government to "rapidly expand family planning programs
[domestically] to make information and services available by
1973 on a voluntary basis to all American women who want
but cannot afford them. 1 5 3 On the international front, it recommended that the United States "continue to expand its programs
of international assistance in population and family planning as
rapidly as funds can be properly allocated by the U.S. and effectively utilized by recipient countries and agencies."' 54 It also
recommended that by act of Congress, the Center for Population
Research be expanded into a National Institute for Population
Research, 5 and that the Federal Government provide "basic
support for population studies centers.' 1 5 6 It also proposed that
149 See, e.g., President Johnson, message of March 4, 1968, contained in 4
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTs 423, 427 (1968).
[hereinafter cited as Presi-

dential Documents]. On Jan. 7, 1969, the President remarked:
...But aside from peace, no problem is more important than
the problem of rising population.
Indeed, even peace itself, I don't think, will ever come
to us unless this problem of population control is solved. Looking back to where we were just a few years ago, I am very
happy to observe this afternoon that I believe this Nation has
made some real progress forward.
In 1964, my first year in the Presidency, our budget contained an investment of $6 million from the Federal Government in population ano family planning activities. In fiscal
1969, that figure will rise to about $115 million.
During this same period, private organizations and groups
concerned with population and family planning have themselves more than doubled their own expenditures. Most important, I think that all of you will agree that there is today a
very new and growing awareness of both the magnitude, as
well as the danger of this problem that concerns us all.
What I am especially proud of this afternoon is that it is
now possible for your Presdent to speak frankly to the people
about this matter....
Id. No. 2, Jan. 13, 1969, at 331; see also 5 id. No. 3, Jan. 20, 1969, at 127.
150 See, e.g., 5 id. No. 29, July 21, 1969, at 1000-1008; 5 id. No. 38, Sept. 22,
1969, at 1275, 1281; 5 id. No. 41, Oct. 13, 1969, at 1395, 1401; 7 id. No. 9,
March 1, 1971, at 305, 371.
151 Statement of July 16, 1969. See 4 id. No. 29, July 22, 1968, at 111-3.
1'-
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153 Id. at 9-10.
154 Id. at 10.
155 Id. at 11.
156 Id. at 12.
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"Congress authorize and the President appoint a Commission
' 57
on Population.'
The following year President Nixon proposed in his message
to the Congress that a Commission on Population Growth and
the American Future be established 58 to study the economic,
social and political ramifications of population expansion. In his
message, the President also proposed a national goal of providing "adequate family planning services within the next five
years to all [American women] who want them but cannot
afford them."' 59 On international cooperation, he said: "It is
our belief that the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and
other international bodies should take the leadership in responding to world population growth. The United States will cooperate fully with their programs."'I
Congress responded to President Nixon's suggestion by
establishing in March 1970, through enactment of Pub. L. No.
91-213,10 the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future. After two years of research and deliberations, the 24member panel, headed by John D. Rockefeller III, submitted a
three-part report to President Nixon and the Congress. " 2 In part
one, the report 0 3 focused on the national impact of population growth and distribution upon government services,' 6 social
aspects,165 the economy, G the environment and natural resources. " The Commission noted the desirability "for a slower
rate of growth"'0 ,8 and concluded that "continued population
growth - beyond that to which we are already committed by
the legacy of the baby boom- is definitely not in the interest
of promoting the quality of life in the nation."' 1 9 In part two of
157 Id.
158 5 Presidential Documents 1000, 1004 (1969).
15. Id. at 1007.
1G0 Id. at 1001.
11 42 U.C.S.
4331 (1970).

1t;2 The report was released in March, 1972 (the first part on March 11, the
second part on March 16 and the third part on March 25). For the
official text of the report see REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON POPULATION
GROWTH

AND

THE

AMERICAN

FUTURE,

POPULATION AND

THE

AMERICAN

(1972) [hereinafter cited as POPULATION AND THE AMERICAN
FUTURE]. For a summary report on the Commission's recommendations
see Population: The Future is Now, 28 POPULATION BULLETIN, No. 2,
April 1972; 4 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, No. 2, April 1972, at 10.
1;:3
First eight chapters of the report, comprising pages 1-78 of POPULATION
AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, were released as part one.
1';4
Id. at 54-61.
3G- Id. at 62-74.
16;Id. at 38-41.
1 7 Id. at 42-53.
1K"Id. at 76.
1f;!) Id.
FUTURE

1973

DEVELOPING GLOBAL ACTION ON POPULATION

31

the report'7" the Commission specifically recommended "enactment of a Population Education Act to assist school systems in
71
establishing well-planned population education programs," 1
liberalization of restrictive abortion statutes,' 72 and availability
of expanded family planning services for all Americans.' 73 Part
three of the report 74 contained recommendations on immigra-

tion,' 7 5 internal migration

7

and research on population.1 77 The
overall conclusion of the Report is that the United States should
178
plan for a stabilized population.
Meanwhile, on December 24, 1970 Congress enacted the
Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970179
which established an Office of Population Affairs in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.18 0 A Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Population Affairs is to direct the office."" The Act
is to "assist in making comprehensive voluntary family planning
services readily available to' all persons desiring such services
[and] to coordinate domestic population and family planning
research with the present and future needs of family planning
programs."' 8 2 The Office of Population Affairs is to constitute
the main agency within the Federal system on all matters
concerned with family planning, population services and re183
search,'
and is to act as "a clearinghouse for information pertaining to domestic and international population research and
family planning programs for use by all interested persons and
' 18 4
public and private entities.
Congressional hearings8 5 leading to the passage of Pub. L.
170 Chapters nine to eleven of the report, id. at 79-109, were released as
part two.
171 Id. at 80.
172 Id. at 104.
173 Id. at 108-109.
174 Chapters twelve to sixteen of the report, id.at 110-40.
175 Id. at 114-17.
176 Id. at 118-28.

77
Id. at 129-35.
1 .id. at 110. For compilation of the Commission's recommendations see
id.at 141-47.
179 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1970).
180 Id. § 3.

1
7

381 Id.
_82

Id. §2(1) and (2).

J18Id. § 4.
84

3

Id. § 4(3).
F, These hearings were held on S.2108, S.3219, H.R.15159 and H.R.19318.
Earlier hearings were held by the House Committee on Conservation
and National Resources of the House Government Operations Committee. For a representative sampling see Hearings on S.2108 and S.3219
Before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., (1970); H.R. Rep. No.
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No. 91-572 indicate the nature and amount of national concern
on the subject of population. Recent judicial decisions have
also recognized the right of the individual to have access to
information on family planning. 186
Official national policies on family planning have undergone a remarkable change during the last decade. At present,
concern with the rate of population growth is being shared
equally by several developing and developed countries; family
planning has acquired respectability. For instance, at mid-1969
about 30 developing countries were officially supporting family
planning programs. 167 In addition, seven states were supporting
privately organized and sponsored programs though they had
not proclaimed any official policy, while in twelve more states,
privately sponsored programs were being carried out without
either government support or opposition.18 1 It is reported in a
recent U.N. report that "over the next five years some twentyfive Governments may decide to embark freshly on such programmes."' 8 9 It may be noted that the combined populations
of the countries with national family planning programs (including mainland China) 190 comprises more than 70 percent of
the total for developing countries.'"' Several states including
the United States, Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Norway, Japan, West Germany and Canada are
192
providing assistance in national family planning programs.
5.

Activities of Nongovernmental Organizations
Several nongovernmental organizations are also active in
the population field. Their activities range from conducting
demographic research and studies to providing assistance in
national family planning efforts. The following are notable
among such organizations: the International Planned Parenthood
91-1472, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970); H.R. Rep. No. 91-1667, 91st Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1970); H.R. Rep. No. 91-1082, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1969).
180 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 471 (1964); Baird v. Eisenstatt, 310.
F. Supp. 951 (1970). See also Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Doe v.
Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973); Able v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (1972).
'S7 The pertinent figures used here are taken from 1970 Report on the World
Social Situation- Add. IX, at 6-7. Another recent study is Reports on
Population/Family Planning, Government Policy Statements on Population: An Inventory (1970).
18 1970 Report on World Social Situaticn- Addendum IX, at 6-7.
189 Report of a United Nations/UNESCO/WHO Mission, The Feasibility of
Establishing a World Population Institute, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SER.R12,
at 38 (1971).
1 )0For a recent report see TIlE VICTOR BOSTRUM FUND & THE POPULATION
CRISIS COMMITTEE,

POPULATION AND FAMILY

PLANNING

IN THE PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1971).

1970 Report on World Social Situation - Addendum
192 POPULATION PROGRAM ASSISTANCE REPORT, supra note
P'

IX, at 6.
147, at 15-36, 48-50.
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Federation (IPPF), the Population Council, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, Population Reference Bureau,
Population Crisis Committee, the Pathfinder Fund, Care, Oxfam
(Great Britain), Oxfam of Canada and Milbank Memorial
193
Fund.
Likely Opposition to International Action on Population
The earlier discussion in the paper shows that both national
and international concern with population is of such recent
origin that it is only in the last decade or so that some states
have translated this concern into the formulation of national
population policies."94 Also there has been a distinct movement
toward the expression of this concern in international declarations and some action by various international, regional and
national governmental and non-governmental organizations. 195
But the fact remains that the concept of state sovereignty and
political and ideological considerations are likely to affect, influence, and perhaps even direct proposed international action,
especially if the proposed action might at some stage even
smack of mandatory controls to effectuate national compliance
with proposed international policy and action programs. For
instance, it will be fruitless to discuss the subject of international policy and plan of action without eventually facing
the question of state sovereignty, for it could be argued that a
state's formulation of its population policy falls within the scope
of the domestic jurisdiction clause of the United Nations Charter (Article 2(7))' 9" which prohibits intervention in the internal affairs of a member state. Similarly, opposition to international policy and planning on ideological and political
grounds might render proposed international programs ineffective. A brief discussion of these two issues follows here.
B.

The U.N. proposals, recommendations and actions on
population show a keen awareness of national sensitivity to
this question. To illustrate, resolutions on population adopted in
the recent past by the General Assembly, ECOSOC and the
Population Commission have not departed from the tone of the
first major resolution on the subject, Resolution 2211 of De393

Id., at 38-44.

194 For discussion see id., at § III (A)

(4).
at § III(A) (1,2,3,5).
reads: "Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essenitally within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

1115For discussion see id.,
196 Article 2, paragraph 7
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cember 17, 1966,1117 in which the Assembly "recognized the
sovereignty of nations in formulating and promoting their own
population policies." Member states are usually urged to take
action if they are "interested"' 8 or if they consider it "appropriate and in accordance with the special needs of each country""'' to act; to make such efforts in the field of population
as may be considered "consistent with their respective needs"; 2"
to ensure "in accordance with their national population policies and needs," that information and education about family
planning, and the means to practice family planning effectively
are made available to all individuals;2 ' to provide assistance in
the population field to other states "upon request"; 2 2 and to
cooperate "in achieving a substantial reduction of the rate of
population growth in those countries which consider that their
present rate of growth is too high and in exploring the possibility for the setting of targets for such a reduction in those
countries. ' 20 3 Even the U.N. agencies and the Secretary-General4
20
are asked to act in response to requests from member states.
However, the principles also state that the size of the family
should be the free choice of each individual family. 20 5 Also, the
need for improved demographic statistics, technical cooperation
and further research on various issues related to population
are accepted as necessary and valid subjects of concern for the
U.N. system,20 6 causing no infringement upon national sovereignty. 20 7 Similarly, in broad terms, reference is being made
in various recent resolutions to the close relationship between
population growth and economic and social development and to
the need for formulating national population policies and programs. Finally, in connection with the proposed activities for
1o7 Supra note 67.
198 See, e.g., ECOSOC Res. 1672 B (LII), 52 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 7,
U.N. Doc. E/5183 (1972).
199 See, e.g., ECOSOC Res. 1483 (XLVIII), 48 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 2,
U.N. Doc. E/4832 (1970).
200 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2683, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 55 (1971).
201 See, e.g., ECOSOC Res. 1672 A (LII), 52 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 7,
U.N. Doc. E/5183 (1972).
202

Id.

203 Id.

204 See, e.g., ECOSOC Res. 1672 D (LII), 52 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 8,
U.N. Doc. F/5183 (1972).
205 This principle was first referred to in G.A. Res. 2211, supra note 67.
206 See, e.g., Population Commission, Report of the 16th Session, 52 U.N.
ECOSOC, Supp. 3, at 7-12, U.N. Doc. E/5090 (1972); World Population
Year, 1974-Progress Repwr t of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
E/CN9/266, at 9-16 (1972).
207 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2626, supra note 81; ECOSOC Res. 1484 (LXVIII),
48 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/4832 (1970); ECOSOC Res.
1672 (LII), 52 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 7, U.N. Doc. E/5183 (1972).
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the 1974 World Population Conference and the 1974 World Population Year, the United Nations is discussing a global popula208
tion strategy and a world population plan of action.
Notwithstanding the United Nations concern with national
sovereignty, it could be argued that every state is required to
make family planning information and services available to
all individuals, for it is a basic human right to have access
to such information and services. 20 9 This right has been reiter210
the 1968
ated in the 1967 Declaration of the Heads of States,
211
and subsequent U.N.
Theran Conference on Human Rights,
resolutions. 21- However, if voluntary measures are available
but are ineffective in handling the problem and the state concerned is unwilling to take stronger measures to moderate
fertility, it is submitted that the question can no longer be
considered to fall within the reserved domain of a nation state
under Article 2(7). There are substantial reasons why the population problem must not be considered to be under the umbrella
of Article 2(7). The subject of population is now a matter of
international concern, because of the expectations created by
several occurrences over the past decade.
A substantial majority of the United Nations members has
either gone on record at U.N. deliberations and those of U.N.
specialized agencies and regional economic commissions in favor
of concerted international, regional and national action to
lower fertility rates, or has undertaken unilateral or bilateral means to do so. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and
former Secretary-General U Thant have repeatedly expressed
concern over the international nature of the problems arising
out of rapid population growth. To illustrate, U Thant stated
in 1970: "World attention has now been focused on the realities
of the demographic situation and it remains for the United
Nations, the specialized agencies and other international bodies
Similarly, Kurt Waldheim
to exert the leadership required. 213
said on September 20, 1972:
"It is my hope that the World Population Year and Conference will rank in the history of the United Nations among
the great events of the seventies and that they will bring us appreciably closer to the day when the world can say that the
208 See, e.g., ECOSOC Res. 1672 B (LII), s-upra note 198.
209 See supra notes 204, 205 and the accompanying text.
21 0
See supra notes 70-72 and the accompanying text.
,11 Supra note 7-3.

21 2

See supra notes 78, 85, 201 and the accompanying text.
"I: Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16
June 1969-15 June 1970, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 124, U.N. Doc.
A/8001 (1970).
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demographic problems facing us are understood, and actions to
solve them are under way.
Population, development and environment make up an important element in the construction of a new economic and social
order which, along with the maintenance of peace, constitutes
the principal challenge of our generation. The United Nations is
again taking the leadership .... 1214

Appeals for population control have been made by the
executive authorities of the FAO, the World Bank, and the
UNICEF, and various U.N. organs and bodies have undertaken
programs to assist national family planning efforts.
Pressures of population in a state or region are likely to
lead to political instability, social unrest, and internal disorders
which might endanger international peace and security either
by involving or affecting neighboring states, or by involving
outside powers especially major powers, in internal conflict.
Pressures of population are likely to encroach upon the right
of the individual by restricting his freedom by the likely imposition of stricter regulations, and by impeding the attainment
of the quality of life as enunciated in the U.N. Human Rights
Program, especially in the International Covenant on Economic,
215
Social and Cultural Rights.
It is evident from the past experience that Article 2 (7) is
to be interpreted in a contextual setting. For example, its interpretation at the United Nations has varied over time on the
issues of human rights, especially apartheid and colonialism.
While in the early discussions at the United Nations on these
questions there was a strong support among the membership
to deny the organization a right to intervene, thus treating
the matter as one of domestic jurisdiction, a marked shift
seems to have occurred, especially during the 1970s. Hence,
these human rights issues are no longer considered to fall within
the ambit of Article 2(7), and have been transformed into
matters of international concern.
Ideological and Religious Opposition
The suggestion of treating the population problem as one
of "international concern" may well face the opposition of some
member states for ideological or religious reasons. The Soviet
Union and other Communist states' dismiss the Western-sponsored population programs as tools of "neo-imperalism." The
Catholic Church opposes artificial birth control measures.
C.

2 4

1 POPULATION NEWSLETTER, No. 16/17, Summer 1972, at 41.

215

For the text of the covenant see 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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It should, however, be noted that the Communist states
seem to be no longer vehemently opposed to population control.2 1 6 Also, while many Third World states were intially
suspicious of the motives of the population programs, they are
increasingly subscribing to the need for some coordinated action.217 And finally, though the church's stand on birth control
remains dogmatic, the trend among Catholics is toward non-conformity. In a recent study, Professor Westoff of Princeton and
Professor Ryder of the University of Wisconsin indicate such
a trend in the United States, 218 a trend which has apparently
not been arrested by the Papal Encyclical of July 1968, which
continued condemnation of artificial birth control. And it seems
that this trend is not confined only to the United States.2 19
Hopefully, the changing attitudes of Catholic laity will soon be
22 0
matched by changes in the traditional Roman stand.
IV.

APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATION

The preceding discussion shows the enormity of the challenge posed by the rising rate of population growth. It also
shows the dramatic change in attitude internationally during
the last decade, bestowing respectability on family planning
programs and offering prospects that the recent heightened
awareness evidenced at the United Nations, as well as regionally
and nationally, on the ecological orientation of all human activities 22 ' will be translated into action programs and that the
216 For various statements excerpted from the Soviet Press on different

aspects of the population problem see U.S.S.R.: Views on Population/
Family Planning,49 STuDiEs IN FAMILY PLANNING (Jan. 1970). See also
Brackett. The Evolution of Marxist Theories of Population: Marxism
Recognizes the Population Problem, 5 DEmoGRAPHY, No. 1, at 158-173
(1968).
217
Axiy number of the recent reports of the U.N. economic commissions
for Asia, Africa, and Latin America show this concern.
21sWestoff and Ryder, United States: The Papal Encyclical [Humanae
Vitae] and Catholic Practice and Attitudes, 1969, 50 STuDIES IN FAMILY

at 1-7 (1970). Two more recent studies have arrived at a similar conclusion: Fiske, Most U.S. Priests Found to Oppose Birth Curb Ban,
N.Y. Times, April 15, 1971, at 1, col. 2 (city ed).
219 For the international reaction to the Papal Encyclical see 50 STuDIES IN
PLANNING,

FAMILY PLANNING

220

8-12 (1970).

But see N.Y. Times, April 11, 1971 § 1, at 21, col. 1.
221 The 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm
is an illustration of this growing concern. See also Activities and Programmes of United Nations Bodies Relevant to the Human Environment - Annex IV, U.N. General Assembly, Preparatory Committee for
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 2nd Sess.,
Geneva, 8-19 Feb. 1971, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.48/PC.8/Add. 1 (1970).
Similar concern is being expressed nationally as well. For a representative sampling of the recent writing in the United States see
AMERICA'S CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, (R. REVELLE & H. LANDSBERG eds.
1970); A. ADAMS, ELEVENTHi HoUR -A
HmAD LOOK AT CONSERVATION
(1970), and the sources cited in note 26 supra.
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222
population will be treated in a broader socio-economic context.

It seems necessary and desirable that the United Nations
continue to assume leadership, 223 giving top priority 224 to (1)
improving demographic statistics; (2) further studying relationships between population change and economic and social
development; population, resources and environment; and
population, family and family well-being;22 5 (3) providing
information to governments, nongovernmental organizations and
the people on the nature and dimension of the demographic
problem as evidenced by recent population trends and future
prospects with a view to sharpening awareness of the problem; (4) strengthening international assistance for national
policy-formulation on population; (5) improving birth planning
techniques; (6) encouraging and promoting family planning
and population education and making family planning services
available to all, and studying legal provisions on abortion and
voluntary sterilization; (7) supporting and strengthening further
research on matters related to fertility control,226 especially
studying the effectiveness of various means of reducing fertility,
including the use of economic incentives and social-psychological support for smaller families, encouraging later marriages, and as a last resort, even coercive measures; and (8)
appraising the effectiveness of the existing international and
national institutions and norms dealing with population and
related issues, including the appraisal of the machinery for
providing technical assistance.
It is realized that even if the population issues were to
be treated as one of "international concern," prior U.N. experience on other issues so treated warns that this characterization
in itself would not solve the problem. South Africa, for example, has flouted all U.N. resolutions on apartheid, and sancI am grateful to Professor Myres McDougal for stressing the importance
of treating the population problem in a contextual setting, in his comment on my presentation at an Association of American Law Schools
panel session in Chicago on Dec. 29, 1970.
223The 1974 World Population Year and World Population Conference
and the increasing range of population activities at the United Nations
indicate that the United Nations will continue to assume leadership.
See, e.g., supra § III A(l,2,3).
224 For elaborate discussion of various suggestions and recommendations
see generally, Report of the Advisory Committee on the ApplicatiGn of
Science and Technology to Development, U.N. Doc. E/5107, at 6-35
(1972) Ihereinafter cited as The Advisory Committee Report]; 52 U.N.
ECOSOC, Supp. 3, at 27-40, U.N. Doc. E/5090 (1972).
225 The Population Commission has at its special session in August 1972,
recommended the study of these relationships as provisional agenda
items for the 1974 World Population Conference. 53 U.N. ECOSOC,
Supp. 12, at 6, U.N. Doe. E/5212 (1972).
See supra notes 137-42 and the accompanying text.
222
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tions against South Africa and Rhodesia have not been effective. However, the lack of effective sanctioning process in the
past should not deter essential preliminary action: to enhance the awareness on a world-wide basis; to treat population as a problem of international concern; to prescribe a
global population policy, and to encourage development of national policies and programs.
Although the U.N. system offers the best prospect for dealing with the global issues of population, the U.N. machinery
should be strengthened and the United Nations and its specialized agencies should expand their activities and capability in
their respective spheres to relate them to population and family
planning. The need is obvious for adequate funding and the
pooling of all available international resources in the population field. In fact, several suggestions are at present being
considered at the United Nations to improve its existing machinery in order to effectively deal with various aspects of the
problem. 227 The following institutional changes are offered to
effectuate further improvement in and strengthening of the
existing machinery:
1. The establishment of a global population agency, headed
by a U.N. High Commissioner on population.
2. The proposed population agency should be closely related to the newly established U.N. environmental
agency.
3. The proposed agency should coordinate all current U.N.
efforts of demographic and family planning research
and assistance, with primary emphasis on:
a. initiating and promoting practical research on population, especially focusing on the need of the developing countries and coordinating its activities
with the U.N. development efforts and other efforts
in dealing with environmental problems;
b. providing training to personnel within the U.N.
system and personnel selected from those engaged
in national population programs on various aspects
related to the population field, such as health, development of human resources, and urban and rural
development planning;
c. acting as an advisor to the various U.N. regional
and national agencies in formulating population
policies, programs, projects and strategies; and
27

See also The Advisory Committee Report, at 36-48.
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d.

4.

5.

6.

acting as a clearing house for all U.N. related population activities.
The proposed agency should establish a set of priorities
in research and action programs and should benefit
from the prior work of the Population Commission in
this regard.
The population agency should organize periodic world
population conferences on the pattern of the two earlier
world conferences and the forthcoming 1974 conference,
and should encourage the holding of regional conferences 22 8 to formulate a world population policy and
regional policies in conformance therewith.
Regional and national population agencies should be
established to effectuate the global population strategy.

A U.N. World Population Institute should be established.
The institutional measures recommended here would need to
be supplemented by effective sanctioning procedures in order
to deal with problematic situations. For instance, a state or
a number of states might refuse to become a part of this global
venture. Or, population growth in a state or a number of states
in one or more regions might continue on its upward spiral
despite the encouragement and active assistance of global and
regional institutions. In such situations, the High Commissioner
should be required to bring the matter to the attention of the
U.N. General Assembly, the specialized agencies, and the regional and national entities established to deal with the problem.
7.

Among other measures which could be taken to effectuate
the compliance of a recalcitrant state, the World Bank, WHO,
and donor countries could use their aid programs as a leverage
to bring about changes in recipients' population policies. Initially, recipients' attention should be directed to the danger
of population growth and to the need for identifying national
population goals in the context of national economic and social
development goals, of course with the offer of appropriate
assistance to the existing national programs and for the development of new programs to slow down the rate of growth.
But the question is whether coercion should be involved to the
228

It is gratifying that the 23-nation Second Asian Population Conference
held in Tokyo from Nov. 1-13, 1972, adopted the Declaration of Population Strategy for Development, recommending efforts "to raise living
standards, to widen the benefits of economic and socia! change, and to
head off environmental threats through integrated national planning
and coordination," and urging governments to consider establishing
goals and programs "to control effectively the growth of population
conditions and policies." 9 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, No. 11, Dec. 1972,

at 105.
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extent of refusing aid. Initially, "encouragement" is the proper
step, accompanied by widespread dissemination of information, but other means might have to be resorted to if active
persuasion did not succeed. It might even become necessary to
recognize that parenthood is no longer a right but a privilege,
and henceforth the traditional unrestricted freedom to procreate
will have to be curbed by involuntary methods if voluntary
means do not succeed.
The discussion of compulsory measures presupposes that
the adoption of such measures nationally and internationally
will be the last resort, preceded by every effort to encourage
voluntary measures and to make them effective. However, if
such compulsory measures are to be resorted to, the basic policy
issue is the delicate balancing of individual freedom versus
societal need. And, within each state, it will be the lawyer's
task to work on setting stdndards and criteria which are resonable and justifiable to the public. Lawyers' skills will be
needed to devise a machinery which will hopefully minimize
administrative intricacies, provide a system of appropriate checks
and balances, and institute the judicial and extra-judicial
procedures necessary to protect the interests of the individual.
Social satirists such as George Orwell and Aldous Huxley,
have given us ample warnings about the possible misuse and
abuse of power by a totalitarian regime.
Ideally, the entire global ecosystem should be managed
as a unit. The formulation of a global population policy and plan
of action are necessary first steps to reach that ideal and indeed
appear essential to our quest for survival.
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TABLE 1. Estimates of past and future population of the world

during 1750-2000 (in millions)

["Medium Variant"

a

is used to arrive at these estimates].

Year

World
Total

More
Percentage
of the
Developed
Regionsb
Total

Less
Percentage
of the
Developed
Total
Regionsb

25.7
590
74.3
1750
791
201
74.4
248
25.6
730
1800
978
72.3
27.7
915
347
1850
1,262
65.3
573
34.7
1,077
1900
1,650
64.0
36.0
1,185
675
1920
1,860
1930
2,070
759
36.7
1,311
63.3
1940
2,295
821
35.8
1,474
64.2
1950
2,517
858
34.1
1,659
65.9
1960
3,005
977
32.5
2,028
67.5
1963
3.176
1,015
32.0
2,161
68.0
1969
3,552/3,561c
1,080
30.4
2,472
69.6
1975
4,022
1,147
28.5
2,875
71.5
1980
4,457
1,210
27.1
3,247
72.9
1985
4,934
1:275
25.8
3,659
74.2
2000
6,130
1,442
23.7
4,688
76.3
a The table is compiled from the following sources:
(1) 1969 Demographic Yearbook, supra note 1, at 115.
(2) 1969 World Population Situation, supra note 3, at 10, 44, 117.
bThe distinction between the "more developed" and "less developed" regions is based on current economic, social and demographic criteria.
Presently, "more developed" regions comprise of Europe, the Soviet
Union, the United States and Canada, Japan, Temperate South America
and Australia and New Zealand, while the rest of the world is combined
in the "less developed region."
The estimate of 3,561 million is based on Annual Data: Midyear Estimates contained in the United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
Nov. 1972 at viii.

TABLE 2. Average annual crude birth, death rates, and rates
of national increase (per. 1,000 population per year),
as projected by regions, 1965-1985.
Crude birth rate
1965- 1970- 1975- 198070
75
80
85
World total
33.8
More developed
regions
18.6
Less developed
regions
40.6
East Asia
31.5
South Asia
44.3
Europe
18.0
USSR
17.9
Africa
46.7
Northern
America
19.3
Latin America 38.5
Oceania
24.5
Source:

Crude death rate
1965- 1970- 1975- 198070
75
80
85

33.2

32.1

30.8

14.0

12.7

11.6

10.5

18.9

19.5

19.5

9.1

9.2

9.3

9.4

39.0
29.1
42.8
17.9
18.4
46.5

37.0
27.0
40.0
17.9
19.8
46.0

34.9
25.1
36.9
17.9
20.4
45.1

16.1
14.0
16.8
10.2
7.7
21.2

14.2
12.4
14.7
10.3
8.0
19.1

12.5
11.0
12.7
10.4
8.3
17.2

10.9
10.0
10.9
10.6
8.7
15.3

20.4
37.5
25.6

21.7
36.6
25.9

22.1
35.5
26.3

9.4
10.1
10.0

9.4
8.7
9.3

9.4
7.9
8.9

9.2
7.1
8.5

1969 World Population Situation, supra note 3, at 121.
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TABLE 3. Estimated and projected annual crude birth rates,
death rates, and rates of national increase for "more
developed" and "less developed" regions for selected
periods.

Period
1960-1967a
Decadesb
1900-1910
1910-1920
1920-1930
1930-1940
1940-1950
1950-1960
1960-1970
1970-1980
1980-1990
1990-2000

More-developed regions
Crude Crude Rate of
birth death natural
rate
rate increase

Less-developed
Crude Crude
birth
death
rate
rate

regions
Rate of
natural
increase

20

9

11

41

18

23

34
26
28
22
20
23
19
19
19
18

21
23
16
14
15
10
9
9
9
9

13
3
12
8
5
13
10
10
10
9

41
40
41
41
40
41
40
37
33
29

34
37
31
29
28
21
18
15
12
10

7
3
10
12
12
20
22
22
21
19

a Demograpic Yearbook, 1967 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E/F.68.

XIII.I.).
Populatin Prospects as Assessed in 1963. The long-range population projections begining 1965 are being revised.
Source: 1970 World PopulationSituation,at 4.

b World
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THE LAW OF THE HIGH SEAS IN
TIME OF PEACE'
MYREs S. McDouGAL**

Tremendous technological changes in recent decades are
permitting multiple new uses, both constructive and destructive, of the oceans. Different peoples about the world are making increasing demands upon the oceans for the enjoyment of
both old and new uses. Unhappily, many of these demands
are not being made in terms of a common interest, designed to
secure the utmost productive use of a great sharable res6urce
through practices of reciprocity and mutual tolerance, but
rather in terms of special interest, for unilateral monopolization of the resource and the destruction of shared competence
and enjoyment. It is but one of the paradoxes of our time
that the most extravagant claims to monopolistic control over
the oceans are being put forward in the guise of preserving
"the common heritage of mankind."
Some ten years ago Professor William T. Burke and I
wrote The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary
International Law of the Sea in which we sought to examine
and appraise the historic record of the international law of the
sea. We concluded, after a survey of the record, that this law,
with a minimum of centralized organization and an economic
body of none too complex rules, had served, and continues to
serve, mankind well, allowing an inestimably greater production and wider distribution of shared values than might have
been, or might be, achieved by monopolistic control.
Today, in the face of a widespread disintegration of perceived common interests, we may be confronted with the imminent dissolution of the principles and institutions which, in
recent years at least, have served mankind so well.
To develop this theme of contemporary disintegration, I
propose to proceed under the following four main headings:
I. The Specification of the Unique Problems of the
High Seas
II. The Clarification of Basic General Community
Policies
*Adapted from a lecture delivered at the United States Naval War
College, Newport, R.I.
** Professor Myres S. McDougal received his A.B., A.M., and LL.B. from
the University of Mississippi; his B.A. and B.C.L. from the University
of Oxford; and his J.S.D. from Yale University. He is presently Sterling
Professor of Law at Yale University Law School.
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III. Trends in Past Decisions with Respect to the Different Types of Problems
IV. Possible Alternatives with Respect to Emerging and
Future Problems.
I. THE

SPECIFICATIONS OF THE UNIQUE PROBLEMS OF THE HIGH SEAS

International law is the comprehensive process of authoritative decisions, transcending all territorial boundaries, by
which the peoples of the world clarify and implement their
common interests. When we look at any community, that is,
any group of people exhibiting interdeterminations and interdependences, we can observe a process of effective power.
Decisions are taken and enforced whether particular people
like it or not. Such a process is observable on a global scale.
Even the Russians, the Communist Chinese and ourselves are
scorpions in the same bottle and must take each other's decisions into account.
There are two different kinds of effective power decisions.
Some are taken by naked power, by sheer calculations of expediency in self-interests; others are taken in accordance with
general community expectations, in arenas of constituted
authority, such as courts, legislatures and executive departments. They are enforced in sufficient degree to be of community consequence; they have adequate sanctions in common
interest, reciprocity and retaliation.
These decisions, taken and enforced in accordance with
general community expectations, become, when projected on a
transnational scale, international law. International law is
much more than, as sometimes described in books, a body of
abstract rules. The rules merely describe, and often most inadequately, past decisions. International law is a living, contemporaneous process of choice, which includes both the perspectives of community members about such choices and the
operations or authoritative practices by which such choices are
put into controlling effect.
Authoritative decisions in the global community are, again
composed of two types. "Constitutional" or, preferably, constitutive decisions determine who the authorized decisionmakers are; what policies they are to follow; in what structures of
authority they are to act; what their bases of power for sanctioning purposes are to be; and what procedures they are to
follow in making all the different kinds of decisions necessary
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to clarify and implement general community policy. In the
global community, as in most communities (even those with
written constitutional documents), this constitutive process is
largely a product of the expectations people create in each
other by their continuous cooperative behavior.
The second kind of decisions, "public order" decisions, are
those that emerge from constitutive process for regulation of
a community's various value processes. These are the decisions
by which resources are allocated, planned, developed, and exploited; an environment is protected or devastated; populations are protected, regulated and controlled; an economy is
maintained or destroyed; health is fostered or neglected;
human rights are protected or denied; enlightenment is encouraged or restrained.
What is meant by "the law of the sea" may now be made
clear. The law of the sea comprises the "public order" decisions which a global constitutive process, established and maintained by all states, including the landlocked, prescribes and
applies for clarifying and securing the common interests of all
peoples in the enjoyment of the oceans. In comparable terms,
one might speak of the law of outer space, the law of international rivers, or the law of the polar regions.
What makes the law of the sea unique is the difference in
the degree to which the oceans and land masses of the world
admit of shared, non-competitive enjoyment in the production
and distribution of values. The oceans admit of shared enjoyment in high degree. Most of the resources of the oceans are
non-consumable, non-exhaustible, or renewable; by appropriate
rules their enjoyment can be made non-competitive, while remaining economic. Where one ship has just been, another can
soon come. When the initiative, energies, capital and skills of
all peoples can be brought to bear upon the enjoyment of such
a resource, the production and distribution of values can, in a
"multiplier" effect, be enormously enhanced for the benefit
of all.
The land masses of the earth do not admit of shared enjoyment in the same degree. Their relative solidity facilitates
the establishment of permanent, sedentary communities. Natural barriers such as mountains, streams, bodies of water and
deserts inhibit freedom of movement. Hence, the global constitutive process has honored the exclusive appropriation
through the organization of territorial communities, of most
land masses.
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The different territorial communities do, of course, require
some control of immediate intimate ocean areas for their own
protection and enjoyment. It is for this reason that the global
constitutive process honors their claims in relation to internal
waters, the territorial sea, contiguous zones and occasional unilateral exercises of self-defense, even upon the high seas. Such
claims are rooted in different exclusive interests. No two
states have precisely the same coastlines or precisely the same
requirements in internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous
zones, or self-defense. They are, however, common interests
in the sense that every coastal state has an interest in the
effective protection of the activities on its land mass from
activities on the oceans. The claims become expressive of special interest, and thus require rejection, only when they expand
beyond need and disregard their impact upon others.
This complementary, inclusive interest of all peoples in the
shared enjoyment of the oceans, which is commonly subsumed
under the label "freedom of the seas" for summary contrast
with the exclusive coastal state interests, is of special concern
in this discussion. It is asserted that, because of changed conditions in the exploitation of the oceans and because of the
more general desperate economic needs of the developing countries, "freedom of the seas" has become outmoded, and it is
necessary to curtail the protection the world constitutive process affords inclusive interests.

II. THE

CLARIFICATION OF BASIC GENERAL COMMUNITY POLICIES

It is necessary to begin with highest-level abstractions,
since how one perceives the whole vitally affects how one perceives the part. The first proposition I would advance is that
it is the prime responsibility of the global constitutive process, in
relation to the public order of the oceans, as in relation to any
other aspect of transnational public order, to clarify and protect the common interests of all peoples and to reject all claims
of special interests. By common interests I refer to shared
demands for values whose achievement is affected by conditions of interdependence or interdermination. By special interests I refer to those which are destructive of common interests, in the sense that the demand for values cannot be shared
even in equivalencies and that their achievement is violative
of the conditions of interdependence, imposing unnecessary
harm upon others.
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The common interests of all peoples in the enjoyment of
the oceans are, as already emphasized, of two different kinds:
inclusive and exclusive. By inclusive I refer to interests in
activities that have significant transnational effects, that is,
which importantly affect more than one territorial community.
By exclusive I refer to interests in activities which predominantly affect only one territorial community.
The inclusive interests of peoples in the enjoyment of the
oceans may be described as relating to both minimum order
and optimum order. By minimum order I refer to the conduct
of activities by the processes of persuasion and agreement,
with a minimum of unauthorized violence or other coercion.
By optimum order I refer to cooperative activity in the production and distribution of all values, in the maintenance of a
world economy and society.
The exclusive interests 6f peoples may be described, similarly, in terms of both minimum and optimum order. Every
coastal state has an interest in protecting its own internal
minimum order from coercion, whether such coercion comes
from internal or external sources. Every state also has an interest in its own internal optimum order, in the healthy functioning of its economy and society.
Recently it has been strongly urged that the developing
countries should be accorded a special width of territorial sea
and other concessions, beyond what has traditionally been regarded as in the common interest, because of their special
economic needs and as a way of righting the wrongs of a historic maldistribution of income. It is explicitly recognized that
these claims cannot be made with a promise of reciprocity to
others and that they cannot be honored except by severe
restriction of the previously protected inclusive rights of all.
These claims on behalf of the developing states are most misguided in relation to common interest. Even the developing
states could win by such extensions of their protected interests only if other states acquiesced and did not make comparable demands for extension. If a large number of other
states makes comparable demands, the sharable resource can
no longer be shared, the muliplier effect will be lost and
everyone, including the developing states, will lose. The history of the law of the sea in recent decades, when not distorted for partisan purposes, demonstrates that the oceans can
be maintained as a sharable resource open to all with the
necessary initiative, skill and capital, with tremendous bene-
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fits for all in the production and distribution of values. The
claims on behalf of the developing states are claims of special
interests both in that their demands for values cannot be
shared even in equivalences and that the conditions of their
achievement must violate interdependences with others. The
historic inequities in the distribution of income might be
better remedied by appropriate reorganization upon the land
masses than by destroying the multiplier potential of the
ocean.

III. TRENDS IN PAST DECISIONS WITH RESPECT To THE DIFFERENT
TYPES OF PROBLEMS

For many years our global constitutive process has indulged a strong presumption in favor of inclusive interests,
limiting the area of exclusive coastal interests as much as
possible and permitting their expansion only as particular
urgent purposes might require. Thus, the base line which
marked the outer boundary of "internal waters," and from
which the territorial sea was measured, was required to follow
the sinuosities of the coast, with only modest exception for
bays. It was not until the Norwegian Fisheries Case, which
rightly or wrongly found certain special needs in Norway for
fish, that this requirement began to be relaxed.
Similarly, prior to the 1960 Geneva Conference it was generally agreed that the width of the territorial sea had to be
very narrow, with most states claiming only three miles. Even
at the Geneva Conference it was agreed that states had no unilateral competence to extend their territorial sea, at the expense of the public domain, and twelve miles was regarded as
the utmost limit that anybody thought lawful.
All this consensus was in wise recognition that the territorial sea has largely ceased to serve any common interest in
the protection of exclusive coastal interests. Traditionally, the
two principal justifications -of a terriorial sea have been security and the need for fish. Yet, today, the width of the terriorial sea has practically no relation to military security: attacks can come from anywhere on the oceans or from the
other side of the moon. When special security needs arise,
they can be taken care of by contiguous zones or equivalent
concepts. Likewise, the width of the territorial sea bears little
relation to the exploitation of fisheries. Most fish simply. do
not move, breed and live within narrow bands of water off the
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coasts. It would require an enormous expropriation of the
"common heritage" for any single state to obtain control over
important stocks of fish.
The extension of unilateral competence through the device
of "contigous zones" has also been strictly limited to distances
regarded as "reasonable" for the particular purposes for which
such zones are claimed. States making special claims for the
protection of their security, customs and fiscal regulations, immigration laws, health, and so on, have been required to tailor
the zones claimed quite precisely to fit the special needs asserted, with the least possible infringement of inclusive interests. The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone goes so far, quite irrationally and impractically I think, as to limit all such claims to "twelve miles
from the base line from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured."
The recent expansion of exclusive coastal state interests
through the concept of the "continental shelf" has, as in the
case of contiguous zones, been limited more by purpose than
by distance. The Convention on the Continental Shelf, despite
its reference to a depth of 200 meters, expressly, albeitly openendedly, delimits the width of the shelf according to its "adjacency" and "exploitability." The limits in terms of purpose
are, however, clear and important. The monoploy of the coastal
state is extended only to certain exhaustible stock resources,
that is, "the minimal and other non-living resources of the
seabed and subsoil," and to certain relatively immobile organisms. The policies for distinguishing these resources relate,
quite rationally, to the economy and technology of exploitation, to the dangers of pollution, and to the potential threats
to security from fixed, relatively permanent installations. It is
expressly provided in the Convention that this limited monopoly in the coastal state is not to affect the legal status of the
superjacent waters or airspace and is not to be exercised in
any way which interferes with traditional inclusive interests.
The contemporary disintegration in perceptions of common
interest, referred to above, is reflected both in widespead assertions of a unilateral competence to extend all these areas
of exclusive interest and in occasional suggestions that there
are no good reasons for maintaining the nice historic discriminations in the purposes for which the different areas are proected, that is, the global constitutive process should honor a
single broad area of exclusive coastal interest.
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Confronted with problems of access to areas agreed to be
within the inclusive domain, the global constitutive process
has sought the utmost freedom of access for all peoples for
the greatest variety of purposes. Thus, the Geneva Convention on the High Seas not only explicitly stipulates protection
for such traditional freedoms as those of navigation, fishing,
laying of submarine cables and pipelines and flying over the
high seas, but also provides protection for a great host of
emerging new uses such as the exploitation of mineral resources, underwater transportation, climate control, ecological
conservation, power development, sea farming, storage and disposal and undersea residence. The potentialities of these emerging new uses, in the production and distribution of values
for the benefit of all peoples, staggers even an informed
imagination.
The contemporary uninformed attacks upon the "freedom
of the seas" do not directly question the importance either of
equal access or of the protection of open-ended purposes in the
enjoyment of the "high seas," but these attacks fail to perceive
that the greater the area included within the high seas, the
greater the multiplier effect from shared enjoyment in the production and distribution of values.
The particular resources of the oceans, which may be held
open for inclusive enjoyment or subjected to exclusive appropriation, vary in their bearing upon the potentialities of shared
use. There are "space-extension" resources whose distinctive
characteristic is their utility as media of movement, transportation, and communication. There are "flow" or renewable resources, of which different quantities become available at different times and which may or may not be increased or diminished by human action. Finally, there are "stock" resources, of
which the quantity is relatively fixed and which may be abundant or scarce.'
It has been a principal function of the doctrine of the
"freedom of the seas" to maintain space-extension resources,
within the area of the inclusive domain, open for shared enjoyment by all. Since any particular use of a space-extension
resource need not interfere with other uses or reduce productivity, the larger the number of participants who engage in
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use, the greater is the production and distribution of values.
Hence, global constitutive process has long enforced a strong
presumption in favor of inclusive enjoyment of navigation,
flying, cable laying, pipe laying and scientific inquiry.
The principal flow or renewable resources are of course
fish. Different kinds of fish apparently differ in the degree to
which their renewability is affected by the activities of man
and have a critical point in their exploitation. Most kinds of
fish appear, however, to inhabit the oceans in such abundance as to require only modest, if any, conservation measures
for shared enjoyment. Thus, global constitutive process has,
again, decreed a strong presumption in favor of such enjoyment. Particular states have been accorded exclusive preferential rights only in cases of exceptional need, and restrictive
nmeasures for purposes of conservation have, except for a few
species, been of minimal impact. One consequence of this shared
enjoyment has been an accelerating increase in the production of food from the oceans, though many areas of the oceans
still remain largely unexplored.
The established processes of decision have as yet had little
experience with allocation of the "stock" resources (petroleum
and other minerals) of the oceans. The reservation of such resources beneath continental shelves to the coastal states has
already been noted. The disposition of such resources beneath
the surface of the deep-sea bed is presently a matter of urgent
discussion in the global arena and certain alternatives will be
examined below.
The most insistent contemporary misconceptions of common interest are comprised of increasing demands for preferential rights for coastal states with respect to fish. If agreement for an organized, inclusive enjoyment fails, comparable
demands may shortly be made with respect to the stock resources of the deep seabed.
It should not be surprising, in a relatively decentralized
and unorganized world, that peoples should find the best guarantee of inclusive enjoyment in inclusive competence. For the
making and application of law with respect to activities upon
the oceans, global constitutive process delegates a highly shared
competence to particular states. For decades, a few relatively
simple rules, and a minimum of organization, have been employed both to maintain order and to promote optimum
enjoyment.
The few rules are built upon the basic constitutive pre-
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scription that everyone is entitled to free access to the oceans
and than no one is authorized to exclude anyone else from
shared enjoyment. Every state may make and apply law to
the activities of its own ships and nationals. No state may
make and apply law to the ships of other nationals. No state
may make and apply law to the ships of other states, except
for violations of international law. And finally, and this is the
linchpin which has held the whole simple structure of shared
competence and enjoyment together, every state may ascribe
its nationality to a ship and no state may, for whatever reason, question this ascription of nationality.
The principal attack upon this structure of shared competence has come in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas
(Art. 5) which provides for a "genuine link" between a state
conferring nationality and a ship. This concept was derived
from the Nottebohm case, which fashioned it to deprive an
individual access to a tribunal for a hearing on the merits of
alleged mistreatment, and no one has ever suggested any rational meaning that might be given to it in relation to ships.
At first it was feared that the concept might be employed to
permit states unilaterally to question each other's competence
to confer nationality on ships. So far these fears have proved
unfounded, and it is to be hoped that they will remain groundless. This is not to suggest that there are not problems about
labor relations, taxation, safety and health requirements in
relation to ships that require attention. It is rather to suggest
that each of these problems has its own unique remedies and
cannot be resolved by destroying the linchpin that holds the
entire structure of shared competence together.
IV.

PossirnE ALTERNATIVES WirH RESPEcT TO EMERGING AND
FUTURE PROBLEMS

A call is being made by the General Assembly for a new
United Nations conference on the law of the sea in 1973. At
this conference the whole allocation of interests and competences between the inclusive community and coastal state will
undoubtedly be brought up for review, and, given the arrogant
contemporary perspectives of nationalism and misperceptions of
common interest, disaster may impend.
The problems that have precipitated this comprehensive review of the law of the sea are those that derive from the
newly achieved accessibility of the deep seabed and its re-
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sources. From an anthropological perspective, these particular
problems might appear to admit of solution either by an extension of the exclusive competence of states or by retention of
inclusive competence, with a choice among a number of specific
alternatives under each general option.
One alternative in exclusive competence might be to permit coastal states, under the "exploitability" criterion in the
Continental Shelf Convention, to extend their authority and
control over seabed resources up to a point in the middle of
the ocean, where they might confront each other. This approach would require an interpretation of the Continental Shelf
Convention not now generally accepted and would of course
give the bulk of the riches of the deep seabed to only a few
states.
Another alternative in exclusive competence might be to
regard the surface of the seabed and its underlying riches, as
the land masses were once regarded, as res nullus and to honor
permanent, exclusive appropriation of areas effectively occupied. This would of course reward the strong and technologically advanced states, at the expense of others, and might lead
to intense conflicts as states sought to establish new domains
of sovereignty.
Alternatives in inclusive competence would appear to admit
of an infinite variety in degrees of organization. The least organized form would be to treat the riches of the seabed as
res communis, like fish, and to allow participants in the enjoyment of the oceans to stake out claims for limited competence
over identifiable and finite submarine areas for the purpose of
exploitation. The adoption of this alternative would require
states to prescribe and apply mining laws, such as have prevailed upon the land masses. Claimants would be required to
give public notice of the areas claimed, to identify and mark
the area of operation as clearly as possible, and to commence
and complete exploitation of the designated area within a reasonable time. Such a system could be administered without
a vast international bureaucracy, and, if agreement upon more
organized inclusive competence fails, it could be this alternative which the peoples of the world will actually accept.
More organized inclusive competence could range from the
mere provision of recording or registration facilties and dispute settlement to a monopoly of production and distribution
activities by international agencies. There are literally dozens
of potential models both in variety of purpose and machinery
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of administration. In recent days the United States, through
the initiative of President Nixon, has put forward for consideration by the United Nations one such model which would
appear both magnanimous in purpose and highly complex in
its prescription and projected administration. This proposal
would mark the outer limit of comprehensive, exclusive coastal
competence over the resources of the seabed at the point where
the waters reach 200 meters in depth, establish a shared competence between coastal states and the general community
over the resources of the continental margin beyond the 200
meter point, and provide an international machinery for control
of exploration and exploitation beyond the continental margin.
From all exploitation beyond the 200 meter point royalties
would be collected for the benefit of the developing countries.
It can be expected that many comparable models will burgeon
from many other sources, official and nonofficial.
Any rational choice among the options in unorganized and
organized exploitation of the resources of the deep seabed must,
of course, depend upon the kind and quality of organization
that states can negotiate. The high potentials in, and the necessity for, the most intense cooperation, if all possible multiple
uses are to be enjoyed and protected, would appear, however,
to establish a strong presumption in favor of a high degree
of organized, inclusive competence.
A rational decision about establishing the boundaries between exclusive coastal competence and inclusive general community competence over the resources of the seabed must equally depend upon the purposes and administrative machinery that
states can negotiate. Given the legislative history of the Continental Shelf Convention, and subsequent practice and authoritative communication, including the recent North Sea case,
there would appear little doubt that coastal states may, within
the limits of "adjacency" and under the benefits of "exploitability," extend their exclusive competence to the full width
of the geologic margin. If, however, states can negotiate purposes and administrative machinery, adequate to ensure the
security and other shared exclusive interests of coastal states,
to provide for both representative and responsible participation on an inclusive basis, and to afford reasonable promise of
an enhanced and economic production of values with an equitable distribution, then common interest might suggest drawing
the outer limits of exclusive competence somewhat closer to
the shore.
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The problem of remedying a global maldistribution of income should not be permitted to blind people to the inherent
exigencies of a productive use of the oceans. When large portions of a potentially sharable resource are brought under
exclusive, monopolistic competence and control, there can only
be a diminishing of production. No matter how equitable the
formula for distribution, when the total "pie" available to be
divided is small, a share may not be worth very much. The
special problems involved in allocating a percentage of the
oceans' wealth for the benefit of the developing states or for
the support of the United Nations can, and should be, considered
on their merits, without their being intermingled with considerations about the most productive and economic employment
of resources.
In conclusion, I should like to strike hard the same note
with which I began. Law in any community serves the function of clarifying and protecting the common interests of the
members of that community. The quality of law that a community can achieve depends most fundamentally upon the perspectives of its members about their common interests: What
values they demand, how deeply they identify with the whole
community, and the comprehensiveness and realism of their
expectations about the conditions under which they can secure
their values. For one who seeks to identify with the whole
community of mankind and is concerned with the global common interest, the most urgent task is that of clarifying for the
peoples of the world the continuing tremendous advantage of
maintaining the utmost inclusive competence over, and enjoyment of, the oceans. In peroration about the beauties of a
narrow territorial sea, Professor Burke and I made an argument which applies, I think, equally to all the resources of the
oceans. We put it this way:
The positive form cf the argument for maintaining the
oceans of the world open in the greatest degree possible for inclusive use can be related in detail to every phase of the
process of interaction by which the oceans are in fact used and
enjoyed. Most importantly, the physical characteristics of the
resources sought to be enjoyed-of the oceans as a spatial-extention resource, principally useful as a domain for movement,
and of the fisheries as, for the most part, a flow or renewable
resource, without a critical zone below which depletion is technologically irreversible - establish that such resources are sharable in highest degree, promising maximium gains to all, with
a minimum of particular losses, from inclusive use. The world
social process exhibits many territorial communities, private associations, and individuals with the capabilities, and potential
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capabilities, of assisting in the exploitation of the riches of the
oceans. The ocean areas are so vast that simultaneous activities
may go forward, at the cost of only minor physical accommodations, even in the waters closest to coasts. Inclusive access to the
oceans both significantly enhances the base values of all participants in their enjoyment and increases the aggregate base
values brought to bear by the general community upon exploitation. The strategies by which resources so vast are exploited can be noncompetitive and cooperative, with a minimum of mutual interference and deprivation. The outcomes of
inclusive, cooprative enjoyment- as several centuries have
be genuinely integrative, with all winning
demonstrated -can
and none losing, in a tremendous production and wide sharing
of benefits.
It is at least incumbent upon those who dispute this posiextion either to give reasons based upon common interest or
2
plicitly to reject common interest as a basis for decision.
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INTRODUCTION

I.

Economically, the Republic of China has been and will
remain an extremely attractive country for foreign investors.
Since the government launched its first four-year economic
development plan in 1953, the gross national product has increased remarkably.
In 1952, the gross national product was $0.43 billion' and
in 1971 the gross national product jumped to $6.24 billion, repre2
senting an average annual increase since 1953 of 15.1 percent.
Prospects for the future are even more optimistic. With a sound
currency and an extremely congenial attitude towards foreign
investors, continuing rapid growth is certain.
From 1952 to 1971 there have been 631 instances of foreign
investment approval by the government, aggregating over $521.36
million.3 In 1971 alone, foreign investments approved by the government totalled $125 million, of which 80 percent represented
new investment projects while the remaining 20 percent went
4
to expansion projects carried out by existing enterprises.
What is the role of the joint venture' in this recent influx
of foreign investment into the Republic of China? Some statistics paint a clear picture. In 1968, a total of 122 cases of foreign
investments were approved by the government for various
privileges under the statutes passed for the encouragement of
investments were approved by the government., Over 63 percent of this total involved joint ventures between foreign investors and local business. In 1969, with 116 cases, over 65
percent involved joint ventures. During the first six months
of 1970, this dual interest still constituted the major portion of foreign investments. 7 Evidently, the majority of for1 COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
TAIWAN STATISTICAL DATA BOOK (1972).

2
3

4
5

AND DEVELOPMENT

(CIECD),

Id.
Id.
Id.
It is worth noting that to many American-trained attorneys the term
"joint-venture" applies only to associations between two or more parties which are limited as to time as well as purpose. The definition we
have adopted in this article is that which is widely used in the international business community. Under this definition joint-ventures may
be temporary as well as long-lasting associations and are usually
incorporated. See generally, W. FRIEDMANN & G. KALMANOFF, JOINT
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES (1961); Miranda, Problems of Joint
InternationalBusiness Ventures, 4 INT'L. LAWYER 550 (1970); Ross, The
Foreign Joint Venture Corporation: Some Legal and Business Considerations, 45 DENVER L.J. 4 (1968); Meek & Feltham, Foreign Sales, Distribution, Licensing and Joint Venture Agreements, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 46

(1967).

6 This statistical data is furnished through the courtesy of the Industrial

Development & Investment Center (IDIC), Republic of China.
7Id.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COOPERATION

eign investors has decided upon the joint venture corporation
as opposed to the 100 percent wholly owned subsidiary as the
method of doing business in Taiwan, the Republic of China.
Many factors affect this decision; we shall discuss them in detail
in various sections of this article. We begin our discussion with
a general picture of Taiwan's economy and the government's
attitude toward foreign investments and joint ventures. After
putting the background into proper focus, we continue with
some basic considerations in setting up a joint venture agreement and specifically the mechanics of such an agreement. The
conclusion is a brief discussion of problems faced by joint venture operations in the Republic of China and offers some examples of how they have worked out.
The general environment for joint ventures
During the early stages of economic development, the government passed the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals
in order to attract foreign investors to Taiwan Province. s This
statute and those following represent the effort of the government and business community to ease unnecessary government
controls, to modify and amend obsolete and obstructive legislation, to simplify administrative procedures and to improve the
credit system. In addition, subsequent steps were taken to
improve labor-management relations and to provide various incentives (tax holidays in particular) for the encouragement of
investments from domestic as well as overseas sources. All such
developments were made in the wake of the realization that
traditional institutional and legal frameworks, designed for or
developed by a rural society, could no longer serve the needs of
a modern developing economy and, in fact, have become obstacles in the path of successful development.
It is difficult to compare the investment environment in
Japan with that of the Republic of China. On the one hand,
Japan has long been ready for the sophisticated types of joint
ventures found in modern business. On the other hand, Japan
8 The Statute For Investment by Foreign Nationals was first promulgated

on July 14, 1954, as amended, December 14, 1959 and as amended, January 8, 1968.
• Such as Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, supra note 8;
Statute for Encouragement of Investment as promulgated September
10, 1960, as amended, on January 4, 1965 and on December 30, 1970;
Enforcement Rules of the Statute for Encouragement of Investment as
promulgated on January 11, 1961, as amended, on February 22, 1966;
Revised Criteria of Encouragement by Way of Reduction or Exemption
of Profit-Seeking-Enterprise Income Tax as promulgated on April 22,
1969; Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese as promulgated on
November 19, 1955, as amended, on March 26, 1950 and on January 8,
1968; and many others.
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is protectionist-oriented. The current Japanese policy toward
foreign investments requires government validation, regardless
of whether the investor wishes to obtain the right to repatriate
capital and earnings in foreign currency or to operate a whollyowned or majority-owned Japanese corporation in Japanese
currency only.' "
The Chinese government adopts a similar policy for validating a foreign investment only if the investor wishes to enjoy
the rights and privileges provided in the Statute for Investment
by Foreign Nationals. These rights and privileges include the
right to repatriate capital and earnings in foreign currency."
However, if the foreign investor does not care to enjoy such
rights and privileges, no special government validation is required. Of course, this latter sort of investor must still apply
to the proper governmental authority for incorporation pursuant to the Company Law and must satisfy any other laws
and regulations relevant to comparable domestic companies.
In this connection, it is important to note that Japan has
adopted a basic policy of not validating even a minority equity
owned by a foreign investor in a Japanese enterprise unless
the investor possesses essential technical knowledge which he
will not make available to Japanese industry by straight patent,
2
know-how, or other licensing arrangement.' The Chinese policy
is far more liberal. During the early stage of encouragement of
foreign investments, the prime concern of the government was
the importation of foreign capital in hard currencies, although
the emphasis is shifting to the importation of modern, sophisti13
cated technology.
Economic development policies of the Republic of China
affecting joint ventures
The government has laid down two general principles for
the promotion of new industries: 1) establishment of new industries to fulfill domestic needs in order to cut down the outflow of foreign exchange; and 2) the establishment of export
industries in order to earn foreign exchange. To comply with
these two principles, emphasis was placed on the development
of light industries, manufacturing consumer products, rather than
10 Henderson, Contract Problems in U.S. - Japanese Joint Ventures, 39
WASH. L. REv. 489 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Henderson].

11 Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, Article 12, as amended
12

January 8, 1968.
Henderson, supra note 10, at 480.

13 China Times (Taipei), Sept. 1, 1970, at 4.

1973

INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS COOPERATION

heavy industries, the results of which can only be seen after
a considerable time.
Therefore, the type of business weighs heavily in the government's decision to grant approval in each case of foreign
investment, whether it occurs in the form of a wholly-owned
subsidiary or joint venture.
In addition to the type of business, other policy considerations are taken into account before government approval is
granted.
These policy considerations usually include the following:
(1) After considering the national interest and the public welfare, one consideration is whether the business ought to be
government owned or privately operated. The conflict often
encountered is between the government's recognition of
the importance of encouraging private enterprise and the
necessity of exercising direct control of certain categories of
industry.
(2) Another consideration relevant to those industries run
by the private sector is whether the business ought to be
run by local investors or by foreign investors. This is usually a protectionist consideration. The government feels
that certain local industries should be protected from the
competi-tion of foreign capital, management, -nd technical
know-how. Of course, such policy considerations change
from time to time according to circumstances. For instance,
the latest trend is to expand and develop basic industries
including certain heavy industries, and also to encourage
and develop the highly sophisticated technical industries.
In other words, the government is becoming more selective with regard to the approval of foreign investment. 14
In approving a foreign venturer's application under the
investment statutes, the government is actually granting certain
concessions out of its sovereign rights, authorities and privIleges. The foreign investor uses various attractive terms
and conditions to induce the government to grant these con14 In the early 1950's, therefore, the emphasis was placed on items such as
cement, sheet glass, bagasse board, metals, machinery and electrical
appliances, textiles, flour milling and edible oil industries, etc. In the
subsequent years, due to the government's encouragement and economic
needs, new emphasis was placed on products such as PVC resin, viscose
rayon, new chemical fertilizers, detergents, antibiotics and other new
drugs, dry yeast, monosodium glutamate, automobile tires and tubes,
aluminum foil and extrusions, wire and cable, industrial instruments,
power tillers, motor vehicles, telephones, transistor radios, TV sets,
refrigerators and other electrical appliances. During the mid-1960's,
significant amounts of foreign capital began to flow into Taiwan for
setting up electronics plants. As of the end of April 1970, about 60 out
of a total of 83 approved electronics plants with foreign investment had
been put into operation. During the same general period, the other type
of industry to receive official blessing from the government was the
chemical industry, especially the petrochemical industries. Along this
line, items such as ethlene, acrylonitrile, ethylene dichloride, acetylene,
propylene and styrene were produced to supply the building blocks of
the growing synthetic and plastics industries.
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cessions. Therefore, in preparing an investment application,
the investor usually tries to convince the government that the
proposed investment will be beneficial to the economy of the
Republic of China.
During this "bargaining" process, the governments approval
depends on its evaluation of the technical know-how to be
introduced into Taiwan, the existing or potential export market
for the products in question, the extent to which the manufacturing of the product might generate growth in related
industries, and the number of job opportunities contributed by
such an investment (presently a somewhat minor factor). The
foreign investor's bargaining position usually involves the
amount of capital to be imported, the value of the technical
know-how, and the extent of the product market. The likelihood
of favorable consideration usually increases when the proposed product is entirely for export and diminishes when the
foreign investor wishes to have a bigger share of the domestic
market. Many foreign investors, realizing their favorable bargaining position if they intend to solely export their products,
ask for monopolistic status for their specific investments. For
example, they might request restriction of further foreign investments in their field. Such requests can be granted since
no antitrust legislation exists in the Republic of China.
In addition to the above basic policy considerations, one of
the Chinese government's most generalized policy guidelines
concerning foreign investments was announced by Deputy Minister Chang of the Ministry of Economic Affairs on December
9, 1970. The new guidelines for approval are more selective,
and the following types of investments have a better chance
for approval:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Those which utilize local raw materials, spare parts, or
semi-finished products to manufacture products for export;
Those which use specialized techniques and know-how to
manufacture their products, where such products are needed
domestically and also have an export market;
Those which involve joint operation by foreign and local
investors to explore natural resources;
Those which need large amounts of capital and advanced
production technology;
Those which will be involved in research and development;
Any other industry which will better the economy of the
Republic of China.15

Some modification of these conditions is permitted if such
15 Economic Daily News, December 10, 1970, at 2.
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modification will better the economy of the Republic of China.
For instance, local sale of products is permitted under certain
circumstances.
As far as the sixth four-year economic plan (1973-1977) is
concerned, these conditions will continue to be effective. Moreover, foreign investment in capital-intensive enterprises will be
preferred to foreign investment in labor-intensive enterprises.
Of course, the principle of protecting local industries or
of giving the local investors some priority consideration will be
continued even in light of the above mentioned guidelines.
These policy considerations affect joint ventures. The most
significant policy shift is the recent trend on the part of the
Chinese government to approve joint venture enterprises over
wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries, showing a tendency to approve those foreign investment applications which permit some
degree of local participation.
Another recent trend is the encouragement of larger foreign
investments. This trend is evidenced by an increase in the total
cash value of foreign investments, accompanied by a decrease
in the number of cases.16 The government has adopted a stricter
policy in selecting those cases to be approved. In addition, the
emphasis in the future will be placed upon capital-intensive
rather than labor-intensive industries. Of course, industries
with highly advanced technology as well as those which have
already obtained a sizable export market will continue to be
welcomed.
The role played by the FCN Treaty and other relevant treaties
As a general principle, any foreign national may organize
a company under the laws of the Republic of China provided he
does not conflict with those provisions prohibiting foreign nationals from engaging in certain activities. 17 This principle is
reinforced by the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between China and the United States.18 Although it is
16 Data furnished by the Industrial Department & Investment Center
(IDIC).
17 Article 12 of Law Governing the Application of the General Principles
of the Civil Code provides: "Within the limits prescribed by law and
ordinances, a recognized foreign juristic person has the same capacity
of enjoying rights as a Chinese juristic person." Two of the areas in
which a foreign national is prohibited from engaging are real estate
and mining. In the observation of Chinese law, a foreign juristic person
mentioned in the foregoing paragraph is under the same obligations as
a Chinese juristic person.
isTreaty with the Republic of China on Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946[1948] 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871. FCN treaties
are a unique feature in U.S. foreign relations; the Republic of China has
only concluded such a treaty with the United States.
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no problem for foreign investors to organize companies under
Chinese law and to own majority interests in these companies,
they must operate as would any ordinary Chinese company.
They are unable to take advantage of the privileges afforded
under the Foreign Investment Encouragement Statute." A
foreign investor must receive the approval of the Chinese government in order to be able to enjoy these rights and privileges
as provided by the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, including, the right to repatriate earnings and capital. 20
Therefore, without the privilege of remitting foreign currency, the profit of the company will remain in the Republic
of China. In addition, foreign capital staying within the country
for more than six months will not be permitted to be repatriated. 2 1 Consequently, foreign investors who have not obtained
19 The two principal articles in the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals are Article 11 and Article 12 dealing with the repatriation of
invested capital as well as exchange settlement of profits or interest.
Article lll':
The investor shall be entitled to apply for exchange settlement
in accordance with provisions of this Statute. This privilege is not
transferable except to his legitimate heir or to other foreign
nationals or overseas Chinese to whom he has assigned his investment.
Article 12:
The investor may apply for exchange settlement against the
yearly income of net profit or interest accruing from his investment.
The investor may each year apply for exchange settlement
against 15% of the total amount of his invested principal two years
after the completion of the approved investment plan.
The percentage for exchange settlement provided in the preceding paragraph may be raised with the approval of the Executive Yuan upon recommendation by the authority-in-charge according to the situation prevailing at the time the annual foreign
exchange settlement application is made.
Applications by investors for exchange settlement against payments on bonds or loans shall be governed by the agreed terms and
conditions as approved.
When the investment is made in accordance with sub-paragraph 2 or Article 3, the value of the total amount of such investment shall be determined by the Ministry of Economic Affairs at
the request of the investor after such machinery, equipment, raw
materials or commodities for sale have been imported.
When the investment is made in accordance with sub-paragraph 3 or Article 3, the value of the total anmount of such investment shall be determined by the Ministry of Economic Affairs at
the time of application for investment. Statute for Investment by
Foreign Nationals, Art. 11 and 12 as amended, January 8, 1968.
20 Id.
21

Regulation Governing the Limitation on the Amount of Gold, Silver,
Foreign Currency and New Taiwan Dollars Carried by Inbound and Outbound Passengers.
Article 7:
1. Passengers entering into Taiwan must declare to the customs the
amount of gold, silver, and foreign currency they are carrying.
The foreign currency may be converted into New Taiwan dollars in accordance with the prevailing rates. However, the gold
and silvcr are not convertible and may be stored with the Cus-
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the privileges under the Foreign Investment Encouragement
Statute are reluctant to invest, even though under Chinese law,
as well as the FCN Treaty, they are permitted to do so.
Most of the Treaties of Amity and Commerce were concluded in the 1920's and 1930's between China and a few other
nations.22 These treaties now have very little effect on a joint
venture situation since the situation in the field of international investment and trade was quite different forty years
ago. The Agreement between the Republic of China and the
United States relating to investment guaranties enables certain
American investments in Taiwan to be eligible to apply for
AID's guaranties.2 3 Another type of treaty affecting a joint
venture situation involving a Chinese party and a foreign party
from a specific nation is a tax treaty. It is anticipated that such
a treaty will be concluded between the Republic of China and
24
the United States in the foreseeable future.
Since there exist relatively few treaties which have any
effect on joint ventures, the treaty factor bears little significance for the joint venture situation.

II. BASIc CONSIDERATIONS IN SETTING UP A JOINT VENTURE
OPERATION

What constitutes a joint venture
Lawyers have made many efforts to define the term "joint
toms authority by the passenger. The passenger then is permitted to bring those declared and stored gold and silver with
him when he departs. As to the foreign currency, only the difference of the amount declared and the amount converted into
New Taiwan dollars is permitted to be carried out.
2. When the above mentioned passenger departs after remaining
in this country for over six months, he is still allowed to carry
the stored gold and silver with him. But the amount of foreign
currency permitted to be carried out shall be limited in accordance with the restriction applying to the ordinary passengers
(i.e. he is allowed to carry 400 U.S. dollars only when he
departs).
22 For example, Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Belgium and
China signed on February 28, 1928; between Portugal and China signed
on March 27, 1929; between Spain and China signed on December 31,
1929. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Republic of China), TREATIES BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND FOREIGN STATES (1927-1961) (1963).

Exchange of Notes, Amendment to the Agreement relating to Investment
Guaranties between the Republic of China and the United States, signed
June 8, 1964, effective August 6, 1965.
24 The officials of the Republic of China and the United States of America
had several preliminary sessions on the drafting of a Tax Treaty between the two countries. The Republic of China and the United States
signed an agreement for the Mutual Exemption for Taxes on Income
Derived from Sea and Air Transport in March 1972, announced in 66
DEP'T STATE BULL. 493 (1972). Furthermore, the Republic of China is
a member of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of other States.
23
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venturee" since there are few, if any, statutory provisions which
attempt to do so. Some say a "joint venture" is a "contract and
more." 25 Others define it as "a special combination of two or
more persons, where, in some specific venture, a profit is jointly
sought without any actual partnership or corporate desig26
nation.
A joint venture is often thought to be limited in duration
and purpose. In the international commercial community this
usage has all but been abandoned. Today, the term joint venture covers practically any type of formal cooperation between
two or more parties.
The meaning of joint venture was well put by Judge Cardozo when he wrote:
Joint adventures, like copartners, owe to one another, while
the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many

forms of conduct permissible in a work-a-day world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden by those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio

of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the
attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the
rule of undivided loyalty by the disintegrating erosion of particular exception. 27

It is established that the so-called joint venture always
commences pursuant to the concluding of a joint venture agreement.28 However, it has been frequently questioned whether
the agreement which gives the joint venture its existence
automatically terminates when the enterprise is incorporated. 29
Will it terminate even though the incorporation was for the
purpose of carrying out the joint venture, the rights of third
parties were not affected thereby, and the act of forming the
corporation has been undertaken in conformity with the contractual agreements of the parties to the undertaking? It seems
reasonable to assume that if the parties to the agreement intend
that the original contract shall continue after incorporation,
Taubman, What Constitutes a Joint Venture, 41 CORNELL L. Q. 640, 643
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Taubman].
2; Annot., 63 A.L.R. 909, 910 (1929). See also 46 Am. Jur. 2d., Joint Adventures, § 1-6 (1969).
27 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
28 Broden & Scanlan, The Legal Status of Joint Venturc Corporations, 11
VAND. L. REV. 673, 678 (1958); Taubman, supra note 25.
29 Note,
Joint Adventures - Contracts Creating Joint Adventures Whether Terms of a Joint Venture Survive in Event Enterprise is Later
Incorporated, 34 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
Joint Adventures].
25
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which serves merely to provide a convenient mode to carry out
the purposes of the joint venture, there should be no reason why
the corporate form and the joint venture agreement could not
co-exist.30
It is well established in practice that a joint venture possesses the following basic attributes: the existence of an agreement, the existence of a joint interest, the sharing of profits and
losses, the recognition of joint control and the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. 31 We can therefore say that a joint venture before its incorporation is nothing more than a partnership
relationship. Article 667 (1) of the Chinese Civil Code Book of
Obligation states that " [p] artnership is a contract whereby two
or more persons agree to put contributions in common for a
'32
collective enterprise.
The question now is: can partnership as defined by the Civil
Code coexist with one of the entities as provided by the Company Law? The logical answer seems to be that a partnership
agreement can exist among individual investors (or joint venturers) even after the incorporation of the new company. In
other words, there is no restriction in Chinese law prohibiting
shareholders or directors from continuing or reaching an agreement among themselves. Therefore, when a joint venture is
concluded, it can continue in existence long after the new company is incorporated. It is said in the note referred to above,
that
[s]ince joint venturers are involved in a fiduciary relationship, owing obligations of loyalty and are expected to conduct
themselves, in relation to one another, with the utmost of good
faith, they, when parties to an original contract, should be
denied an opportunity to use the corporate entity as a shield
to perpetrate wrong. For the corporate veil is not so sacred
that a court would not look through the form to discover the
substance, even though this would require a disregard of the
33
corporate fiction.

In reality, the establishment and registration of a company often
involves various types of contractual relationships among the
promoters, shareholders, and directors; these contractual relationships cannot be terminated simply because the joint venture has launched into a new phase, namely, the incorporation
34
of a joint venture company.
3

oI .,at 162.
:41
Id.
promulgated on
32 Civil Code - Book of Obligation Article 667 (1),
November 22, 1929, effective from May 5, 1930.
33 Joint Adventures, supra note 29, at 164; see also Mirabito v. San Francisco Dairy Co., 8 Cal. App. 2d 54, 47 P.2d 530 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
:4 Joint Adventures, supra note 29; partnership, Title XVIII. Civil Code
of Obligation.
-Book
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In determining the existence of a joint venture under Chinese law, the following criteria are of vital importance: (1) The
conclusion of a joint venture agreement. Although such an
agreement represents a partnership among the joint venturers,
it goes beyond being a mere contract since the joint venture
agreement also serves as a prerequisite to the formation of a
joint venture corporation. In addition to being a contract, it
is also "a form and method of business organization and of
doing business. '3 5 (2) Dual interest. In a joint venture arrangement, there should be a clear understanding of the existence
of joint interest as well as the sharing of profits and losses.
(3) Degree of control. There should also be a specific arrangement as to what degree of control each joint venturer possesses.
There is neither a provision of law nor a court decision
attempting to define joint venture or to classify a joint venture
as a unique type of contract under Chinese law. It would seem
most reasonable, therefore, to classify a joint venture agreement
as a form of partnership agreement. In other words, before
the incorporation all juristic acts are conducted in the name of
partnership and thus, all partners bear obligation as joint and
several obligors to each other. 36 Once the joint venture company is incorporated, although the joint venture agreement
should not be deemed automatically terminated, all juristic acts
will be conducted in the name of the company. If the company
is of limited liability, then the liability will be limited to the
assets of the company. 37 It is obvious that the enterprise would
not want to conduct juristic acts in the name of the partnership
at this point.
Corporate structure of a joint venture
As has been stated above, the term "joint venture" has
actually been quite loosely used. The mere existence of a joint
venture agreement and the fact of shared participation in a
joint venture company, regardless of the percentage of shares,
would in most cases be considered a joint venture. Thus, one
party's interest in a joint venture can range from 1% to 99%.
It might seem reasonable to the layman to consider a jointventure as a 50-50 deal. But this is rarely the case since it
would involve complicated legal problems, for example, deter3 Taubman, supra note 25, at 643.
3'; Article 681 of the Book of Obligations of the Civil Code reads:

"If the
assets of the partnership are not sufficient to cover the liabilities, the
partners are liable as joint debtors for the deficit."
:17
There are two types of limited liability companies under the Chinese
Company Law: companies limited and companies limited by shares.
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mining who has controlling interest. This problem is dealt
vith in a subsequent section.
Despite the fact that under the Chinese Company Law
there are five different forms of companies,3 almost all joint
ventures are organized in the form of a "Company Limited
by Shares" for reasons not always evident in the Company
Law. Considering only the Company Law, the most satisfactory
form is probably the so-called "Limited Company 3 9 for the
following reasons: (1) The liability of shareholders to the company is limited to the extent of the capital contributed by each
of them; 40 (2) the required shareholders can be as few as two;4 1
(3) the minimum capital requirement is considerably less than
that of a company limited by shares; 42 (4) shareholders who do
not conduct business may from time to time exercise power
of control; 43 (5) the shareholders may not, without the agreement of a majority of all the other shareholders, transfer all
or a part of their contribution to the capital of the company to
other persons; and (6) the shareholders who conduct the business of the company, or directors and supervisor, may not,
without the unanimous agreement of all other shareholders,
transfer all or a part of their contribution to the capital of the
44
company to other persons.
Such an internal corporate arrangement does, to a great
extent, simplify the complicated nature of a joint venture, and
under normal circumstances will be a satisfactory arrangement
for setting up a joint venture company. The only drawback is
that if the joint venturer desires to enjoy all the privileges
and benefits provided by the Statute for Encouragement of
Investment, he must organize a "Company Limited by Shares"
since the Statute recognizes only the "Company Limited by
Shares" as a "productive enterprise" within the meaning of
the Statute. 45 In other words, a "Limited Company" is not a
Company Law, Article 2 as amended, September, 1970.
Company Law, Chapter 3 Limited Company, as amended, September,
1970.
40 Id., Article 99.
41 Id., Article 98.
42 Id., Article 100. In practice, the Ministry of Economic Affairs sets a minimum capital requirement in accordance with the economic policies at the
time.
43 Id., Article 109.
44 Id., Article 111.
45 Article 3 of the Statute For Encouragement of Investment reads as
38

39

follows: "The term, 'productive enterprise' as used in this Statute refers
to any one of the following types of operation which produces goods

and/or renders services, and which is organized as a company limited
by shares in accordance with the Company Law:

72

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 3

"productive enterprise" under the Statute for Encouragement
of Investment. As a result, joint venturers are left almost no
choice but to try to qualify their operation as one of the
(1)

Manfacturing: Any operation which makes or processes products
with machinery and manual labor.
(2) Handicraft: Any operation which makes or processes products
with manual labor and skill.
(3) Mining: Any operation which prospects or works mines with
machinery and manual labor for the purpose of producing mineral products.
(4) Agriculture: Any operation which utilizes land and equipment
for growing plants and producing crops.
(5) Forestry: Any operation which utilizes forest land and equipment for planting or replanting forests and for felling or cutting
trees for forestry products and by-products.
(6) Fishery: Any operation which catches and cultures marine animals and plants with fishing craft or fish ponds and fishing gear.
(7) Animal Husbandry: Any operation which raises and breeds livestock on farm or ranch or by mechanical means."
The Statute For Encouragement of Investment provides the following
privileges and benefits: (1) five years exemption from profit-seekingenterprise income tax (or business income tax, Article 5); (2) the
maximum rate of profit-seeking-enterprise income tax, including all
forms of surtax, payable by a productive enterprise shall not exceed
eighteen percent of its total annual income (Article 6); (3) a productive enterprise which invests its undistributed profits for the taxable
year in expansion of its machinery or equipment used for production or
rendition of services, may exclude the amount of such investments
from its taxable income, provided that the undistributed profits eligible
for such exclusion does not exceed an amount equal to 25% of its taxable income for current taxable year (Article 7); (4) where a productive enterprise invests its undistributed profits in an expansion of its
machinery or equipment, the new stocks issued to shareholders or the
increased value of old stocks held by shareholders as a result of the
capital increase are excludable from the shareholders' consolidated income or profit-seeking-enterprise income of the taxable year for taxation (Article 9); (5) a productive enterprise which incurs a foreign
currency debt for purchase of productive equipment with government
approval may set aside each year from its profits, starting from the
year in which such debt is incurred, an amount not exceeding seven
percent of the unpaid balance of the foreign currency debt calculated in
local currency at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of closing of
accounts for the current year as special reserve for foreign currency
debt exchange loss to be used solely for compensating loses incident
to exchange rate adjustment. Such special reserve shall not be included
as taxable profit-seeking-enterprise income (Article 13); (6) a productive enterprise importing machinery or equipment for use by the
enterprise for the production of goods or rendition of services may pay
the duties on such machinery in installments (Article 23); (7) a productive enterprise engaged in any of the basic metal industries, electrical and electronics industries, machinery manufacturing industries,
transportation equipment manufacturing industries, chemical fertilizer
industries, petrochemical industries, pulp manufacturing industries, or
industries for the installation of pipelines for supply of natural gas in
conformity with the standards as may be prescribed by the Ministry
of Economic Affairs, which has a capitalization of not less than 30,000,
000 juan (equivalent to NT $90,000,000), shall be exempt from the payment of import duties on machinery or equipment (Article 23); (8) a
productive enterprise which renovates its machinery or equipment for
the purpose of increasing its production or service may reduce the useful life of such machinery and equipment by one-third of the number of
service years prescribed by the Income Tax Law for the purpose of
depreciation (Article 24); (9) the deed tax on real property used by
productive enterprises directly for productive purposes is imposed at
half the statutory rate (Article 28).
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"productive enterprises" in order to obtain the privileges under
the Statute.
It is important to note that, in theory, any of the five corporate forms as provided by the Chinese Company Law can be
chosen for a joint venture operation provided that the joint
venturers decide to forego some of the privileges and benefits
of the Statute. There is no law restricting a joint operation
involving foreign investors. In fact, there are some foreignowned or joint venture companies operating in the Republic
of China which have never applied under the Statute for Encouragement of Investment and the Statute for Investment by
Foreign Nationals and therefore do not enjoy the privileges
and benefits provided therein. These companies operate as would
any Chinese company. The incentives provided by the Statute
are sufficiently valuable, however, as to nullify any internal
advantages which might be" obtained by forming a company
'46
other than a "Company Limited by Shares.
III.

PREPARATION OF THE JOINT VENTuRE AGREEMENT

In preparing a joint venture agreement to form a joint
venture company, the primary consideration is the conformity
of the agreement to the relevant Chinese laws regulating contracts. Contracts are regulated by the civil code which, to a
great extent, corresponds to the Japanese and German Civil
Codes. The Civil Code Book of General Principles covers juristic
acts including the formation of contracts. 47 Book II of the
Chapter I Title (1) Part (1) -deals
Civil Code -Obligations,
specifically with contracts. 4 There is no separate commercial
46

Lawyers trained in Anglo-American law are often curious as to the
extent to which Chinese Company Law differs from the corporate law
of common law countries. The Chinese Company Law is, of course,
based on civil law concepts, but some recent revisions are markedly
influenced by Anglo-American legal concepts.

For instance, it is well

established that in the civil law tradition, it is the shareholders, not the
board of directors, who make managerial decisions, but the revised
Chinese Company Law has placed the managerial decision making
power in the hands of the board of directors. Nevertheless, the Chinese
Company Law still remains basically different from Anglo-American
corporate concepts. Under the Anglo-American legal system, the power
of corporate directors is limited by the objects of the corporation as
set forth in the articles of incorporation. Where directors act beyond
these corporate powers, their act is void; where directors act within
the corporate powers but beyond the scope of the powers granted to
them as directors in the articles of incorporation, their act is invalid
unless and until it is ratified by the shareholders. Under Chinese law,
a company is a juristic person whose powers are those of any individual
and thus are not limited by the objectives specified in the articles of
incorporation.

Civil Code- Book of General Principles, Chapter 4, promulgated May
1929, effective as of October 1929.
48 Civil Code - Book of Obligations, Chapter I, promulgated November
22, 1929, effective May 5, 1930.
4T
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code in Chinese law and commercial matters are primarily
covered by the Civil Code. Of course, a joint venture agreement
usually involves many other juristic acts and therefore, other
provisions of the Civil Code are applicable as well. 49
Various means for corporate control50
One of the main concerns in drafting a joint venture agreement is corporate control, assuming control is desired. Under
the Chinese Company Law, the board of directors represented
by the chairman, the shareholders, and the general manager
are those relevant in the control of the company. 1 The chairman of the board is elected from among the directors by a
majority at a meeting attended by over two-thirds of the directors; directors are elected by the meeting of shareholders from
among shareholders with disposing capacity and any of their
designated representatives. 52 Usually, a shareholders' meeting is,
unless otherwise provided for in the Company Law, convened
by the board of directors. 53 Thus, it is clear that the shareholders have the real power to elect a new board of directors
and thereby to retain or remove the chairman of the board.
Another power of shareholders under the Chinese Company
Law is removal of errant directors. When a director has done
anything causing great loss or damage to the company or has
committed a serious violation of law or the articles of incorporation, a shareholder who has continuously held five percent
or more of the total number of issued shares for a period of
one year or longer may institute suit for removal of the director,
provided that a shareholders' meeting has not adopted a resolution to remove the director from office. 54
It is also important to note here that, under Chinese Company Law, stock without voting rights is not permitted. HowThe legal ramifications of these juristic acts are covered by specific sections in the code (e.g., maritime, insurance, negotiable instrument and
company laws), or by the General Principles Section Book of Obligation.
50
We have dealt with only the principal means of maintaining corporate
control. There are other methods, such as that provided in Article 198
of the Company Law, which provides for cumulative voting.
5' Company Law, Article 193, Article 208, Article 29-39.
52 Id., Article 208.
53 Id., Article 171.
14 Id., Article 173, Article 172. The Chinese Company Law also provides that
shareholders who have continuously held more than three percent
of the total number of issued shares for a period of one year or longer
may request the board of directors to convene a special meeting of
shareholders. If the board refuses to do so, the shareholders may apply
to the local competent authority for permission to convene the meeting
themselves (Article 175). Once such a meeting is convened, they can
accerdingly reelect directors and auditors and modify or alter the articles of incorporation (Article 172)
49
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ever, the voting rights of special shares may be restricted as
5
compared with the voting rights of common shares.5 For instance, the voting rights of common shares may be one vote
for each share held while the voting rights of special shares
may be one voting right for every two shares or for every five
shares held. However, having 50 percent local participation,
while limiting the voting rights of this party so as to have
actual management control by the 50 percent foreign investor,
will certainly have an adverse effect on government approval
of the foreign investment application.
As a principle, the voting power of shareholders under the
Chinese Company Law is not based on the number of shareholders but rather on the number of shares a shareholder holds.
56
In other words, each share has one vote. There are few
57
exceptions to this principle. It is therefore clear that the most
effective means of assuring dorporate control is simply to hold
a majority of the company's stock.
A secondary means for corporate control is found in the
statutory power of the chairman of the board. According to
the Chinese Company Law, the statutory power of a chairman
5
cannot be limited or changed by the articles of incorpartion.
The Law provides the chairman of the board with the following
powers:
(1)

The chairman of the board shall preside at the meeting of
shareholders, meetings of the board of directors, and meetings of the managing directors that represent the company.

(2)

In case the chairman of the board of directors is on leave
of absence or cannot exercise his powers and authority, he
may designate one of the managing directors or, where
there are no managing directors, one of the directors, to
act on his behalf.

(3)

Since a chairman of the board represents the company, he

shall have power to conduct all affairs pertaining to the

.55 Company Law, Article 157, Article 158.
56 Id., Article 179.
The articles of incorporation may prescribe a restriction on the
57 (1)
number of votes of any shareholder holding three percent or more
of the total number of issued shares (Article 179).

A company, shall have no voting power for shares held by itself
(Article 178).
(3) A shareholder who has a personal interest in the matter under
discussion at a meeting, which may impair the interest of the
company, shall not vote nor exercise the voting power of another
shareholder (Article 178).
(4) Except in case of trust business, when a person acts as the proxy
of two or more shareholders, the voting power of such proxy
shall not exceed three percent of the total number of issued shares
and, in case of excess, such excessive votes shall not be counted
(2)

(Article 177).

58 Company Law, Article 208 (3).
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business of the company pursuant to Article 208 and Article
57 of the Chinese Company Law which set forth the general power of the chairman. 59

The Chinese Company Law requires that a chairman of the
board must have Chinese nationality, with domicile within the
national boundary.00 This requirement, however, is waived in
the case of a company formed to carry out an investment
approved under the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals.6 1 It is important to note here that Article 58 states
that, "[a] ny restriction imposed by the company on the power
of representation of a shareholder cannot be set up as a defense
against a bona fide third person. '6 2 This article is also applicable mutatis 7nutandis to directors representing the company
63
including the chairman of the board.
It is thus clear that the chairman as well as the board of
directors has a considerable degree of power in corporate control, and that to be able to appoint a majority number of directors on the board is always a positive measure in strengthen64
ing one's position of control in the joint venture company.
As to the power of the general manager, there is nothing
under the Chinese Company Law which would limit or restrict
giving to the general manager the power to run the daily
operations of the corporation. Of course, his duties and powers
may be limited by the articles of incorporation as well as by
an employment contract. In addition, a general manager "shall
not modify or alter the decision of shareholders or shareholders
conducting the business, or resolutions adopted at the shareholders' meeting or the board of directors, nor exceed the scope
Id., Article 208 (6). "Provisions in Article 57 and 58 shall mutatis mutanandis apply to directors representing the Company."
60 Id., Article 208 (5).
61 Statute For Investment by Foreign Nationals, Article 17 reads: "Investors
who form a company according to the Company Law and other relevant
laws may be exempted from the restrictions of the following provisions:
1. Those concerning domicile in Chinese territory contained in Articles
98- (1), 128- (1), 208- (5) and 216- (1) of the Company Law.
2. Those concerning Chinese Nationality contained in Article 208- (5) of
the Company Law."
62 Company Law, Article 58.
63 Id., Article 208 (6).
64 Although Article 27 of the Civil Code provides that a director of a company can represent the company for the management of its affairs, the
company law somewhat limits the representing power of a director. Under
the Company Law, the collective body of the directors (i.e., board of directors), not a director acting individually, is vested with power as the supreme decision-making body of the company. Article 202 of the Company
Law states, "The transaction of business of the company shall be decided
by the board of directors. Unless otherwise provided for in this law or in
the articles of incorporation that certain matters must be resolved at the
meeting of shareholders, all may be decided by resolutions of the board of
directors."
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of their prescribed authority. '"'5 Although his duty is to carry
out the policy of the board of directors, the general manager
as the chief executive officer of the company has broad discretion.
The function of the supervisor under the Chinese Company
Law is not to take active control of the company, but rather
to act as a watchdog over the company's affairs." Supervisors,
unlike general managers, are elected at a meeting of shareholders from among the shareholders.6 7 Their statutory function is to investigate from time to time the business and financial condition of the company, examine books and records,
and request that the board of directors submit reports. 8 In
carrying out these functions, a supervisor may appoint a lawyer
or public accountant for the company to undertake an examination.61 Also, a supervisor checks for accuracy statements and
records prepared and submitted by the board of directors to
the meeting of shareholders. 7" A supervisor may convene a
shareholders' meeting when he deems it necessary. 71 On the
other hand, a supervisor may not be a director or managerial
officer of the company at the same time. Outside of the functions set forth in the Company Law, supervisors have no actual
control of the company's business operation or policy making.
The function of supervisors under Chinese law is relatively
foreign to lawyers trained under the Anglo-American legal
system, especially the fact that supervisors may have the right
to convene shareholders' meetings and that they sometimes
seem to be in a position somewhat superior to the board of
72
directors.
Therefore, in order to acquire effective control of a company, one must first acquire the majority interest of shares and
thereby appoint the supervisor, and then appoint a majority
to the board of directors. Since the decision to appoint, discharge, or renounce a corporate officer must be by a majority
of all the directors (as distinguished from a majority of the
65

Company Law, Article 33.

IMId., Article 218 (1). "A supervisor may at any time investigate the business and financial condition of the company examine books, records
and documents and request the board of directors to submit reports."
67 Id., Article 216,
68 Id., Article 218 (1).
69 Id., Article 218 (2).
7 Id., Article 219.
-1 Id., Article 220.
72

Id., Article 218 (1).

78

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 3

directors as a specific meeting), 73 majority control then means
the power to appoint the general manager.
The articles of incorporation of most foreign-local joint
venture enterprises stipulate the exact number of board members each party may appoint. In addition, the articles of incorporation may also regulate explicitly which party may appoint the chairman of the board, managing director and general manager. These provisions are usually first found in the
joint-venture agreement itself before the new company is
formed. Their purpose, of course, is to assure effective control
of the corporation.
The protection of minority interest
The lawyer's task is somewhat more difficult wherx his
client is the party having a minority interest in a joint venture
than when he seeks to maintain control. In protecting the interest of minority shareholders, the Chinese Company Law provides the following:
(1)

(2)

A shareholder or shareholders, who collectively hold more
than three percent of the total number of issued shares
over a period of one year, may petition the board of directors to convene a special meeting of shareholders. They
must do this in writing stating the reasons for the request.
If the board fails to give notice of the convening of a meeting within fifteen days after such request, the shareholders
may apply to the local competent authority for permission
to convene the meeting themselves. 74 This provision is of
special significance when the board of directors is controlled by members of one joint venture party which refuses to convene a shareholders' meeting to deal with matters which are deemed to be important by another party of
of the joint venture.
Another factor in minority shareholder protection is a
"buy out" provision. If the company decides to alter the
character of the business (Article 185), a shareholder may
serve notice in writing upon the company stating his intention to object to such a resolution. If he also raises his
objections in a shareholder's meeting, he may request the
company to buy back all of his shares at the prevailing
fair price. 75 If the shareholders decide to dissolve the
enterprise and to transfer a major portion of the business
or assets, the provision does not apply.j' This "buy back"

73 Id., Article 29 (2).
74 Id., Article 173.
75 Id., Article 186.

7,Id., Article 186. "A shareholder who had, before a resolution was adopted

at a shareholders' meeting to do any of the acts mentioned in paragraph
1 of the preceding article, served a notice in writing to the company
declaring his intention to object to such an act and also raised such
objection during the meeting, may request the company to buy back
all the shares held by him at the prevailing fair price; provided, however, that this shall not apply where, at the time of adopting a resolution
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(3)

provision serves to prevent a minority shareholder's interest from being overwhelmed by the decision of the majority.
A shareholder may ask for a court order to annul a resolution adopted at a shareholders' meeting if the procedure
in convening the meeting or the means of adopting the
resolution was in violation of law or ordinance or the articles of incorporation.7

(4)

If a director, acting in his capacity as such, commits an
act which is seriously prejudicial to the company, or is in
violation of law or ordinance, or of the articles of incorporation, and the shareholders do not adopt a resolution to
78
then a shareholder who holds
remove him from office,
over five percent of the total number of issued shares for
a period over one year, may instittue an action in court for
79
a judgment for removal.

(5)

Shareholders who hold more than ten percent of the total
number of issued shares over a period of one year may
request a supervisor to institute an action against a board
80
director.
Shareholders who hold over ten percent of the total number of issued shares over a period of six months may ask
for a court ruling for readjustment (reorganization of the
company) in the case of temporary suspension of business
or reasonable anxiety over ceasing of business of a coms
pany due to financial difficulty. '

(6)

Under Chinese law, a company's articles may require the
quorum or the number of votes required for passage of a
resolution to be greater than that provided by the law. Thereon any matter specified in subparagraph 1 of paragraph 1 of article,
the meeting of shareholders also resolved to dissolve the company."
77 Id., Article 189.
78 According to Article 199 of the Company Law, a director may be removed
from office at any time by a resolution adopted at a shareholders'
meeting.
79 Id., Article 200.
so Id., Article 214.
81 Id., Article 282. "Where a company suspends its business due to financial
difficulty or there is an apprehension of suspension of business, the court
may, on the application of any of the following interested persons, rule
for reorganization:
1. Board of directors;
2. Shareholders who have been continuously holding shares representing
ten percent or more of the total number of issued shares for a period
of six months or longer;
3. Creditcrs of the company who have claims equivalent to ten percent
or more of the capital from the total number of issued shares.
The board of directors shall, for the aforesaid application to court, adopt
a resolution by a majority vote at a meeting of the board of directors
attended by over two-thirds of the directors."
Article 185 of the Company Law requires that certain acts of the company, such as merger, consolidation or dissolution be resolved at a shareholders' meeting attended by shareholders representing at least twothirds of the issued shares and that the resolution be passed by a majority vote of those present. However, the special provisions mentioned
here require that certain resolutions of shareholders' meeting be adopted
with the approval of a certain percentage of the total issued shares, not
the percentage of shares which attend such meeting.
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fore, one of the most effective means to afford protection to
minority shareholders is to stipulate in the joint venture agreement or the articles of incorporation of the joint venture company a provision which requires a greater number of votes
than that required by law in order to pass certain resolutions
which might alter the company's character or affect its equity.
A typical sample for such provision usually reads:
That the power vested in the shareholders to change the location
of the company, to change the capitalization of the company or
to modify the articles of incorporation, or to merge, consolidate,
or dissolve the company shall be exercisable only upon the affirmative vote of seventy percent of the shares issued and out
standing.8 2

This special arrangement may be also applied to protect minority
interest on the board of directors.
Such a provision is designed specifically for the protection
of minority interests; the percentage required in the provision
is always larger than the percentage of shares held by the
shareholder(s) acquiring the majority interest. Several wellknown joint venture operations have inserted such provisions
in both their joint venture agreement and artic±; of incorporation. The government opposed this arrangement when it first
became aware of it, based on the ground that such provision
was not in compliance with Article 246 (now Article 277)83 of
the Company Law which stipulated the requirements in voting.
The parties involved then filed an appeal to the Ministry of
Economic Affairs requesting the government to withdraw this
ruling, arguing that the article only set forth the minimum
but not maximum requirements of votes. This argument was
also supported by an opinion of the Grand Judges Council. 4
The government finally withdrew its ruling, thus clarifying
the matter.
As another measure protective of minority joint ventures,
Article 179 of the Company Law stipulates that the articles of
incorporation must restrict the number of votes of a shareholder who holds more than three percent of the total number
of issued shares. 85 The following provision is usually inserted
to offer token compliance with this article:
82 Id., Article 185.
8:3Id., Article 277.

"A company shall not modify or alter its articles of incorporation without a resolution adopted at a meeting of shareholders.
The aforesaid resolution at the meeting of shareholders shall be adopted
by a majority of shareholders at a meeting attended by shareholders
representing over two-thirds of the total number of issued shares."
84 Grand Judges' Council Explaination number 100.
85

Company Law, Article 179.
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A stockholder shall be entitled to one vote for each share of
stock held by him provided, however, that any stockholder holding more than 3 percent of the total oustanding capital stock
shall have his voting rights on the shares exceeding 3 percent
of the total outstanding capital stock discounted at one percent,
i.e. 99 voting rights for every 100 shares.

Article 229 sets forth the minority shareholder's right to
obtain information relating to company management, including
statements and records of accounts prepared by the board of
directors and the report made by the supervisor. The articles
of incorporation may also provide the minority shareholder with
additional access to information, thus offering some degree of
protection. s 6
Article 267 provides that shareholders are entitled to maintain their original ratio in newly issued shares. The minority
shareholder will then have his interest protected from dilution
if the majority resolves to issue new shares. However, if the
shareholder is unable to exercise or to transfer his preemptive
87
rights, they will expire within a given period.
There are instances in which the minority shareholder is
unable to raise the funds to exercise his preemptive rights and
must then see his interest diluted. To prevent this and to maintain the fixed ratio of shares between the joint venture parties,
the following clause may be inserted into the articles of incorporation:
The ratio of the original contributions to the capital of the
corporation and the ratio of loang or additional contributions to

capital shall be on the basis of (sixty-five) percent for A and
(thirty-five) percent for B.
Other provisions, such as the appointment of managers and
key personnel and the restriction of assignment of the interest
of one party in the joint venture operation to a third party, are
relevant in protecting the interest of minority shareholders.
The disadvantage of a 50-50 arrangement
Lawyers would not normally recommend a 50-50 participation in a joint venture company since questions on which the
parties differ become practically impossible to settle by vote
in a shareholders' meeting. Consequently, there is a possibility
of an impasse on important decisions. Such events have actually occurred in several joint venture operations in the Re86 Id., Article 229.
87 Id., Article 267.
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public of China.88 The result was, needless to say, frustrating
to both parties.
The proposal of a 50-50 joint venture is usually based on
good faith and friendly relations between the two parties involved. There is an implicit agreement between the two parties
that both shall share control and decision making powers equally. However, good faith can hardly be maintained when
disputes arise and no compromise solution is found. Reliance
on the shareholders' meeting to resolve these conflicts are then
fruitless.
If equal participation is a necessary feature in the joint
venture company, there are several provisions which would at
least diminish the possibility of deadlock. To maintain the balance and good faith of the original parties to the joint venture
company, a provision in the joint venture agreement to restrict
stock transfers is appropriate.
Sometimes, even when there is equal participation, one
party is given the right of management control. The most effective method is to permit the party to appoint one more
director. This majority of the board of directors will then set
corporate policy and appoint the officers of the company. A
less effective measure is to obtain the right to appoint managerial personnel or to set up certain corporate control mechanisms such as special voing rights in conflict situations.
Another measure to reduce the possibility of deadlock is
to insert an arbitration clause in the articles of incorporation.
Binding arbitration is most effective. "Buy out" agreements are
also useful if the joint venture parties are irreconcilable.
A further measure which could be taken to eliminate conflicts in an equal participation joint venture company is to
assign specific functions to each party. Thereby management
responsibilities may be divided between the two parties.
A more realistic possibility, which could be effective, is to
joint venture operation to another future joint corporathe
tie
tion. The same could be done with supplemental agreements
such as trademark, patent, and know-how licenses; sales agencies; supply contracts; capital equipment imports; employment
contracts for key engineers and managers; and any other items
which may be of critical importance in the over-all bargain to
88

In one instance a foreign electronics firm decided to go into a joint venture with a local manufacturer. They formed a joint venture corporation
with equal participation. An impasse was reached when they could not
decide on a proper division of the market, and the firm had to be finally
dissolved.
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the other party, thereby creating the need to maintain a "good
faith" atmosphere.
Articles 14 and 15 of the Statute for Investment by Foreign
Nationals also have an effect upon the share a foreign investor
would want in the new joint venture company. These are the
expropriation articles. If the foreign investor holds less than
51 percent of the total capital of the enterprise he is subject to
expropriation at any time by the government if national defense
needs dictate. Of course, he will be reasonably compensated and
may convert the compensation into foreign exchange from time
to time upon application to the proper government authority.
If, however, the foreign investor holds more than 51 percent of
the total capital of the enterprise, he will not be subject to expropriation within twenty years after he commences business so
long as he continues to maintain his majority interest.
When the licensing of industrial properties is involved
It is common business practice to invest in a proposed
company by licensing patent rights or technical know-how to
the new enterprise instead of making a cash contribution. This
practice has frequently been employed by new companies as
a convenient substitute for the often cumbersome process of
allocating capital.8 9
Some governments, however, impose stringent requirements
on the valuation of intangible assets contributed in exchange
for shares. In addition, some intangible assets do not qualify as
capital assets for special investment incentives. Many governments also do not permit certain intangible assets such as
unpatented know-how to be capitalized. 90
Like the law in most countries, the law of the Republic of
1
China permits capitalization of intangible assets." However,
few local investors are willing to invest in this manner because
in assessing the value, the government usually takes a very
conservative view and estimates the value of the intangible
assets at a rate much lower than its real potential. Therefore,
the owners of patent rights or technical know-how are most
reluctant to capitalize these assets as part of an investment in

"The payment of subscription in the first paragraph may be made in assets required in the business of the company." There is no question under the
Chinese law that the so-called assets include intangible assets such as
patent rights and technical know-how.

89 Paragraph 3 of Article 11 of the Chinese Company Law reads:

90Friedman, Legal Problems in Foreign Investments, 14
(1959).

Bus. L. 746, 756

91 Id., see also Article 41(5), 131, 359(3) of the Chinese Company Law.
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a joint venture company since they might be able to sell them
at a higher price later.
The government adopts a different attitude towards capitalization of intangible assets by foreign investors. Although
Article 3 of the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals
stipulates that capital for investments referred to in this statute
includes technical know-how and patent rights, the regulations
for approval of these investments are stringent.92 The regulations which supplement Article 3 are entitled "Regulations Governing the Licensing of Patent Rights or Technical Know-how
as Equity Investment. ' ' 93 Article 6 of this regulation defines
the restrictions upon foreign investors as follows:
The licensing of patent rights or technical know-how as equity
investment by an investor, unless in the occasion of being an unlimited liability stockholder, shall have the following restrictions:
1) The value of the patent rights shall not exceed 20
percent of the actual paid-in capital of the company.
2) The value of the technical know-how shall not exceed
15 percent of the actual paid-in capital of the company.
This technical know-how investment must be coupled
with another equal percentage of equity
investment in
94
the form of cash and/or equipment.

In addition, Article 4 of the same regulation restricts patent
rights and technical know-how to (1) that which can be used
to produce new products not yet producible in the Republic
of China, or (2) that which can improve the quality or reduce
the cost of local products. 95 Article 7 further requires that
shares paid by patent rights are not transferable during the
valid period of the patent right and shares paid by technical
know-how are not transferable within two years from the
completion of the investment plan.9 6
However, the foreign investor who possesses these intangible assets may avoid coming under Article 3 of the Statute for
Investment by Foreign Nationals. This may be done in two
steps:
(1) Instead of using the intangible assets as contribution to
capital, he may either sell it outright or license it for royalties;
(2) He may then use the proceeds to buy shares in the
company and thereby avoid the restriction as to percentage of
contribution to capital as well as the resale restrictions.
92 Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, Article 3.
93
Regulations Governing the Licensing of Patent Rights or Technical knowhow as Equity Investment, as promulgated May 9, 1968.
94 Id., Article 6.

95 Id., Article 4.
96 Id., Article 7.
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The problem the investor may face is government approval of
his investment plan in purchasing the company's shares.
The licensing of trademarks presents a different problem
under relevant Chinese laws and government policy. Although
Article 131 of the Company Law indicates that trademark rights
may be capitalized,!'7 it is of little use to the foreign joint
venturer since trademark rights do not fall into the category of invested capital entitled to the privileges and benefits provided by the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals.!'8 However, the foreign joint venturer may capitalize
his trademark rights under Article 131 of the Company Law
if he is not interested in those privileges.
The problems of capitalization of intangible assets (i.e.,
patent rights and technical know-how) in a joint venture has
been briefly discussed above. Sometimes, however, the foreign
party possessing an advanced technical skill or patent right
does not want to capitalize it as an equity investment. Yet, since
the technology is important to the success of the joint venture,
both parties are eager to utilize it. To achieve this purpose, the
foreign venturer may in accordance with the Statute for Technical Cooperation enter into a technical cooperation agreement
with the new enterprise.9 " He must submit this agreement to
10 0
Under the
the competent government authority for approval.
new enthe
furnish
to
agrees
venturer
Statute, the foreign
terprise with the technical skill or patent rights for a fixed roy10 2
Also, if
alty,1 0' which may be repatriated in foreign currency.
in
settlement
for
apply
not
does
the foreign joint venturer
foreign exchange, but chooses to invest the royalty earnings
in domestic enterprises, the provisions of the Statute for In13
vestment by Foreign Nationals apply. 1 However, the technical
skill and patent rights furnished under this Statute must be
those capable of producing new products or increasing the
volume of production.
Other considerations
It is beyond our scope to deal comprehensively with all the
Company Law, Article 131.
,8 Regulations Governing the Licensing of Patent Rights or Technical Knowhow as Equity Investment, Article 2, Article 3.
991Statute for Technical Cooperation as promulgated August 9, 1962 and as
amended, May 29, 1964.
97

1im Id., Article 11.
101 Id., Article 3.

Id., Article 13.
-;'-Statute for Technical Cooperation, Article 13, as amended, on May 29,
1964.

102
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considerations involved in preparing a joint venture agreement.
However, there are several major considerations worth noting.
First, the question of the choice of law always draws the
attention of lawyers. In most joint venture agreements, the law
governing the agreement is the law of the country in which
the joint venture company is incorporated. This arrangement is
reasonable since there are many substantive as well as procedural difficulties in enforcing the law of one country within
the territory of another country. Assuming that the law governing the joint venture agreement is Chinese law, the question becomes whether the foreign venturer is prejudiced in his
right to bring action against the Chinese party in the Chinese
court. Article 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "Whoever has capacity to enjoy rights has the capacity to be a
party to an action."' 0 4 This rule offers the basic principle for
becoming a plaintiff or defendant in a Chinese court. Article 2 of the Law Governing the Application of the Book
of General Principle of the Civil Code further regulates that
"within the limits prescribed by law or ordinances, a foreigner
has the capacity to enjoy rights. 1 0 5 When a foreign corporation is involved, a "recognized"1 06 foreign corporation has
the same capacity to enjoy rights as a Chinese juristic person.10 7 However, the law does not say much about a "nonrecognized" foreign corporation's right to become plaintiff or
defendant in a Chinese court. A Supreme Court ruling in 1961
clarified this point and affirmed that even a "non-recognized"
foreign corporation may be a plaintiff or defendant in a Chinese

court. x08
Code of Civil Procedure, Article 40, promulgated on February 1, 1935; as
amended, December 26, 1945.
105 Law Governing the Application of the Book of General Principle of the
Civil Code, Article 2, promulgated September 24, 1929, effective on
October 10, 1929.
6
10 Article 292 of the Company Law stipulates:
"A foreign company shall not transact business or establish a branch
office within the territory of China without a certificate of authcrity given
after admission, and cannot apply for admission without incorporation in
its own country."
10T Article 12 of the Law Governing the Application of the Book of General
Principles of the Civil Code reads: "Within the limits prescribed by law
and ordinances, a recognized juristic person has the same capacity of
enjoying rights as a Chinese juristic person."
los The Chinese Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"Although a foreign juristic person not 'recognized' by Chinese authority
is not deemed a juristic person under Chinese law, it is nevertheless a
non-juristic person organization under subdivision 3 of Article 40 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, as long as it has a representative or administrator, a non-juristicperson organizationmay be a plaintiff
or defendant in a Chinese Court. Whether the foreign juristic person
has an office or business in China is not relevant for this purpose." (Case
number: Tai-sang No. 1898, 1961).
104
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It is thus clear that a foreign venturer enjoys rights in litigation in a Chinese court equal to those of Chinese nationals and
may not be prejudiced. Needless to say, the generally recognized
principles of international law and treaty obligation on the part
of the Republic of China also play a major role if foreign
venturers are discriminated against in a Chinese court.
Parties in disagreement do not always look upon litigation
as the best solution. Therefore, an arbitration clause is a most
effective preventive measure. The main questions in drafting
the arbitration clause are where the arbitration is held and
what laws and rules are applicable. In arbitration the primary
concern is how and where to enforce the arbitral award. In
the Republic of China, foreign awards cannot be enforced directly, but may be enforced by an action as a foreign court
judgment. In other words, if the foreign arbitral award is reduced to a foreign court judgment, then that judgment may
be enforced in the Republic of China. 10 9 If a foreign award has
not been reduced to judgment, an action for breach of contract
may be instituted in the case of binding arbitration. Since the
arbitration clause or agreement is basically a contract between
the parties involved, the award itself is a contractual obligation; and its breach can result in an action for breach of contract against the party which refuses to act pursuant to the
arbitral award. 10
Other aspects such as financing arrangements, warranty
provisions covering each party, covenants not to compete, expenses, and assignments are also of keen interest to lawyers
involved in drafting a joint venture agreement.
IV.

SpEcIFic PROBLEMS FACED BY

JoIr

VENTURE OPERATIONS

Foreign exchange restrictions
Foreign exchange restrictions affecting foreign investors
also apply to foreign joint venturers. Although, there are international conventions such as the Bretton Woods Agreement
and sections of the treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation which deal with the foreign exchange issue,' 1' it is a
basic principle of international law that foreign exchange restrictions are purely a question of domestic law. Therefore, the
109

Hsu, The Enforcement of American Arbitarl Awards in the Republic of
China, 1 CHENCH L. REV. 53, 57 (1969).

110 Id.
111 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1, 1944,
Art. 8, § (2b), 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 3 Bevans 1351, 2 U.N.T.S.

39, as amended, May 31, 1968, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748.
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courts of one country will not enforce the foreign exchange laws
of another.
Article 19, section 1 of the FCN treaty between the Republic
of China and the United States, states that if one party establishes or maintains any form of control of international
payment or of international financial transactions, it shall accord
fair and equitable treatment to the nationals, corporations and
12
Since there is
associations, and commerce of the other party.
no general recognized principle of international law governing
foreign exchange restrictions, the foreign exchange regulations
of the Republic of China are applicable to all foreign investors
11 3
as well as foreign parties to joint venture operations.
Under the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, the
foreign joint venturer may apply for exchange settlement
against the yearly net profit or interest accruing from his investment.1 1 4 Also, a foreign joint venturer may annually apply
for exchange settlement against 15 percent of the total amount
112 Treaty with the Republic of China on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946 [1948], Art. 19, 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871.
11sIn addition to the Rules Administrating Foreign Exchange and Trade,
which are the basic rules of law governing foreign exchange control, the
Republic of China has promulgated many supplemental rules and regulations covering foreign exchange restrictions. In general, it is permitted
to hold but not to buy or sell foreign currencies and foreign exchange.
Chinese and foreign exchange may only be sold to appointed foreign
exchange banks or their designated agencies. The following kinds of
foreign exchange should be sold to appointed foreign exchange banks for
New Taiwan Dollars at the prevalent buying rate: (1) foreign exchange
derived from export of commodities or other types of transactions; (2)
foreign exchange derived from service income by the navigation industry
and the insurance industry, etc. (including commission in foreign exchange acquired by importers); (3) inward remittances; (4) income
from investments abroad by Chinese nationals; (5) foreign currencies
or foreign exchange held by nationals or foreigners for conversion into
New Taiwan Dollars.
The Statute for Foreign Exchange Control was promulgated by the Legislative Yuan on December 24, 1970 to supersede the former Regulation
Governing Foreign Exchange issued by the Executive Yuan.
The following kinds of foreign exchange may be purchased with New
Taiwan Dollars at appointed foreign exchange banks at the banks' prevailing selling rate: (1) foreign exchange required for import of commodities; (2) foreign exchange required for payment for transactions by
navigation and insurance industries, etc. (including commission in foreign currencies paid abroad by exporters); (3) foreign exchange required
for payment by people going abroad for study, inspection tours, traveling,
medical treatment, employment, visiting close relatives and business consultation; (4) foreign exchange required for remittance of family maintenance expenses by nationals or foreigners serving in government organizations and private enterprises in the territory of the Republic of
China for their dependants abroad; (5) foreign exchange required for
remittances of principal and interest and profits accrued from investments
in the Republic of China by foreigners and overseas Chinese. The above
mentioned categories are by no means exhaustive but only provide a
general picture of the kind of foreign exchange restrictions the Republic
of China has.
114 Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, Article 12, as amended, on
December 14, 1959.
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of his invested principal two years after the completion of the
approved investment plan. 15 The determination of the total
amount of the so-called "invested principal" is based on the total
amount of equity investment, consisting of cash and properties
such as equipment and machinery."" The foreign joint venturer
is permitted to repatriate only his original capital and remit only
his share of the profits. 17 The right to repatriate capital and
earnings is granted only to the foreign investor; the joint venture company does not enjoy these privileges. It is important
to note that because of the prohibition against transferring the
shares paid by capitalized patent rights and the limitation imposed on the transfer of shares paid by capitalized technical
know-how, the 15 percent annual remittance of total capital is
not applicable to that portion of capital based on these capitalizations.
Foreign exchange restrictions often present difficult problems to the foreign party in a joint venture operation since
the determination of what constitutes foreign exchange and
how it is restricted is highly involved. Moreover, government
policies play an important role in foreign exchange restriction
issues. In addition to penalties provided by the Statute for
Foreign Exchange Control, violation of foreign exchange restriction may constitute violation of the National Mobilization
Law. The penalty is very severe. 18
Taxation
Tax benefits provided under the Statute for Encouragement of Investments are enticing to the joint venturer. It may
be noted that a five year tax holiday on the Business Income
Tax (sometimes known as the Profit-Seeking-Enterprise Income
Tax) is provided by the Statute for Encouragement of Investment, while the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals
115 Id.
116 Id., Article 3.
117 The remittance of capital will only occur after the assets of the invested

company have been transferred.
118 Statute for Exchange Control, as promulgated on December 24, 1970,

Articles 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26. The Former Regulation Governing
Foreign Exchange, as issued by the Executive Yuan was thereafter superseded by the Statute for Exchange Control.
By order of the Executive Yuan on April 11, 1958, foreign currencies or
foreign exchange are designated as "general mobilization commodities"
as prescribed under Clause 9, Article 3 of the National General Mobilization Law. According to the stipulation of Clause 1, Article 7 of the National General Mobilization Law, buying and selling freely or transfer
of foreign exchange is prohibited. Violators shall be punished in accordance with Item 2 of Clause 1, and Clause 2 of Article 5 and Article 7 of

Temporary Rules Governing Penalties for Violation of the National General Mobilization Law.
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only provides the privilege of remittance of foreign exchange
on earnings and capital. 119 Therefore, in preparing an investment
application, it is vital to request the granting of privileges and
benefits provided by both the Statute for Encouragement of
Investment and the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals.
On the other hand, if the foreign venturer does not intend to
make his investment as a foreign investment under the Statute
for Investment by Foreign Nationals, it is unnecessary for the
foreign venturer to himself obtain government approval in
order to enjoy the tax benefit provided by the Statute for
120
Encouragement of Investment; it is for the company to do so.
In this case, the foreign venturer may enjoy the tax exemptions
and accumulate his profits in New Taiwan Dollars, but he will
not be able to remit them from the Republic of China.
An important aspect of Chinese taxation relevant to
a foreign-local joint venture operation is taxation of a foreign
party to a joint venture operation. First, if the company wishes
to enjoy all the benefits under the Statute for Encouragement
of Investment, the enterprise must be in the form of a "Com' 21
Secondly, a foreign joint venture
pany Limited by Shares.'
party within the joint venture company is not treated separately
from the company. The joint venture company is taxed as an
entity. The only possible difference between a foreign party
and a local party is that the foreign party may remit his earnings and capital (if he sold his shares) out of the Republic of
China provided that approval of investment under the Statute
for Investment by Foreign Nationals is granted. The amount
he may remit is, of course limited to his share of the profits.
Note that all tax exemptions and benefits only apply to
the company, while individual shareholders of the joint venture
company still must pay an individual income tax. American
companies may credit any Chinese income tax paid or acits U.S. income tax under IRC §904 and Reg.
crued against
1.904-1.2 2
privileges provided under the Statute for Encouragement of Investments are granted to the newly formed joint-venture company. These
privileges accrue to the invested company not to the investing company.
The privileges of repatriation as provided under the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals belong to the investor or investing company.
See Statute for Encouragement of Investment, Article 5, as amended,
on January 4, 1965, and Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals,
Article 12, as amended, on December 14, 1959.
120 Id.
121 State for Encouragement of Investment, Article 3, as amended, January
4, 1965. The Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals does not stipulate in what form the invested enterprise must be.
122 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 904; Treas. Reg. § 1.904-1 (1964).
1M1)The
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In 1972, the Chinese Government decided to eliminate the
pre-withholding of income tax on undistributed earnings. Since
the undistributed earnings of a joint venture company are no
longer subject to the withholding of a 10 percent income tax,
the disadvantage formerly encountered by the joint venture
operation in the expansion of enterprise is no longer in existence.
With this development, foreign investors may be more willing
to reinvest their investment earnings in the expansion of the
joint venture operation.
Some potential disputes in a joint venture
Besides the major problems such as management and control in an operation as sophisticated and complex as a foreignlocal joint venture, there exists the possibility of future conflicts. The following is by no means an exhaustive list.
Fertile ground for conflict is typified by one member of
the joint venture party deciding to compete with the joint
venture company. To prevent this, a covenant not to compete
may be inserted in the joint venture agreement. This may read
as follows: "X Party shall not at any time after the conclusion
of the agreement be engaged in or have an interest, directly
or indirectly, either by itself or in conjunction with any other
person or persons, in any business in the Republic of China

detrimental to the business then being carried on by

y.,

1

2

3

Another possible item for dispute is the allocation of expenses incurred in preparing the joint venture agreement when
the agreement fails to be concluded. Some advance arrangement
as to the allocation will be helpful.
The assignment of the joint venture agreement by one
joint venture party to a third party could also cause disputes
between the original parties. A non-assignment clause would
eliminate the problem.
The joint venturer's responsibility for obtaining government approvals, permits, authorizations, and other requirements
should be explicitly agreed upon by the parties concerned.
Also, it would be wise to insert a provision stating that the
agreement is valid only if the necessary documents are obtained.
123

First paragraph of Article 209 of the Company Law provides "A director

who engages anything for himself or on behalf of another person that in
within the scope of the company's business, shall explain to the meeting

of shareholders the essential contents of such act and secure its approval."
Article 32 of the Company Law provides:
"Managerial officer shall not concurrently be managerial officer of other
profit-making enterprises and shall not engage in the same kind of busi-

ness either for himself or on behalf of others, unless otherwise agreed
upon by a majority of executive shareholders or directors."

92

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 3

The control of certain trade secrets is also of great concern to the joint venture parties and disputes in this regard
are always likely to arise when the mutual trust and good faith
between these parties diminish. Again, preventive draftsmanship must be employed.
How would a loan from abroad affect a joint venture operation?
From time to time, a joint venture operation needs financing from either domestic or foreign sources. If a lender
from abroad does not expect repayment in foreign currency,
the loan would not require any Government approval. The
amount loaned would stay in Taiwan since the repayment could
only be made in local currency.
On the other hand, if the loan from abroad is expected
to be repayed in foreign currency, then Chinese government
approval of the loan is necessary under Chinse law.124 Such
loans are usually treated in two different ways. First, a straight
loan must be approved by the Central Bank of China. Once
such approval is obtained, the borrower has the right to remit
the loan amount and interest earned from the Republic of
China in foreign currency.
The Central Bank of China recently adopted measures
against inflation limiting loans from abroad. 125 Such measures
are based on the following guidelines:
(1)
(2)

(3)

The maximum amount of the loan is $5,000,000 and the
minimum is $10,000;
The purpose of such loan is limited to the purchase of
equipment, machinery and raw materials from abroad for
the local productive enterprises;
The period for the loan is from two years to seven
26
years.1

However, it is anticipated that once the trend of inflation is
over, such restrictions will be lifted by the government. Secondly, if the loan is to be treated as investment, then a foreign
investment application must be filed pursuant to the Statute
for Investment by Foreign Nationals. 12 7 In this instance, it is
the lender (or the foreign joint venture party) who files the
124 Measures Governing the Obtaining of Loans from Abroad by Productive
Enterprises, Article 1, promulgated by the Central Bank of China on
November 13, 1970.
125 The inflow of foreign currency by way of loans requires the issuance of
more local currency, since all inward remittances in foreign currency have
to be sold to the government appointed bank.
126 Measures Governing Productive lEnterprises to Obtain Loans From
Abroad, Articles 3, 4, 5; issued by the Cental Bank of China, November
13, 1970; see also China Times, November 14, 1970, at 7.
127 Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, Article 12, as amended,
December 14, 1959.
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investment application. When approval is granted, it is the
lender who obtains the privilege to repatriate the repayment
28
of his loan investment when it is due.1
V.

CONCLUSION

A joint venture between a Chinese and a foreign venturer
is a valiant undertaking considering the differences in law, in
environment, and most importantly, in concepts. It is thus
safe to assume that some tribulations have been experienced
by both local and foreign parties during the early phases of
joint venture operations in the Republic of China. But in general, joint ventures in the Republic of China have worked out
satisfactorily, often with the blessing of the government. Nevertheless, there have been some unpleasant experiences. The most
severe cases have involved foreign parties with dominant economic power who have controlling interest in the joint venture.
Because of their majority interest, they have managed to have
resolutions adopted at shareholders' meetings increasing the
capital. The local party lacked the economic power to catch up
and was eventually squeezed out.
But on the whole, there are encouraging signs for the
future of joint ventures in the Republic of China, especially
since the government is now very concerned about local participation in the newly established industries. Therefore, a joint
venture proposal is likely to obtain government approval.
As a final word, we suggest that in the case of a foreign
investor who only intends to invest a relatively small amount
of capital and is not involved in a sophisticated technical field,
it would be advisable for him to create a joint venture with
a local party. Otherwise, it would be difficult to obtain the required government approval. If a foreign investor intends to
invest a substantial amount of capital and assures a foreign
market for his product, the government still looks upon his
establishing a wholly-owned subsidiary in a favorable light.

128 Id.

SMALL NATIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS:
THE EXPERIENCE OF SINGAPORE'
S. JAYAKUMAR**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The 26th General Assembly session witnessed the admission of five new states to membership of the United Nations
-Bhutan,
Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Their admission raised anew the question of small nations in the organization. The term "small nations" is used
here in a general sense to refer to those independent nations
which are very small in area, population, and human and economic resources.1
From time to time, scholars outside the United Nations, as
well as delegations within the world body, have expressed concern over the growing preponderance of small nations in the
organization. This is understandable. One of the most outstanding developments within the United Nations in the past
two decades has been the rapid increase in its overall membership. From 51 original members, the membership rose to 76
in 1955, to 100 in 1960, and to 132 in 1971. A significant proportion of these new members are the small, developing
nations.
Two kinds of general questions may be raised with regard
to the relationship between small nations and the United Nations. The first concerns the role of these small nations, individually or collectively, in contributing to the effectiveness
and success of the United Nations. Do they strengthen or
weaken it? The second concerns the advantages and benefits,
if any, that may accrue to a small nation from membership
and representation in the United Nations.
Much has been contributed regarding the first question
and the role of the small nations in assisting the organization
to discharge its primary obligations. For instance, everyone
is familiar with the debate concerning the mini-states prob* Adapted from an address to the Asia Society, New York, April 26, 1972.
Ambassador of Singapore to the United Nations; LL.B., Singapore; LL.M.,
Yale; Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Singapore.
I An adaptation of U Thant's definition of micro-states in the INTRODUc-

**

TION TO THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

ON THE WORK

OF THE ORGANIZATION 1966-67, U.N. Doc. A/6701 Add. 1 (1967).
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lem, the one-state-one-vote principle, proposals for weighted
voting and related matters. The advantages and benefits that
a small nation may obtain through representation at the United
Nations are not as well known. One may, indeed, be tempted
to believe that in view of the numerous weaknesses of the
United Nations and its frequent inabilities to solve some major
crises there are no significant advantages at all.
The question is not an academic one; certainly not for the
small nations. Representation at the United Nations involves
considerable expenditures for each member and include:
a)

Contributions to the United Nations budget. For
instance, the Singapore assessment for 1972 is $88,2
846- representing 0.05 percent of the regular budget.

b)

Rental or purchase of office premises as well as
residences for home-based staff.

c)

Salaries, medical treatment and other aspects of
welfare of the home-based staff.

d)
e)

Salaries for locally recruited staff.
Transportation within New York as well as between the home capital and New York, Geneva or
elsewhere to attend various meetings and conferences.
Communications systems between New York and
the respective home capitals which, as a minimum,
would consist of weekly airflown diplomatic bags,
telex, cable and telephone facilities.

f)

For a small nation, the total amount incurred can be a staggering figure representing a significant portion of its limited
resources. Are the advantages commensurate with the expense?
A rather cynical ambassador once stated that the reasons why
small nations sought membership in the United Nations were
first, that it was fashionable to do so and that no small nation would want to be the odd man out; second, that it was
a symbolic expression of support for the laudable objectives
and activities of the United Nations in trying to make the world
a less dangerous place to live in; and third, that membership
of the United Nations was probably the best evidence of statehood and sovereignty.
There are other, more distinct, advantages which make
United Nations membership extremely useful and beneficial
2

G.A. Res. 2654, 25 GAOR Supp. 28, at 106, U.N. Doc. A/8183 (1970).
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for small nations. These advantages, each of which will be
discussed in turn, include:
a) The advantage of economic and technical assistance;
b) The United Nations as a sensor of world trends;
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)

The United Nations as a source of data and scientific knowledge;
The promotion and protection of national interests;
The development of international law;
The United Nations as a modality for bilateral
diplomacy;
The United Nations as a training school for young
foreign service officials.
II.

ECONOmiC AiD mN

TEcHNIcAL

ASSISTANCE

The first advantage is the technical assistance and aid provided through various subsidiary organs such as the United
Nations Development Program (U.N.D.P.) and the specialized
agencies. For small developing nations this is probably the
most important.
The modalities of such assistance vary and may consist of
the provision of experts, fellowships, supplies, or equipment.
Equally useful is the availability of and access to training institutions, regional training centres, seminars and group study
tours. It is possible to receive some of this assistance without
being a member of the United Nations, but membership is
definitely an advantage in being able to participate in, and to
influence, the decision-making in the United Nations regarding
aid and technical assistance.
It is, of course, no secret that developing countries would
want even more than what is presently being done under the
auspices of the United Nations. But there can be no doubt
that many small nations have benefited immensely from this
facet of United Nations activities. To give an example relating
to Singapore, the 1969 Yearbook of the United Nations discloses
that the Pre-Investment Assistance provided in 1969 to Singapore under the Special Fund component of the U.N.D.P. totalled
$975,000. 3 There were a total number of 35 experts who were
sent and three fellowships were awarded. The value of equipment involved was $331,000.
The Singapore delegation has -consistently maintained that
1969 YEARBOOK OF THE UN1rED NATIONS 309.
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the failure to promote rapid economic development is one
major reason why small nations have failed to achieve internal
stability and modernization and why they easily succumb to
the designs of the big powers. As Singapore's Foreign Minister,
Mr. S. Rajaratnam, stated in his speech at the 26th General
Assembly:
We cannot build immunity against manipulation by great and
wealthy states so long as we remain economically weak and
are beset by all the ills of underdevelopment .... It is vital
for small nations . . . to approach the problem of economic
development with a new sense of realism and urgency ....
For a start we should develop an obsession about economic
4
development.

It is also significant to observe that it is not only the
quantum and extent of the assistance which is beneficial, but
also the character of technical assistance channeled through the
United Nations. It is well known that small nations would
like to limit the extent to which they are recipients of such
assistance from individual countries on a bilateral basis, and
thus avoid any obligations which could lead to delicate or
embarassing situations. Assistance from the United Nations
eliminates such problems. There is a comforting cloak of
anonymity: it is an organization, not a specific country, that
is providing the aid. It is true that several contributing countries may be involved in the United Nations' efforts, but as
this assistance is being provided by the United Nations, the
recipient small nations do not feel that their interests are
being compromised.
III. THE UNTm NATIONS AS A SENSOR OF WoRLD TRENDs
The second advantage is that the United Nations is a helpful gauge for monitoring and assessing current world trends.
In today's world of fast-moving events and interdependence
among nations, it is important for all nations to keep abreast
of world trends and developments, both on the political and
economic fronts. Assessment of world trends is important in
order to predict future events so that one can plan ahead with
confidence, to be prepared to adjust to major changes and
avoid being caught by surprise. This may be far more important to small nations than to the larger and more advanced
countries which would find it easier than small nations to
cushion themselves against the shocks of traumatic world
events. Small nations, further do not have the resources to
establish as sophisticated and large an organization of diplo426th General Assembly, Plenary Session 1960, Oct. 11, 1971.
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mats, analysts, experts, or intelligence services as do the larger
nations. In this connection, the United Nations can prove most
useful to the small nation. It is an excellent place for sensing
important world political trends, and an ambassador at the
United Nations could assist his country immensely.
The Debates. Many of the debates and discussions in the
various United Nations committees can frequently reveal the
attitudes of certain powers, give an insight to significant
changes in policies of some states, or reveal a shifting of relationships between states. This is not only true in the political
arena for it must be remembered that in the General Assembly,
there are the following main committees:
1st Committee and
Special Political - dealing with political and
security matters;
Committee
2nd Committee
3rd Committee
4th Committee
5th Committee

-dealing with economic and
financial matters;
-dealing with social, cultural
and humanitarian matters;
-dealing with colonial and
trusteeship matters;
- dealing with budgetary and
administrative matters;

-dealing with legal matters.
6th Committee
At the United Nations a wide spectrum of international
questions are discussed with more than 130 nations participating in this discussion. By observing the debates, the politics,
the lobbying, the alliances formed between certain states to
press or to defeat certain proposals, one may discern some new
trends and tendencies. Thus, if a small nation sent a competent
and conscientious delegation to the General Assembly, it would
receive incisive reports which would assist the government considerably in assessing trends, as well as in being informed on
specific topics and on specific countries. This would enable
the government to constantly review and adjust its policies in
the United Nations or towards certain countries.
An example of this is the sharp Soviet-Chinese verbal attacks against each other last year in the Security Council and
General Assembly. 5 Most ambassadors would write reports on
this to their home governments for at least three reasons: first,
it suggested the emergence of a new cold war at the United
5U.S. News, Oct. 30, 1972, at 64.
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Nations reminiscent of the cold war of the fifties between the
United States and Soviet Union; second, it gave confirmation of
China's present attitudes and feelings toward the Soviet Union;
and, third, it enabled the governments to predict what this
augurs as to events both within and without the United Nations.
One must, however, be cautious here, and as my predecessor, Ambassador Koh, stated, the reality mirrored in the United
Nations is often at odds with objective reality or with the
reality in the world. This is because many delegations sometimes say things they do not mean and some important political
problems are not reflected in the United Nations at all. Another note of caution is that the ambassador who concentrates
on the formal discussions and open debates may be wasting
his time, for not infrequently the most interesting information
can be picked up in the corridor conversations and at cocktail
parties. Indeed, one suspects that this may be one of the reasons
why ambassadors religiously attend cocktails, often taking in
as many as four cocktail functions in one evening.
Information from Missions. At the United Nations there
are more than a hundred missions which are constantly issuing statements, announcements and press releases which are
distributed to all other missions. In each morning's mail, for
instance, the Singapore mission receives countless communications from various other missions. Most of these are routine
such as those informing of changes in the staff of the mission.
On the other hand, some of these communications are important
statements of policy which may interest governments at home.
The United Nations Press Corps. There is a unique collection of pressmen at the United Nations. They are a fantastic
source of information not only about the U.N. events but
also about the events and policies of various countries. The
U.N. Correspondents Association lists at least 200 accredited
journalists from more than 150 publishers from all regions
of the world. They are extremely competent and knowledgeable persons who have fairly good relations with most delegations. Thus, if an ambassador does not know much about
what is going on in a certain country or does not have good
relations with the ambassador of that country, he may nevertheless find out the latest from a friendly U.N. journalist who
has recently had an interview with the ambassador of that
country. This is one reason many ambassadors strive to maintain good relations with the United Nations press corps.
It may be true that nations are no longer placing too
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much emphasis on bilateral diplomacy as a means of assessing
international trends. The importance of traditional diplomacy,
in this regard, has been diminished by the rapid advances in
communications technology and with the wide distribution of
the various international news services. The United Nations is
an exception and, for the reasons given, it will continue to be
used by nations to evaluate the international climate.
IV.

TmE UNITED NATIONS AS A SOURCE OF DATA AND
ScIENTIFIc KNOWLEDGE

The incredible bulk of documentation at the United Nations
is well known. A great percentage of this documentation is unnecessary and serious efforts must be made to stop the proliferation of U.N. documents. However, some of these publications are extremely valuable to governments, especially the
smaller developing nations. United Nations publications, generally speaking, fall into the following categories:
a)
b)

c)

Official reports of proceedings of various United Nations organs or verbatim records;
Various documents tabled at meetings of these organs
including draft resolutions or preparatory documents
issued by the Secretariat;
Reports of seminars and meetings held by the United
Nations at a regional or international level;

d)

Studies and Reports prepared by the Secretariat and
other bodies such as UNITAR, ECAFE, on various
topics including industrial development, scientific and
technological development;

e)

Statistical documents such as the Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.

Several of these publications are extremely valuable and can
aid developing nations in planning their development policies.
For example, the Secretariat recently issued a paper explaining how remote satellite sensing surveys could be useful
to developing countries; such surveys can identify certain features of the natural resources on land and water which would
otherwise take years to discover. This interested many developing countries in the work of the United Nationas Working Group
in Remote Sensing by Satellites.6
The Singapore mission each week examines the pile of
U.N. documents to select those which we think can of be
"G.A. Res. 2778, 26 GAOR Supp. 29, at 28, U.N. Doc. A/8528 (1971).
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of assistance to different departments of our government. We
send these documents directly to the different ministries which,
in turn, have often confirmed that they have found these
documents useful and have urged us to continue sending further publications.
V.

THE

PROMOTION

AND

PROTECTION

OF

NATIONAL

INTERESTS

The debates, resolutions and policies involved at the
United Nations can often have long and short term implications for a nation's interests. These consequences may be direct
or indirect and they may be beneficial or adverse for a particular nation depending on the problem, the decision of the
United Nations and on how the nation perceives its national
interests. Membership in the United Nations, in this sense, is
imperative for all nations, large or small, so that they may
protect or advance their national interests. Small nations
would suffer by default if they were not represented at the
United Nations to express their particular viewpoints on the
diverse activities which could affect them.
An example of this is the present discussion on the law
of the sea, especially the seabed and ocean floor.7 The General
Assembly has formally declared that the seabed and ocean
floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, constitute the common heritage of mankind. The exploitation of this international area and the profits thus derived are to be for the benefit of mankind as a whole. Now
the problem is one of defining the international area, because
so far there has been no agreement on permissible limits of
national jurisdiction. This is one of the debates at the United
Nations. The extent of seabed areas claimed by coastal nations
will in turn determine the so-called international area. Quite
a few coastal nations and especially those with long coastlines
are pressing for national seabed zones up to 200 miles.
Singapore is a shelf-locked state; that is, it is physically
unable to extend its claims to national seabed jurisdiction beyond its present limits. Therefore, it has a vital interest in
the concept of a common heritage. Along with other shelflocked states and landlocked states, it is urging that the international regime should be as broad as possible. The reasons
are obvious: the greater the international area, the greater the
revenue and benefits which will accrue to mankind of which
Singapore is a part. It is too early to say if the smaller nations
7 G.A. Res. 2749, 25 GAOR Supp. 28 at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970).
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will succeed, but at least they are being heard and have the
cpportunity of persuading other countries to accomodate their
views.
In this sense, membership at the United Nations is an
advantage in that the opportunity exists for small states to
try to advance their national interests or to try to modify
certain actions which may be detrimental to a country's national interest.

VI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The advantage concerning the development of international
law is closely related to the question of national interests.
Many of the newly independent nations have questioned some
of the traditional rules of international law on the ground
that this body of international law had been formulated by
the small handful of western nations. It is argued that such
law does not really reflect the needs, interests and practices
of the contemporary international community. There is some
force in this argument, for if international law is to be effective, its rules must be supported and recognized by the majority of nations. Just as national laws are not static and are constantly undergoing change and reform, the same is true of
international law.
Over the years the United Nations has become an important vehicle for the reform and updating of international
law. The discussions in the International Law Commission,
the Sixth Committee of the United Nations as well as other
organs of the United Nations can and often do lead to the
adoption of multilateral treaties which either replace previous
instruments or introduce rules on matters which had not been
specifically regulated by law. These treaties may cover a wide
range of subjects. Examples are numerous: the 1958 Geneva
Conventions on the Law of the Sea," the 1961 Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, 9 the 1965 Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 0 the 1966 Covenants on
Human Rights," the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
8

Convention on the High Seas, Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (done, April 29, 1958); Convention on the Continental Shelf, June 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499
U.N.T.S. 311 (done, April 29, 1958); Convention on the Territorial Sea,
and Contiguous Zone, Sept. 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205 (done, April 29, 1958).
9 547 U.N.T.S. 358, done, April 18, 1961.
l U.N. Doc. A/RES/2106 (1966), also 5 IN'L LEGAL MATERIALS 350 (done,
Nov. 20, 1963).
it 21 .N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49-60, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), also 6 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 368 (done, Dec. 19, 1966).
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Treaties. 12 All are treaties which owe their existence to the
United Nations deliberations. This is not to suggest that the mere
adoption of these treaties automatically alters general international law. This would turn on many other factors such as
the number of states which adhere to the treaty.
What should be stressed is that these law-making aspects
of U.N. authority provide the opportunity for the small nations
to express their point of view and, where possible, to bring
about the modification of certain rules which they regard as
anachronistic in the twentieth century.
In a negative sense, on this point, it should be mentioned
that participation in these activities would also enable a nation
to observe any moves by other states to create certain new
rules which could conflict with that nation's vital interests. In
such a situation there would be an opportunity for that state
to protest, adduce arguments against the proposed rule and, if
necessary, to combine efforts with other states with similar
interests to counter such moves. In this sense no nation,
whether large or small, can afford to opt out of such activities.
VII.

THE

UNITED NATIONS AS A MODALITY FOR BILATERAL
DIPLOMACY

It is often said that the United Nations represents multilateral diplomacy or conference-orientated diplomacy. The
point not commonly realized is that in practice a great deal of
bilateral diplomacy goes on. Many small nations find in the
United Nations excellent opportunities for establishing contacts, conducting transactions with nations with which they
do not have formal diplomatic relations or to improve relations
with such countries.
This can be visualized once it is appreciated that there are
132 member nations at the United Nations and six observer
nations. Nearly all of them have representatives resident in
New York with an operational staff and office. There is no
other place in the world where so many nations are represented on a permanent basis.
In the conduct of bilateral diplomacy small nations, because of their limited resources, have to limit their overseas
diplomatic missions, unfortunately, to only a handful of countries. Singapore, as an example, presently has a total of 26
diplomatic missions (excluding our U.N. mission). The number
of diplomatic and consular missions of other countries in Singa12

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969),
(done, May 23, 1969).

also 8

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

679

1973
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pore totals 49. Thus, it is clear that Singapore does not have
formal diplomatic relations with the vast majority of nations.
The United Nations is an ideal place where this gap can be
overcome. First, by personal friendship and cooperation, one
can promote close links and understanding with many of these
countries. Secondly, whenever there is a need to transact any
diplomatic business with a country, this can be done through
the respective missions of the two countries.
This unofficial bilateral diplomacy is facilitated by the fact
that there is far less protocol in the United Nations than in
the bilateral diplomacy conducted in various countries. This
seems to be the consensus of other permanent representatives
who have served as ambassadors in bilateral diplomatic posts.
It is their opinion that there are less artificial rituals and ceremonies at the United Nations and an ambassador here has
easier and more informal access to his colleagues from other
countries.

VIII.

THE UNITED NATIONS AS A TRAINING SCHOOL
FOR YOUNG FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICIALS

One of the problems of small nations in their efforts to
build an efficient foreign service is the lack of resources and
facilities to train their recruits to the foreign service. More
often than not their foreign services are understaffed and the
new recruits have to start work almost immediately without
adequate training. While some of the bigger and more advanced nations can afford the time and expense to establish
ideal training programs, for the smaller nations the question
usually is one of giving the maximum training in a minimum
amount of time.
This intensive training takes place at the United Nations
itself. A small nation would be well advised to send its new
recruits to be attached to its mission at the United Nations for
a year, or if that is not possible, to expose them to the General
Assembly session which lasts for three months. It is doubtful
that there is any other place where one can observe first hand
both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy at work. The experience one obtains at the United Nations is valuable:
a)

One observes first hand how nations operate, how
they lobby to promote or oppose a proposal;

b)

One learns the tactics and strategies employed;

c)

One obtains experience in assessing the implica-

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

106

d)

VOL. 3

tions of various proposals in relation to one's national interests;
One learns how to make quick decisions. In fact,
at the United Nations, one cannot get away from
making decisions since countries are called upon
to publicly announce their voting positions. On
some occasions, one may have instructions; on
others, decisions would have to be made on the
spot;

One has to quickly develop a flair for tactful
and diplomatic relations with representatives of
friendly countries. Whichever way a nation votes
it is bound to make some country unhappy and disappointed and here it is important to be diplomatic,
friendly and, in a persuasive manner, to explain
one's position to that country without jeopardizing
friendly relations.
In short, the highly intense, pressurized political and diplomatic activity in the United Nations offers an ideal training
ground for foreign service officials.
e)

IX.

CONCLUSION

These are the advantages which small nations can obtain
through membership at the United Nations. Most of these advantages stem from:
-the unique character of the United Nations;
-the

unusual number of states represented;

wide spectrum of matters discussed in the organ-the
ization;
-the
importance of some of the U.N. activities;
and,
-the fact that while the United Nations mainly represents
multilateral diplomacy, in practice much bilateral diplomacy is also prevalent.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND
UGANDA'S EXPULSION OF ITS ASIAN MINORITY
I.

BACKGROUND

On August 5, 1972, Major General Idi Amin Dada Oumee
ordered all Ugandans of Asian descent out of the country within
three months, accusing them of "sabotaging the economy."'
Most of the Asians are of Indian or Pakistani origin and have
resided in Uganda for generations. They control 90 percent of
Uganda's commerce and trade. They comprise 80 percent of the
2
doctors, lawyers and teachers.
Of the 309,000 Asians living in East Africa, over one-third
are British subjects.3 These people have either preferred to remain British subjects because of the travel and educational advantages, or they have inadvertently forgotten to renounce their
British citizenship.
Immediately after the expulsion decree was issued the
British acknowledged "special responsibility" for the Asians in
Uganda who held British passports.4 Noting Britain's moral and
legal duty to absorb the ousted Asians, Sir Alec Douglas-Hume
observed that
If these people were ever expelled we (the British Government)
accepted an obligation to take them in. To go back on that would
be to break the word solemnly given of successive British Governments. But it's not only a matter of the British Government's
word. Under international law a state has a duty to accept those
5
of its nationals who have nowhere else to go.

Many of the Asians living in Uganda, however, claimed
Ugandan citizenship. The government demanded that they furnish documentary evidence, such as a birth certificate or documents renouncing any previous citizenship, to substantiate their
claim.6 The citizenship certificates of those Asians unable to
7
do so were cancelled, and they became stateless.
Times, Aug. 6, 1972, at 9, col. 1. Foreign Minister Kcbeki claimed the
Asians were charging exorbitant prices and illegally exporting funds
from the country. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1972, at 2, col. 7.
2 N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
3N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1972, at 8, col. 3.
4N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1972, at 6, col. 1.
5 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1972, at 3, col. 6.
"N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1972, at 4, col. 4.
7 N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1972, at 3, col. 4. Also Britain's envoy to Uganda and
European Economic Council Representative, Geofrey Rippon, reported
that citizenship papers were torn up at random by Ugandan officials.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1972, at 8, col. 1.
1 N.Y.
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Amin banned all air shipments of Asians' possessions for
fear they would ship expensive goods instead of complying with
currency regulations. Amin's minister of Commerce, Wilson Lutera, stated that the government would buy the property and sell
it to Africans." No mention was made of the amount of reparation to be paid. The British reported that the first Ugandans
arriving in Britain had been stripped of all their possessions.
Army troops confiscated their remaining belongings as the
expellees approached the airport to departY
The Asians were allowed 48 hours to leave the country
after receiving exit papers. To insure compliance, Amin ordered a house to house search without warrant.' 0 The order
authorized troops and prison officials to arrest any person suspected "on reasonable grounds of having committed or being
about to commit an offense against property, a person or public
order.""
On September 14, Amin announced that any Asians left after
November 8 would be put into camps by the army. Amin was
later quoted by Ugandan radio as having no intention of extending this deadline;1 2 however, he did express in a letter to
U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim that "it is not my intention
to treat or otherwise oppress any non-citizen Asian who might
have failed to meet the deadline.' 3 This statement later proved
to be untrue, and Asians were detained in camps after the departure date had expired.
II.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND ALIENS

The failure of traditional international law to provide
mechanisms for protecting individual rights has often been
noted. How these rights can be protected within the domestic
sphere of a sovereign state remains a dilemma exemplified by
the Ugandan situation. 4
Basic to the protection of human rights is the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention, which proposes that "each state
has a legal duty to see that conditions prevailing within its own
8 N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1972, at 2, col. 5.
9 N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1972, at 8, col. 5. See also report in N.Y. Times, Sept.
30, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
10 Time, Oct. 16, 1972, at 34.

11 N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1972, at 5, col. 1.
12 N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1972, at 13, col. 1.
13 N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1972, at 13, col. 1.
14 Professor McDougal has expressed the belief that whatever values we
summarize as "human rights," however narrowly or broadly, are with
equal obvicusness dependent upon "security" and all other values. McDougal and Bebr, Human Rights in the Uinted Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 607 (1964)

[hereinafter cited as McDougal and Bebr].
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territory do not menace international peace and order, and
[that] to this end it must treat its own populace in a way
which will not violate the dictates of humanity and justice or
shock the conscience of mankind."' 5 Although its original purpose was to protect -individuals and groups from their own
state, the doctrine has been expanded to sanction the use of
external force "in cases in which a State maltreats its subjects,"'16 and to "require of each state a minimum protection of
all inhabitants of its territory."' 7
A denial of justice allows an international claim of a violation of human rights, or "some unlawful violation of the
rights of an alien."' 8 Interestingly, international law has developed more complex protection for aliens than for citizens. 19
Professor Lauterpacht has noted:
Although international law does not at present recognize, apart
from treaty, any fundamental rights of the individual protected
by international society as against the state of which he is a
national, it does acknowledge some of the principle fundamental
rights of the individual in one particular sphere, namely, in
respect of aliens . . .The result, which is somewhat paradoxical,
is that the individual in his capacity as an alien enjoys a larger
law than in his character
measure of protection by international
as the citizen of his own state. 20
There is substantial agreement that there is an "international standard of civilized justice" requiring local leaders
to protect aliens crossing national and local boundaries. 21 That
standard would apply to the status of the Asians in Uganda.
Since they have been deported as aliens, their rights in that
country should have been interpreted accordingly by the in22
ternational community. As long as a "vigorous minority,"
however, demands that "equality of treatment" be the only
international standard, 23 aliens will be offered the same small
protection given to nationals.
III.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Article 55(c) of the United Nations Charter states that
"the United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for,
15 38 AM. J. INT'L. L. Supp. 41-135 (1944); cited in McDougal and Bebr.
16 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN 32 (1950).
17 AM. J. INT'L. L. SuPP., supra note 15.
18BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD, passim,
(1915).
19 AM. J. INT'L. L. SuPP., supra note 15, at 609.
20 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 16, at 121.
21 BoRcHARD, supra.note 18, at intro. Soe also McDougal and Bebr at 610.
2 AM. J. INT'L. L. SuPP., supra note 15, at 610.
2. J. ROTH, MINIMUM STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO ALIENS
23 (1949); see also C. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 47 (1931).
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and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all . . ." Article 56 adds: "All Members pledge themselves
to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
'
Article 552 24
The two provisions taken together have been interpretated
to create definite legal obligations. But since the legal obligation is very general, the U.N. has supplemented the Charter by
adopting covenants which provide more substantive content
and outline some specific enforcement procedures. Additionally,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights25 has given comprehensive substance to human rights. While the Declaration is
not a legal instrument, some of its provisions expound general
principles of law. Perhaps its greatest significance is that it
provides an authoritative guide to the interpretation of the
26
provisions in the Charter.
In most instances however, the U.N. has not been able
to do much about actual violations of human rights and, in fact,
has frequently ignored them. There exists, consequently, no
generally applicable and systematic international procedures or
institutional machinery for receiving and investigating complaints for individual petitioners.
The first step in giving the individual substantial remedies
for violations of human rights is to recognize him as a subject
of international law. One is a subject of international law when
he has "rights under international rules of conduct which he
can enforce by seeking relief before a tribunal, whether or not
'27
domestic law would enforce such a right.
Professor McDougal aptly describes the protection of the
individual through the state of nationality as a "fiction": the
wrong done to the individual is a wrong done to the national
state and international law imposes no duty on the nation state
24 United Nations Charter, set forth at 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.

See
also Articles 62, 68 & 76 for further provisions on human rights. Two
cases point out that when private individuals tried to invoke Articles
55 and 56 in a domestic setting, relief was denied because the Charter
was interpreted as not being a "self-executing" treaty, and, therefore,
not binding on private citizens of the United States without some
domestic legislation. See Fujui v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617
(1952), and Rice V. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa
147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953).
25 U.N. Doc. No. A/811 (1948).
'6 Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 RECUEIL DES
COURs 5, 198-99 (1962). See, e.g., Nanda, A Critique of the United Nations Inaction in the Bangladesh Crisis, 49 DENVER L.J. 53 (1972).
27 Tucker, Has the Individual Become a Subject of International Law?, 34
U. OF CIN. L. REV. 345 (1965).
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to prosecute such claims. 28
Thus, rights of the individual have not been widely recognized. Indeed, only the European Court of Human Rights grants
the right of "individual petition. '2 Ugandan Asians, therefore,
must qualify under other international provisions, not as individuals seeking petition, but as racial minorities appealing to
other mechanisms for protection of their rights as aliens.

IV.

REGIONAL SOLUTION

The eradication of colonialism, of racial discrimination and
of apartheid are issues on which African leaders have always
stood firmly united, and along these lines a regional solution
may be found to situations like Uganda's. 30 The Resolution on
Apartheid and Racial Discrimination expresses "the unanimous
conviction of the imperious and urgent necessity of coordinating
and intensifying efforts to put an end to the South African
Government's criminal policy of apartheid and wipe out racial
discrimination in all its forms.3 '
The Organization of African Unity Charter 2 provides that
by adherance to the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, "the Heads of State and Government set forth
a code of behavior for African States in their mutual relationship, elaborated in Article 3 of the Charter and based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity in inter-African
affairs." 33 It should be noted that nowhere in the O.A.U. Charter
is it stated that certain purposes are primary, and that, by
34
exclusion, others are secondary.
Regional arrangements in Africa have already been initiated.
In 1961 in Lagos a conference, organized by the International
Commission of Jurists, created the "Law of Lagos" which states
that a proposed convention should provide for "the creation
of a court of appropriate jurisdiction and that recourse thereto
should be made available to all persons under the jurisdiction
35
of the signatory state. 1
As the European experience has shown, standards and approaches that entail relatively minimum obligations can be
gradually expanded as fears of abuses lessen. On a local level,
28

AM. J. INT'L. Supp., supra note 15, at 610.

29)2 Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTs 174 (1957-58).
30 j.CERVENKA, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRIcAN UNIrY AND ITS CHARTER 1

(1965).
of the Proceedings of the Summit Conference of the Heads of
State and Government held at Adidas Ababa in May 1963, published by

31 Vol. I
32

the Provisional Secretariat at Adidas Ababa.
Id., sec. 1, at 1-7 (separately paged).
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a small number of nations may closely control protocols, liberal
reservation clauses and optional clauses, and so increase their
confidence in such instruments.
As confidence increases in a regional instrument, the states'
desire to have aliens exhaust its local remedies rule would
decrease. The local remedies rule, which has traditionally required that the claimant exhaust all local remedies that were
effective, would be modified allowing appeal to a regional body
attuned to state as well as regional problems.

V. THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

One of the first formal efforts to prevent racial discrimination against minorities like the Ugandan Asians was Article 36
of the text prepared by the Drafting Committee of the Human
Rights Commission. 36 It was not a strong text: While it recognized that persons belonging to racial, linguistic and religious
minorities "shall have the right as far as compatible with public
order to establish and maintain their schools and cultural or
religious institutions and to use their language in the Press, in
37
public assembly and before the Courts and other authorities,"
it did not put any obligation on governments to assist such
minorities financially. It also limited protection to a interpre38
tation of public order to be determined by the local authorities.
Since then much has been done by the U.N. Subcommission
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. In fact, there has been no issue with which the U.N. has
been more concerned than that of racial discrimination. The
U.N. has made "detailed studies" regarding the existence and
status of recognized minorities in various states and the legis39
lative measures taken by these states for their protection.
Still, it was not until the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was adopted
.33Id.
34 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SU1MMIT CONFERENCE OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND

GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, at 32.
: See International Commission of Jurists, African Conference on the Rule
of Law, Lagos, Nigeria (Jan. 3-7, 1961), at 11. Cited in Nanda, Implementation of Human Rights - Steps Taken by the United Nations and
Regional Organizations,21 DEPAUL L. REV. 307, 332 (1971).
:34;
1947 U.N. Yearbook on Human Rights 499, 502.
:1z Id. Emphasis added.
3
8 Humphrey, The United Nations Subcommission on the Prevention of
Discriminationand the Protection of Minorities, 62 AM. J. INT'L. L. 872
(1968).
39 Id. at 873.
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that minorities were afforded some substantive protection.40
Article 1(1) provides that
in this Convention the term "racial discrimination" shall mean
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment,
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life.
The systematic elimination of all persons of Asian descent from
the Ugandan social, political, cultural and economic experience
clearly comes within this definition. Additionally, the reasons
articulated in Amin's expulsion order suggest a racial basis for
the expulsion, even though such a basis was expressly denied
41
therein.
Within this definition the rights to which prohibition of
discrimination apply are very broad: it covers discrimination
in regard to "human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, social, cultural or any other field of public life. '42 As
Professor Schwelb has noted: "For the practical purposes of
the interpretation of the Convention of 1965 the three terms
'descent', 'national origin' and 'ethnic origin' among them cover
distinctions both on the ground of present or previous 'nationality' in the ethnographical sense and on the ground of
previous nationality in the 'politico-legal' sense of citizenship
(emphasis added) .' 43 Thus, the "nationality" of the Ugandan
Asians does include them within the definitional protection
of this Convention, regardless of their historic entry into Uganda.
Paragraph 2 of Article 1 points out that exclusions of or
restrictions upon aliens qua aliens are not prohibited by the
Convention. The Convention does not necessarily prohibit distinctions based on whether a person is, or is not, a citizen.
Amin's action has not excluded Ugandan citizens and de facto
appears to have been based on a citizen/non-citizen standard.
However, this interpretation ignores the rationale for expulsion
of the Asians, which was based not on this standard but on
a purely racial distinction which singled out one minority be4

0Annex to General Assembly resolution 2106A (XX), 1406th plenary
meeting, Dec. 21, 1965, General Assembly Official Records: Twentieth
Session. Supplement No. 14 (A/6014) at 47 [hereinafter cited as Annex].
For a complete study of the Convention, see Schwelb, The International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
15 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 996 [hereinafter cited as SCHWELB].
41 11 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 1191 (1972). See also 5 N.Y.U. J. OF INT'L.
LAW AND POLITICS '603 (1972).
4 ANNEX, supra note 40, at 1103.
43 ANNEX, supra note 40, at 1007.
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cause of its economic wealth. If the former standard had been
used by Amin, all Europeans living in Uganda should have
been treated in the same manner.
Part II of the Convention provides for the use of mechanisms for the elimination of racial discrimination and the rights
implicit therein. In particular, the Convention provides for an
international "Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination" (Arts. 8 and 10), for a reporting system in which
State Parties- undertake to cooperate (Art. 9), for interstate
complaints through the Committee and through "ad hoc Conciliation Commissions" (Arts. 11 and 13), for the Committee to
receive individual petitions (Art. 14), and for a sui generis
procedure which will consider parties relating to non-self-governing territories (Art. 15). Lastly, the Convention provides
for adjudication to the International Court of Justice with respect to interpretation or application of the Convention (Art.
22 of Part III). From this Convention and its ratification, therefore, comes the most efficacious means of protecting individuals
in situations like Uganda's. As Professor Schwelb has pointed
out, the Convention is not only the most "comprehensive and
unambiguous codification in treaty form on the equality of
the races." 4 4 but it is also the best mechanism for protecting
individual rights now in existence.
VI.

STATE RESPONSiBITrY

State Responsibility is the principle in international law
holding that a state is responsible for its conduct and may be
held to account for wrongdoing. 45 The need to concentrate study on the determination of the principles which govern
the responsibility of states for international protection of human rights is great, but is too complex a concept to deal with
in depth here.
African states, much like Asian states, are critical of the
customary legal principle of state responsibility:
They believe that such a principle was established against their
basic interests as sovereign states; that it is outmoded since it is
basically a European principle; that aliens should not receive
better or worse treatment than the nationals of a state; that
admission of aliens should be at the complete discretion of the
receiving state alone; and that the receiving state is permitted
absolute discretion in prohibiting or restricting the participation
46
of aliens in professions and other forms of gainful employrent.
supra note 40, at 1057.
4.5U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233 at 179.
44 AN-Ex,

46

C.

RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1971).
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Procedurally, to invoke the theory of state responsibility
against the recent actions of the Ugandan Government, there
must first be shown a violation of international law: "There
can be no question of a State's international responsibility unless it can be proved that the State has violated one of the
international obligations incumbent upon States under international law."'47 Additionally, under international law and apart
from any convention or treaty, to invoke state responsibility,
"it is necessary that an unlawful international act be imputed
to a State, that is, that there exist a violation of a duty im48
posed by an international juridical standard."
Since violations of international law in Uganda have been
confirmed both under international convention and under customary law, it is necessary to consider what acts perpetrated
there can actually be considered state conduct. Clearly, public
officials acting in their mandated capacity perform duties for
which the highest authority and the state must be responsible.' 9
Hence, the violations herein cited do come within the state
responsibility of Uganda.
VII.

CONCLUSION

International protection of individuals in situations like
that of Ugandan Asians has been given effect through the
concept of humanitarian intervention and through formal
documents yet unratified. However, actual protection of individuals does not exist now, nor appear to exist in the near
future. Only through conventions like the 1965 Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination can
these people come within international jurisdiction. State responsibility is still a concept, far from being finalized, and
remains dependent on varying interpretations of international
obligations.
What is needed for the future are flexible techniques such
as optional clauses and liberal reservation clauses which can
gradually change relatively minimal obligations into effective
international instruments. How and when these instruments
will come into existence is related to the willingness of the
international community to reassess existing procedures and
to experiment with new ideas.
Randolph John Nogel
47 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233, at para. 33.
48

Id. at para. 42.

49

Id. at para. 36. See also 2 Y.B.
A/CN.4/496, annex 3 (1956).
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CASE NOTES
AcT OF STATE DocTRmN -First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
In July 1958, First National City Bank loaned $15 million
to a predecessor of Banco Nacional de Cuba. United States
Government bonds were pledged as collateral.' By 1960, $5 million had been repaid, and First National City had released
a corresponding amount of collateral.
2
Meanwhile, Fidel Castro had come to power in Cuba.
Implementation of his policies resulted in substantial expropriation of foreign-owned properties, including First National
City's Cuban banking branches on September 16, 1960.3 A week
later, the American bank sold the remaining collateral securing
the loan and applied the proceeds to principal and unpaid interest. That sale realized an excess of approximately $1.8 million.
Banco Nacional de Cuba brought suit in Federal District
Court to recover this excess. First National City, as setoff and
counterclaim, asserted its right to damages from the expropriation of its Cuban properties. 4 The District Court granted
summary judgment to First National City, holding that the Hickenlooper Amendment overruled Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, the Supreme Court's definitive application of the
act of state doctrine to the Cuban expropriations, and that the
expropriation of the banking facilities violated international
law. 5
Banco Nacional appealed. 6 Meanwhile, the parties stipulated
1 The loan was initially extended to Banco de Desarrallo Economico y
Social (Bandes), a corporate agency of the Republic of Cuba. The loan
collateral was pledged by Banco Nacional and Fondo de Establizacion
de la Moneda (Fondo). Subsequently, Bandes was dissolved by the
Cuban government, and Banco Nacional succeeded to many of its rights
and obligations, including the obligation to pay the loan. The Republic
of Cuba also guaranteed the loan; for the purposes of this litigation,
Banco Nacional was assumed by the courts to be the agent of the Cuban
government.
2 January 1, 1959. N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1959, § 1 at 1, col. 1.
3 Under Executive Power Resolution No. 2 issued pursuant to Cuban
Law No. 851, July 6, 1960; this resolution is set out in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
4 Id. at 1004 et seq.
5 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); the Hickenlooper (Sabbatino) Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964,
22 U.S.C. . 2370(e) (2), formerly pt. III, ch. 1, § 301(d) (4), 78 Stat.
1013 (1964), was intended to limit the scope of the Sabbatino decision.
6431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970).
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that First National City's counterclaim was not in excess of the
$1.8 million claim brought by Banco Nacional. 7 With this proviso,
the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision and
ruled that the act of state doctrine barred the counterclaim.
According to the Appeals Court, Congress intended the Hickenlooper Amendment to apply to expropriated property subsequently marketed in the United States, in order to prevent
this country from becoming a "thieves' market."8 The Court
added that reading the Hickenlooper Amendment as an overruling of Sabbatino would vitiate the effectiveness of the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission by allowing First National City
a windfall at the expense of other creditors.'
It was First National City's turn to appeal. 10 As it took
its case to the Supreme Court, the Department of State issued
a letter urging the Judiciary to ignore the act of state doctrine
in "this or like cases."" The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and vacated the Court of Appeals judgment for consideration
of the State Department's views. 12 The Court of Appeals adhered
to its original judgment in a split decision. '3 The Supreme Court
4
again granted certiorari.'
A complex decision by the Supreme Court allowed First
National City's counterclaim and reversed the ruling of the
Court of Appeals.' 5 Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment;
the Chief Justice and Justice White joined in his opinion, which
cited with approval the so-called Bernstein exception to the
act of state doctrine. Justice Douglas and Justice Powell each
7First National City Bank reduced its counterclaim from the alleged
value of its Cuban properties to the amount sought by Banco Nacional,
apparently to avoid a sovereign immunity argument based on a counterclaim exceeding the plaintiff's claim.
8 431 F.2d at 399-402.
9 Id. at 403-04.
10 In petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, First National
City Bank argued that Sabbatino was inapplicable to a counterclaim offsetting Banco Nacional's claim; that the act of state doctrine did not
control the case; that the Hickenlooper Amendment was a proper basis
for finding against Banco NM.cional; and that the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949 should not have barred the counterclaim. 10
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 56 (1971).

After the issuance of the "Stevenson

letter", First National City Bank added the Bernstein exception to its
panoply of arguments in its brief before the Supreme Court, 11 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 30

(1972).

]'The letter, issued by John R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor to the Department of State, is reproduced in the Court of Appeals' second opinion,
442 F.2d 530, 536 (2d Cir. 1971) and in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 89
(1971).
12400 U.S. 1019 (1971); vacating the judgment of the Ccurt of Appeals,
the Supreme Court expressed "no views on the merits of the case."
1:1
442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).
14 404 U.S. 820 (1971).
15 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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concurred in separate opinions on distinct grounds. The four
remaining Justices dissented in a lengthy opinion by Justice
Brennan.
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba raises
difficult questions, none of which the Court adequately answers.
The case represents an incursion on the Court's prior ruling
in Sabbatino, which articulated the status of the act of state
doctrine. It is unclear whether the incursion is based on the
Bernstein exception or on a dubious comparison with sovereign
immunity. More fundamentally, First National City Bank is
rich in controversy about the justiciability of "political questions" arising from acts of foreign countries. The following
analysis considers these issues in light of the case's most evident
characteristic: fundamental disagreement among the Justices
over basic questions of jurisprudence.
I.

FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK AS A QUALIFICATION OF SABBATINO

Chief Justice Fuller's remarks in Underhill v. Hernandez
constitute the traditional American expression of the act of
state doctrine:
Every soverign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to
be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.16
The principle's apparent clarity obscures the often confusing
history of its application. Although frequently invoked, the
7
doctrine has rarely been essential to the holding of a case.'
While it is generally assumed to be a rule of conflict of laws,
it has been associated with substantive international law as
well.18
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Supreme Court
16 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See generally, Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollection,; in Tranquility,6 COLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967); Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L
L. 826 (1959); Note, The Castro Government in American Courts:
Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 75 HARv. L. REV.
1607 (1962).
17 See, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., 246 304 (1918); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937);
United States v. Belmont. 201 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink
315 U.S. 203 (1942). Although Oetjen and Ricaud reaffirmed Underhili
in unequivocal terms, Justice White's dissent in Sabbatino persuasively

argued that these cases only peripherally involved the act of state
doctrine. 376 U.S. at 442, n.2.

IL Jiminez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), stay denied, 314
F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963), rehearing
denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963).
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on. Justice Harlan,
adhered to the act
claim against Banco
of sugar.'"

At the heart of the Sabbatino decision is its discussion of the
varied roles played by the act of state doctrine. The doctrine
exercises a distributive function by allocating authority and
control between the Executive and the Judiciary in the conduct
of foreign policy; simultaneously, it assumes a regulative task
as a principle of comity among sovereign states. 211 Despite its
importance, the doctrine is less than a hard and fast legal rule:
If the act of state doctrine is a principle of decision binding on
federal and state courts alike but compelled by neither international law nor the Corstitution, its continuing vitality depends
on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions
between the judicial and political branches of the Government
21
on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.

The act of state doctrine, far from precluding judicial inquiry into the validity of a foreign state's conduct within its own
borders, supervenes only in the absence of firm agreement between nations on controlling legal principles. To avoid application of the doctrine, agreement must constitute more than
customary international law. The Sabbatino decision continued:
... rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and
all-encompassing rule in this case we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government,
extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in
absence of a treaty or other ambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the
22
taking violates customary international law.

Sabbatino encourages flexible balancing of interests in light
of current developments in international law. If international
19) The facts of the Sabbatino case were rather peculiar. Farr, Whitlock &
Co., an American commodity broker, contracted to purchase Cuban
sugar ultimately bound for Morocco. The sugar was owned by the subsidiary of a Cuban corporation, principally owned by American shareholders. Before being shipped, the sugar was nationalized by Cuba.
Farr, Whitlock then renegotiated the contract of sale this time promising to pay the Cuban government. Banco Nacional de Cuba subsequently presented the shipping documents and a sight draft for $175,000
to Farr, Whitlock for payment. Farr, Whitlock, however, had entered
into an agreement with the former owner of the sugar not to turn the
funds over to the Cuban government. The funds were later transferred
to Sabbatino, the receiver for the former Cuban owner's assets. 376
U.S. at 401-07. In effect, the former owners had resorted to a self-help
remedy, facilitated by the fortuitous appearance of the assets in cash
form in New York. The Supreme Court sought to discourage such a
remedy. Id. at 438.
211Id. at 427-37.
"' Id. at 427-28.
22

Id. at 428.
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law has not developed to the point of firm agreement between
the parties, the Court ought to apply the act of state doctrine
rather than preempt the State Department in its conduct of
foreign policy.
Justice White, the lone dissenter in Sabbatino, reached a
conclusion similar to Justice Harlan's. 23 The dissent also decried
inflexible operation of the act of state doctrine, but seemed
convinced that the international law of expropriation is welldeveloped. Traditionally, international law imposes a triad of
conditions to which any expropriation must conform: it must
serve some public purpose, there must be nondiscrimination
24
in the taking, and compensation must be fair and prompt.
Justice White relied on this traditional view; however, Justice
Harlan relegated these requirements to the status of customary
international law, which he contended was insufficient to preclude application of the act of state doctrine. 25 He noted that
many countries, especially expropriating countries, might contend that an American court's application of these traditional
requirements would actually constitute advancement of imperial
interests of capital-exporting countries under the guise of international law. As Professor Falk has suggested, Justice White's
dissent not only attacks the straw man of a supposedly inflexible act of state doctrine, but also fails to prove adequately
that the Cuban expropriation was sufficiently within the ambit
26
of international law to preclude application of the doctrine.
Sabbatino challenges the Judiciary to consider in each case
whether international law is sufficiently well-developed to justify departure from the act of state doctrine. First National
City Bank fails to meet this challenge. Justice Rehnquist's opinion purports to distinguish the Court's position from Sabbatino
because of the presence in First National City Bank of an expression of State Department policy.27 This distinction is attempted by citing Sabbatino in which Justice Harlan noted,
"[t]his Court has never had occasion to pass upon the so-called
23

Id. at 439-42.

24 See, RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §' 185
et seq. (1962). Traditionai statements of these rules in older sources
are cited at length in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 60, n.4.

25 376 U.S. at 457-61.
OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL Sociry 413-17 (1970).
Falk's position has been criticized in Klein, An Examination of the
Competence of National Courts to Prescribe and Apply International
Law: The Sabbatino Case Revisited, 1 U. OF SAN FRAN. L. REV. 49
(1966).

; FALK, THE STATUS

27

406 U.S. at 768-70.
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Bernstein exception, nor need it do so now. '28 In First National City Bank such an exception does appear in the
form of the "Stevenson letter" (see II., infra).29 Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the function of the act of state doctrine is to lend judicial expression to the Executive's lead in the
34
conduct of foreign affairs..
1 Where the act of state doctrine
serves American policy, it should be applied; where the State
Department makes clear that American policy is not benefitted
by application of the doctrine, it should be cast aside. Whether
the international law of expropriation is well-developed or not
seemed irrelevant to the First National City Bank Court. In
effect, Sabbatino urged adoption of the act of state doctrine
where no clearly controlling, mutually agreed upon transnational
legal principles existed. However, First National City Bank
intimates that the criterion for discarding the act of state doctrine is benefit to American foreign policy as articulated by
the Department of State, without regard to the presence or lack
of controlling principles of international law.31 Summing up his
position, in which the Chief Justice and Justice White joined,
Justice Rehnquist concluded:
We conclude that where the Executive Branch, charged as it is
with primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs,

expressly represents to the Court that the act of state doctrine
would not advance the interests of American foreign policy,
that doctrine should not be applied by the courts. In so doing,
we of course adopt and approve the so-called Bernstein excep32

tion to the act of state doctrine.

To avoid casting the Judiciary in the role of handmaiden
to the State Department, however, Justice Rehnquist further
distinguished First National City Bank from Sabbatino on the
basis of a dubious analogy between the act of state doctrine
and sovereign immunity. He noted that, "[o] ur holding is in no
sense an abdication of the judicial function to the Executive
Branch. '33 Since he believed the only reason for the act of state
doctrine to be avoidance of conflict with the State Department's
conduct of foreign policy, he concluded that when the danger
is absent, the case ought to be adjudicated on the merits. Therefore, First National City Bank was allowed to press its counterclaim without regard to either sovereign immunity or the act
28
29

376 U.S. at 420.
442 F.2d at 536.

30 406 U.S. at 766-68.
31
32

Id. at 782-84.
Id. at 768.

33 Id.
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of state doctrine, relying on the principles of equity in National
34
City Bank v. Republic of China.
Out of this same concern, Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, formulated the theory that the act of state
doctrine, like sovereign immunity, is inapplicable to counterclaims not in excess of the foreign state's original claim:
If the amount of the setoff exceeds the asserted claim, then we
would have a Sabbatino type of case. There the fund in controversy was the proceeds of sugar which Cuba had nationalized. Sabbatino held that the issue of who was the rightful
claimant was a "political question", as its resolution would result
in ideological and political clashes between nations which must
be resolved by the other branches of government. We would
have that type of controversy here, if and to the extent that the
setoff asserted exceeds the amount of Cuba's claim. I would disallow the judicial resolution of that dispute for the reasons
stated in Sabbatino and by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN in the instant case. As he states, the Executive Branch "cannot by simple5
stipulation change a political question into a cognizable claim."
Clearly, this theory distorts the rationale of Justice Rehnquist's
opinion. Having at first established the paramount importance
of the State Department's opinion on the applicability of the
act of state doctrine, Justice Rehnquist then contended that
where the doctrine is inapplicable, sovereign immunity is unavailable as a defense to a counterclaim not exceeding the plaintiff's claim. Justice Douglas, on the other hand, concluded that
"fair dealing" ought to be the governing principle in the first
instance:
• .."fair dealing" requires recognition of any counterclaim or
setoff that eliminates or reduces that claim. It is that principle,
not the Bernstein exception, which should govern here. Otherwise the Court becomes u mere errand boy for the Executive
which may choose 30to pick some people's chestnuts from the
fire, but not others.
To Justice Douglas, then, the "Stevenson letter" cannot be
relevant to the Court's reversal in favor of First National City
Bank. (Justice Powell concurred on still other grounds, invoking Justice White's arguments in Sabbatino and refusing to
narrowly adopt the Bernstein exception as the decisive factor.
Discussion of his position is reserved for IV., infra.)
What is one to make of these conflicting opinions? May
First National City Bank be distinguished from Sabbatino on
the basis of the Bernstein exception, or rather because "fair
dealing" requires recognition of counterclaims, even those based
34 National City Bank v. Republic of China, 438 U.S. 456 (1955).
35
36

406 U.S. at 772.

Id. at 772-73.
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upon acts of state? Not only does First National City Bank fail
to answer either question; it is also well off the mark of Justice
Harlan's primary concern in Sabbatino - careful consideration
of the status of international law and application of the act
of state doctrine where a definitive international law of expropriation is lacking.

II. FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK AND THE BmNsTEn EXCEPTION
The so-called Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine partially determined the result in First National City
Bank.37 Although given a lease on life in this instance, the
exception's viability remains doubtful. Justice Rehnquist approved and adopted the Bernstein exception in his opinion;
however, his analogy to sovereign immunity undermined it, and
Justice Brennan's dissent maintained that six Justices explicitly
rejected it."'
The Bernstein exception refers to the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche.3" In that case, "a definitive expression
of Executive policy", in the form of a letter from the Department of State, purported to release the Judiciary from act of
state constraints in passing upon the legality of German official
acts during the Nazi period. The Court reversed per curiam
its previous application of the act of state doctrine and held
that the Bernstein letter (from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal
40
Adviser of the Department of State) supervened the doctrine.
The "Stevenson letter", First National City Bank's analogue
to the Bernstein letter, attempted to apply State Department
policy to the Cuban expropriations. To bring the Bernstein
exception into play in the Federal courts, John R. Stevenson,
the Department's. legal advisor, wrote that:
The Department of State believes that the act of state doctrine
should not be applied to bar consideration of a defendant's
counterclaim or set-off against the Government of Cuba in this
41
or like cases.
37 It was improper for Justice Rehnquist to state that the holding of the
Court was the adoption of the Bernstein exception, since only three
Justices so held.
38 406 U.S. at 776-77.
39
Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954).
40 That letter is reproduced id. at 376; the earlier case denying Bernstein
relief, prior to the issuance of the Department of State letter, recites
the facts of the taking of the property at 173 F.2d 71,75-76 n.8.
41 442 F.2d at 538. The impact of the letter was considered prior to the
Supreme Court's decision at Note, Executive Suggestion and the Act of
State Cases: Implications of the Stevenson Letter in the Citibank Case,
12 HARv. INT'L L. J. 557 (1971).
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The letter was issued following the first decision of the Court
of Appeals, which found in favor of Banco Nacional. The
Supreme Court returned the case to the Appeals Court, urging
consideration of the State Department position.
In its reconsideration of First National City Bank, the
Second Circuit argued that the "Stevenson letter" failed to
undermine the act of state doctrine:
The Bernstein exception has been an exceedingly narrow one.
Prior to the present case, a "Bernstein letter" has been issued
only once -in the Bernstein case itself. Moreover, the case has
never been followed successfully; it has been relied upon only
twice, and in both of those instances,42 by lower ccurts whose
decisions were subsequently reversed.
Emphasizing Bernstein's unique facts, the Court noted that the
letter applied to the acts of a German government no longer
in existence; a government with which the United States had
been at war; and finally, a government that had perpetrated
atrocities arguably violating more than mere customary international law. 43 Moreover:
In Bernstein.. . the balance of the equities was almost entirely
on the side of the party opposing application of the act of state
doctrine, plaintiff, whereas there, as we found in our prior deCity
cision in this case, the contrary is true, since First National
44
is seeking a windfall at the expense of other creditors.
Therefore, the Court concluded:
Bernstein arose out of a unique set of circumstances calling for
a special treatment, and hence should be 45narrowly construed
and, insofar as possible, limited to its facts.
Thus, the Appeals Court forcefully argued that the "Stevenson
letter" was insufficient to revive the so-called Bernstein exception.
The Supreme Court also rejected the Bernstein exception
in First National City Bank. As noted above, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion rather confused the status of the exception, at one point
calling it the holding of the Court, but failing to come up with
even four justices supporting it. Underlining this confusion,
Justice Brennan stated in his dissent:
42 442 F.2d at 535, citing Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), and Kane v. National Institute of Agrarian
Reform, 18 Fla. Supp. 116 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1961), rev'd, 153 So.2d 40 (Fla.
App. 1963).
43'442 F.2d at 534. Ani interesting question remains whether the act of
state doctrine should have applied in Bernstein even had there been no
letter from the State Department. Did the Nuremberg proceedings
raise the world's condemnation of Nazi genocide to the status of international law? See generally, KELSEN & TUcKER, PRINCIPLES OF INTRNATIONAL LAW 215-220 (2d ed. 1966).
44 442 F.2d at 534-35.
45 Id. at 534.

126

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 3

The Court today reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit that declined to engraft the so-called
"Bernstein'" exception upon the act of state doctrine ...
The
Court, nevertheless, affirms the Court of Appeals rejection of
the "Bernstein" exception. Four of us in this opinion unequivocally take that step, as do MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR.
4
JUSTICE POWELL in their separate concurring opinions. 6

Justice Brennan went on to assert that while Sabbatino technically reserved the Bernstein question, as Justice Rehnquist
correctly observed, the decision in that case placed considerable
doubt upon the propriety of the exception. 47 As explained above,
Sabbatino essentially held that the act of state doctrine should
apply where no rule of international law agreed upon by the
parties may be applied by the courts; it did not hold that the
act of state doctrine should apply where the Executive fails
to invoke the Bernstein exception.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in First National City
Bank, it was predicted in some quarters that the case would
definitely resolve the proper balance between the Executive
and the Judiciary in matters involving foreign relations. 48 This
balance hinges upon whether the question before the Court is
"political" or "legal". 40 Unfortunately, the confusion of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, combined with the specific rejection of
the Bernstein exception by six justices, leaves the matter unresolved. Moreover, Justice Brennan noted the undesirable
effect had the exception been adopted:
The "Bernstein" exception relinquishes the function (of determining whether an issue is a political question) to the Executive
by requiring blind adherence to its requests that foreign acts
of state be reviewed. Conversely, it politicizes the Judiciary. 50

The most plausible conclusions to be drawn from First
National City Bank are that 1) the Bernstein exception to the
act of state doctrine is not law; 2) due to the limited applicability of the Bernstein principle, the issuance of a letter from
the State Department invoking it will remain an unlikely
occurrence; and 3) the best guides to the relationship between
the Executive and the Judiciary in foreign affairs are still
Baker v. Carr and Sabbatino, with First National City Bank
merely a confusing and unhelpful footnote.51
4, 406 U.S. at 776-77.
47 Id. at 790.
4

8 Comment, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 409 (1971).

4', See, IV., infra.

-5 406 U.S. at 790.
5 1Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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III. FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The most patent instance of confusion in First National City
Bank results from an inappropriate analogy to National City
52
Bank v. Republic of China,
an earlier case establishing implied waiver of sovereign immunity for a foreign state bringing
an action in this country's courts and subsequently subjected
to a counterclaim based on American law. 53 The notion is one
of "fair dealing": if a foreign nation invokes "our law", it is
only fair that he expose himself to counterclaims based on
54
that law.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion noted first that the result
reached in First National City Bank is "consonant with the
principles of equity" set forth in Republic of China.55 From
constituting a mere analogy, however, the principle of "fair
dealing" in counterclaims became for Justice Douglas, in his
concurrence, the governing principle of the case, despite the
fact that the counterclaim in Republic of China was based on
sovereign immunity while the one in First National City Bank
hinged upon an act of state.56
Justice Douglas maintained that the concept of "fair dealing" articulated in Republic of China by itself determined the
First National City Bank holding; the act of state doctrine, he
contended, is irrelevant to counterclaims. 57 Although based on
an incorrect analysis, Justice Douglas' view possessed the virtue
of consistency; Justice Rehnquist's, on the other hand, confused
the Bernstein rationale with the "fair dealing" approach.
At issue is the relationship between "fair dealing" and
the act of state doctrine. Should the doctrine bar assertion of a
counterclaim, not otherwise barred by sovereign immunity,
52

348 U.S. 356 (1955).

53 Id. at 364-65.
54 This notion is set out at length in Justice Douglas' concurrence, 406
U.S. at 770-73; general criticism of the sovereign immunity rule itself
is found in Justice Brennan's dissent, supra at 789-90, n.13.
; Id. at 768.
56 Justice Douglas argued that the essential issue was Cuba's desire "to
have its cake and eat it too." Beyond this, he simply failed to analyze
whether the distinction between the types of counterclaims asserted in
the two cases was at all relevant.
57 Curiously, Chief Justice Burger had himself employed this "fair dealing" argument while on the District of Columbia bench, in his dissent
in Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1961). In that
case, a Cuban national, sued by Cuba in American courts, asserted a
counterclaim based on the value of his expropriated property. The
Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the counterclaim; then Judge
Burger's dissent relied heavily on National City Bank. Yet, in First
National City Bank, the Chief Justice found himself in agreement with
Justice Rehnquist, supporting the Bernstein exception and only alluding

to the "fair dealing" argument in passing.
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when the counterclaim arises from an act of state? It seems
that it should, even if the counterclaim does not exceed the
amount of the foreign government's claim.
Determinative of the issue is the crucial difference between
the types of counterclaims asserted in Republic of China and
First National City Bank. In the former case, China's claim was
for recovery of a deposit with National City Bank. The Bank
sought setoff on defaulted Treasury notes in the amount of
China's claim. It should be noted that no issue arose as to the
applicable substantive law in determining the validity of the
counterclaim; the only question was the availability of the
sovereign immunity defense to the Republic of China. 58
The problem is quite different in First National City Bank,
where the counterclaim arose from an alleged act of state.
The analytical first step in the two cases is similar: to decide
that it is equally unfair to bar a counterclaim because of sovereign immunity as it is to bar one because of the act of state
doctrine.
Next, a court must determine what law to apply in evaluating such counterclaims.5 " At this point the circumstances of
the two cases differ markedly. In Republic of China the default
upon which the counterclaim rested occurred within the United
States; therefore, domestic law was clearly applicable. However,
for the act of state counterclaim there exist no firmly agreed
upon rules of international law that an American court can
apply in determining the validity of Cuban expropriations.
Justice Harlan found this distinction controlling in Sabbatino:
. . immunity relates to the prerogative right not tc have sovereign property subject to suit; fairness has been thought to require that when the sovereign seeks recovery, it be subject to
legitimate counterclaims against it. The act of state doctrine,
however, although it shares with the immunity doctrine a respect for sovereign states, concerns the limits for60 determining
the validity of an otherwise applicable rule of law.

In summary, the essence of the act of state doctrine is its
limitation upon the American Judiciary which prevents the
58 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, noted the es-

sential problem: whether a counterclaim not "based on the subject
matter of a sovereign's suit is allowed to cut into the doctrine of immunity." 348 U.S. at 364. He concluded that it is, but said nothing
about the substantive rules a court should apply in assessing the counterclaim. Presumably, there was no doubt that straightforward breach
of contract rules applied in the National City Bank case.
59 In Sabbatino, it was urged that the forum simply apply its own law to
"all relevant transactions." Justice Harlan rejected this solution. 376
U.S. at 438.
60 Id.
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application of American law or customary international law
to acts occurring within Cuba. The "fair dealing" argument
pales in light of the central problem which the act of state
doctrine poses to the courts: are there rules of law that apply
in assessing a counterclaim arising from a foreign state's conduct within its own territory? In Republic of China well-developed rules of domestic law clearly dealt with the default
of an obligation incurred within the jurisdiction of American
courts. In contrast, the act of expropriation which prompted First
National City's counterclaim occurred within Cuba's own territory, and hence American law did not apply. Furthermore, there
existed no internationally accepted law of expropriation under
which the counterclaim might be adjudicated.
IV.

"POLITICAL QUESTIONS" AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

"Political questions", De Tocqueville says, have a habit of
eventually assuming a legal character as society changes.6 1 Expropriation, a "political question" in Sabbatino, could therefore
evolve into a legally cognizable issue.6 2 "Political" acts of state
gradually become justiciable as nations substitute law for parochial self-interest.
To preclude application of the act of state doctrine, international law must constitute more than notions of comity, customary international law, or a generalized concept of political
morality grounded in sovereign states' respect for one another.
As Justice Harlan put it in Sabbatino:
...the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate
it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the
courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle
to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of
with the national inestablishing a principle not inconsistent
. 3
terest or with international justice 6

The desired development therefore requires rules of expropriation exerting authority and control over both capital exporting
(Harper & Row ed. 1966).
For a general discussion of his celebrated thesis distinguishing the political from the legal jurisdictions, see, pp. 89-93.
G_Justice White, dissenting in Sabbatino, felt that the law of expropriation had already achieved the requisite status of binding international
law so as to justify adjudication on the merits. 376 U.S. at 458-59. In
First National City Bank, Justice Powell was of the opinion that even
if the law of expropriation were not well developed, domestic courts
had the duty of furthering its development by adjudicating the case on
the substantive issues, despite the act of state doctrine. 406 U.S. at 775.
61 A. DE TOcQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA,

63 376 U.S. at 428.
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64
and capital importing nations.

Since expropriation constitutes a "political question", it is
surprising that First National City Bank's counterclaim was held
to be justiciable. The eight years intervening between Sabbatino
and First National City Bank saw no lessening of political tensions
attending expropriations. 65 Evidently three justices felt a combination of the "Stevenson letter" and "fair dealing" rendered
the counterclaim justiciable. A fourth, Justice Douglas, thought
the case did not involve the act of state doctrine because it arose
from a counterclaim. And Justice Powell said the law of expropriation should have been a "legal question" in both cases. " ,
Such diverse opinions expressed by the majority justices,
not to mention the contrary view of the dissenters, confuse the
standards for determining justiciability in act of state cases.
Those standards have never been entirely clear." Advocating an
ad hoc approach, Baker v. Carr noted that:
Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a discriminating
analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the history
of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility
to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the
specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial
68
action.

In that decision, Justice Brennan stated generally that determining whether an issue is "political" is a "delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court
'69
as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of Cuban expropriation is
less than delicate. Assuming the raison d'etre of the act of state
doctrine to be advancement of American foreign policy, he concluded that Executive disapproval of the doctrine should be
64

These dual notions of authority and control as determinative components
of the development of international law have been most fully analyzed
by Myres S. McDougal; see McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD

PUBLIC

ORDER:

THE

LEGAL

REGULATION

AND

INTERNATIONAL

(1961).
65 The unanswered question is how many of these expropriations or
nationalizations will give rise to lawsuits in the United States. Sovereign
immunity prevents direct claims against foreign states; however, foreign assets in the United States combined with collateral claims by the
foreign state against the former American owner of the taken property
may well yield more of these peculiar act of state litigations.
COERCION

66 406 U.S. at 774-75.
G7 Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion the distinction between

jurisdiction and justiciability, the former concerning the Court's power
over the parties, the latter concerning the appropriateness of the subject

matter for judicial resolution. Thus, the sovereign immunity analogy
provided a jurisdictional basis for allowing the counterclaim against
Cuba, while justiciability was the issue presented by the act of state
doctrine. Id. at 773-74.
"G369 U.S. at 211-12.

69*Id. at 211.
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heeded by the Court. As he expressed it, "the reason of the
' 70
law ceasing, the law itself also ceases.
Justice Brennan's dissent labeled this tidy argument "mechanical and fallacious." 71 Its fallacy stems from the incorrect view
that the doctrine's function is to facilitate successful conduct of
foreign affairs. The doctrine's purpose is the prevention of
judicial bungling in the political arena. 72 Acts of state are generally "political" because no law exists with which to assess
their validity. However, if law does exist, whether by treaty,
mutual agreement, or multinational convention, the act of state
may be justiciable.7 3 In any case, the Department of State's
view on the national interest should have little relationship
to the Court's determination of the applicability of international
74
legal standards.
Curiously, Justice Powell's concurrence is consistent with
both Sabbatino and Justice Trennan's dissent.75 He would have
joined in Justice White's dissent in Sabbatino, contending that
precisely that balancing of considerations pondered by Justice
Harlan and adverted to in Baker v. Carr should have required
discarding the act of state doctrine in the Cuban expropriation
cases. He contended that if no conflict with American foreign
policy exists, the courts have "a duty to determine and apply
the applicable international law." 76 He mistakenly assumed an
international law of expropriation exists, apart from non-binding
customary behavior. Justice Powell's concurrence fails to suggest any reliable method for ascertaining appropriate legal standards concerning expropriation.
To what extent may American courts apply international
law to acts of state? According to Sabbatino, acts of expropriation are justiciable if international law is codified or unambiguous. However, claims based on a foreign nation's conduct are
"political" insofar as that behavior is subject only to customary
international law. First National City Bank adds that counterclaims arising from acts of state may be justiciable even in the
absence of a dispositive law of expropriation. In effect, First
70 406 U.S. at 768.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 785,792-93.
73 376 U.S. at 428.
7N406 U.S. at 783-85; 376 U.S. at 432-33.
71

72

Justice Powell believed that the viewpoint of the Department of State
is only one of many factors determining justiciability of an act of state.
Like Justice White in Sabbatino, he contended that the Cuban expropriations constituted an area where domestic courts should be instrumental in developing international law.
76

Id. at 776.
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National City Bank's consideration of the Bernstein exception and
the "fair dealing" argument obscures the role of international
law in determining justiciability of acts of state.
V.

CONCLUSION

The internal contradictions of First National City Bank characterize a Supreme Court badly split over fundamental questions
of judicial philosophy. Justice Rehnquist's opinion purports to
adopt the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine. Read
closely, the opinion merely suggests that the Court should proceed case by case to determine the applicability of the act of
state doctrine. The dissent explicitly states that the four dissenters, as well as Justices Douglas and Powell in their concurrences, reject the Bernstein exception. Thus, the case offers a
confusing and rather unreliable guide to future litigation in the
act of state arena.
he important issue of justiciability raised by First National
City Bank is still more ccnfusing. It is safe to say that the Justices agree, as might be expected from ' Baker v. Carr, that some
foreign relations problems are not "political questions" and are
therefore cognizable in American courts. But what determining
factors does the Court set forth? Justice Rehnquist argues that
the Department of State's opinion on whether the act of state
doctrine serves in a particular instance to advance American
foreign policy controls justiciability of the issue. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, looks to a myriad of factors, among which
the state of development of international law predominates. Justice Douglas says the existence of a counterclaim is the key to
justiciability of acts of state; but Justice Powell adopts a middle
position and says justiciability may only be determined case by
case. Hence, the limits of justiciability of acts of state remain ill
defined.
The Sabbatino decision satisfied many commentators that
relative clarity had been achieved for the act of state doctrine.
Dabbling with that doctrine in First National City Bank, the
Supreme Court muddied the waters once again.
Greg Abbott

CASE NOTES
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE- Antitrust Law. Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
With the recent denial of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme
Court, Occidental Petroleum v. Buttes. Gas & Oil Co.' can take
its place among the growing number of cases to raise the act
of state doctrine of judicial restraint.2 In doing so, Occidental
may signal the end of one of the basic premises in the analytical development of the act of state doctrine and foreshadow
the merger of what has been two distinct lines of cases under
the doctrine.
Analysis of Occidental must begin with the classification
of its factual content as it relates to the two lines of cases,
then follow with an inquiry into the different analytical bases
for the doctrine itself.3
An action was brought by the Occidental Petroleum Corporation against Buttes Gas and Oil Company, Clayco Petroleum Corporation 4 and their respective officers, in a private
antitrust suit for treble damages and an injunction. 5 The
complaint alleged an intricate conspiracy to restrain trade and
monopolize "the exploration, development and exploitation of
petroleum reserves of the territorial waters of the Trucial
States"'6 in the Persian Gulf.
1331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Ca. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
2 The act of state doctrine is a rule of judicial restraint applied by American
courts since at least 1796, Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 230
(1796), whereby courts have declined to act when having to examine the
validity of a foreign act of state. See generally, RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, §§ 41-43 (1962).

3 The case has inspired a number of insightful and probing comments. See,
65 AM. J. INT'L L. 815 (1971); 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 251 (1971);
7 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 247 (1972); 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 413 (1972); and 3
Unfortunately, however, most comRUTGERS CAMDEN L. J. 544 (1972).
ments have failed to develop a clear distinction between the various cases
which have applied the doctrine, an exercise which is necessary in the
understanding of Occidentals historical perspective and future significance.

4 A motion to dismiss Clayco and its president, Clayman, was granted on

three grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and defective service of process. 331 F. Supp. at 95-98.
5 Clayton Act, §§ 4, 16; 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-26, (1970).
6 331 F. Supp. at 95. The Trucial States consisted of several Sheikdoms
along the Persian Gulf, some of which were rich in oil, deriving the name
"Trucial" from truces imposed upon them by Great Britain 150 years ago.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1971, at 13, col. 1. See in general H. ALBAHARNA, THE
Britain recognized
GULF STATES (1968).
the "sovereignty" of the Trucial States, but exercised "protecting power
in matters of external affairs," E. LAUTERPACHT, BRrrISH PRACTICE IN
LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABIAN
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In 1969, the plaintiff, Occidental, was granted a concession in the United States to explore and extract any oil underlying the territorial and off-shore waters of the Sheikdom of
Umm al Qaywayn. Shortly thereafter, Buttes received a similar
concession from the adjoining Trucial State of Sharjah. At the
time of the concessions, the Sheikdom of Sharjah asserted
sovereignty to the island of Abu Musa located about 38 miles
off the coast of the mainland, and in a strategic position in the
7
Strait of Hormutz which is the mouth of the Persian Gulf.
Occidental and Buttes worked in cooperation, exchanging information from seismic tests in their respective areas until
March 1970. At that time Occidental's tests indicated the existence of large quantities of oil lying approximately nine miles
off the island of Abu Musa, and within their alleged concession
area. Upon this discovery, Occidental alleges that Buttes embarked on a plan to gain the concession in the oil-rich area
for themselves. The alleged plan included the inducement of
Sharjah to claim territorial waters of 12 miles off Abu Musa
by means of back-dated decrees, inducing Iran to claim sovereignty over the island, and finally inducing Britain to coerce
the Ruler of Umm al Qaywayn to suspend the concession granted
Occidental.8
I.

THE PARTY/NON-PARTY DISTINCTION

Upon examination there emerge essentially two distinct
types of cases which have arisen under the act of state doctrine. The first line can be called the "foreign-party" cases.
In these, a foreign sovereign has been an actual party to the

(1965). In other words, England exclusively
determined the foreign policy of the Sheikdoms. More recently six of
the Sheikdoms, including the two concerned with this case, have formed
the "Union of Arab Emirates" and are now independent, both domestically and internationally from Great Britain. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1971,
at 12, col. 3; id., Jan. 25, 1972, at 6, col. 1. Now many indications exist
that Iran is filling essentially the same role as Britain had before the
British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in December 1971.
VThe strategic importance of the island is vividly demonstrated by the
dramatic reaction of Iraq to the occupation by Iranian troops on November 30 1971. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1971, at 13, col. 1; id., Dec. 2, 1971,
at 19, col. 1; id., Dec. 3, 1971, at 12, col. 6; id., Dec. 8,1971, at 11, col. 1;
id., Jan. 1, 1972, at 2, col. 4.
8 331 F. Supp. at 99-101. On the later point, Occidental claims that the
British Royal Air Force buzzed the home of the ruler by airplanes, surrounded his house and threatened to exile him. Previously, Occidental
claimed that the Royal Navy had boarded its sea-going equipment under
force.
9
An alternative an~iysis would be to breakdown the cases according to
their subject content (i.e. expropriation, antitrust, contracts, etc.) but
since the crucial element in the doctrine involves who the actor is, the
party breakdown seems more appropriate.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 109
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suit either as a plaintiff,"' as a defendant being sued either
directly or through an agent," or as a party to litigation involving private rights affected by its acts.' 2 The other cases fall into
a "foreign-non-party" category where the state's acts are ques3
tioned only collaterally in litigation between private citizens.'
Because the states involved in the charges are not joined in
the action, Occidental falls into the latter category. 14 The merger
of the legal-philosophical basis of the two lines of cases has
been accomplished by the gradual destruction, completed by
Occidental, of the analytical foundation of the "foreign-nonparty" line of cases.
II.

THE ANALYTIcAL DisTmCnONs

As early as 1796 the roots of the American doctrine were
developed in Ware v. Hylton. 5 In refusing to invalidate the
confiscation of money owed a British citizen by Virginia during
the Revolutionary War, the court invoked the principles of
6
national sovereignty and international comity.'
These same principles were called into use 100 years later,
in a case which virtually all commentators rely upon as the
classic statement of the act of state doctrine, Underhill v. Hernandez1 7 That court declared that "[e]very sovereign State is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." This is an example of the national sovereignty approach
1

OBanco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

11

Frazier v. Foreign Bondholders Protective Council Inc., 283 App. Div. 44,
125 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1953).

National Institute of Agrararian Reform v. Kane, 153 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
App. 1963).
.a Oetjen v. Central Leather, 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
4 In Occidental the defendant argued that Great B6itain, Iran, Sharjah and
Umm al Qaywayn were all "indispensible parties" to the case and required to be joined under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In considering possible remedies and how they would affect the
above parties, the court decided that they were not "indispnsible parties"
and that the action could be pursued in their absence, 331 F. Supp. at 107.
15 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
10' I shall conclude my observations on the right to confiscate any British
property, by remarking, that the validity of such a law would not be
uestioned in the Court of Chancery of Great Britain: and I confess the
octrine seems strange to me in an American Court of Justice. In the
case of Wright and Nutt, Lord Chancellor Thurlow declared, that he considered an act of the state of Georgia, passed in 1782, for the confiscation
of real and personal estate of Sir JamesWright, and also his debts, as a
law of an independent country; and concluded with the following observation, that the law of every country must be equally regarded in the
courts of justice of Great Britain, whether the law was of a barbarious
or civilized institution, or wise or foolish. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 230.
17 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
12
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to the act of state.'8 Significantly, Underhill falls into the "foreign-party" group of cases in which the sovereign is a party to
the suit through its agent who is being sued." Though most
cases in this line pay homage to Underhill by citing the basic
rule, its fundamental principles have been blurred. This has
resulted from a lack of careful analysis of Underhill itself and
of its English and American precedents which emphasized the
importance of international comity to the national sovereignty
premise.

20

Modern analysis of the "foreign-party" cases finds the roots
of the doctrine in separation of powers. The most explicit state21
ment is found in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. The
financial agent of the Cuban government brought an action in
the United States courts to recover money paid for a sugar
shipment over which the Cuban government claimed ownership by expropriation. It appeared that the issue was whether
the act of state doctrine would apply when the act was a vio22
The court skirted this question,
lation of international law.
18 This approach is not uniquely American. In English courts the doctrine
seems to develop as a reaction to the abhorent thought of a jury of commoners sitting in judgment of the acts of a sovereign. See Blad v. Banfield, 3 Swans 605 (App.), (Chancery 1674). Here a Danish citizen was
asking a permanent injunction to restrain proceedings for seizure of property of English subjects in Iceland pursuant to orders from the King of
Denmark. The court remarked, "[n]ow after all this, to send it to a trial at
law, where either the Court must pretend to judge the validity of the
King's letters, patent in Denmark, or the exposition and meaning of the
articles of peace; or that a common jury should try whether the English
have a right to trade in Iceland, is monstrous and absurd."
19 The defendant, Hernandez, was head of the anti-government force in
Venezuela which on October 6, 1892 took command of the capital, and on
October 23 was formally recognized as the legitimate government of
Venezuela by the United States. 168 U.S. at 251.
20 These principles have recently been recognized by Justice White dissenting in Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 442. He is especially concerned that Underhill was settled "on the merits of plaintiff's claim under international
law."
21 Supra, note 10, at 423. "The act of state doctrine dces have constitutional
underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches
of government in a system of separation of powers .

.

. the doctrine as

formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial
Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of
goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the
international sphere." See also Jimenex v. Aristeguieta 311 F.2d 547
(5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1962); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); and Metzger,
The Act of State Doctrine, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, (1972).
22 There was a strong interest on this point in the international legal community, and a good deal of sentiment to suspend the doctrine in these
types of cases if there exists a clear violation of international law. (Among
those filing briefs of amici curiae generally supporting this view were the
American Bar Association, the Executive Committee of the American
Branch of the International Law Association, and the Committee on International Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
This view has recently prevailed in First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), discussed in note 23, infra. See
also R.
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however, by declaring that it could not apply international law
because "[t] here are few if any issues in international law today
on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on
a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens. '23 The
court did imply, however, that when issues of international
law are explicit and not very important, the act of state doc4
trine might be overcome .2

III.

THE DIsTINCTIONs APPLIED TO OCCIDENTAL

It is the Sabbatinoapproach which is endorsed by the court
in Occidental. "In sum, the doctrine is a reflection of the executive's primary competency in foreign affairs, and an acknowledgment of the fact that in passing upon governmental acts the
judiciary may hinder or embarrass the conduct of our foreign
relations. ' 25 Thus the Occidental court applied a line of reasoning developed in the series of "foreign-party" cases to which
Occidental does not belong. In order to exercise judicial restraint, the court was forced to adopt this analysis because of
the erosion of the doctrine's basis as developed in the "foreignnon-party" cases to which Occidental does belong.
The line of non-party cases began with American Banana
v. United Fruit Co. 2 6 According to the Occidental court, "the
facts of that case are strikingly similar to those now before the
court. ' 27 United Fruit was being sued under the Sherman Act
64-138 (1964) for an exhaustive analysis; also J. White, dissenting,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964).
23 376 U.S. at 428. This decision involved such a negative response that the
Congress reacted by essentially overruling it in the so-called "Sabbatino
Amendment," 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (1970), which provides that "no
court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act
of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to
the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or
other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state
(or party claiming through such state based upon (or traced through) a
confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959 by an act of that state
in violation of the principles of international law."
Subsequently, the Court overruled the application of the doctrine by
the Court of Appeals in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) partly on the grounds that the Executive
Branch had asked the Court not to invoke the doctrine-thus a complete
departure from Sabbatino in this respect. Additionally, the Court instructed the lower courts to apply customary rules of international law to
determine the validity of the expropriation of the plaintiff's property by
the government of Cuba.
24 "The greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it . . . the less important the
implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the
justification for exclusivity in the political branches" Supra, note 10,
at 428.
25 331 F. Supp. at 108-109.
2-; 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
27 331 F. Supp. at 109.
ORDER

138

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 3

for treble damages for allegedly inducing the Costa Rican army
to seize and maintain control of the plaintiff's banana plantation. In affirming the lower courts' refusal to try the case,
Justice Holmes wrote: "A seizure by a state is not a thing that
28
can be complained of elsewhere in the courts.1
The basis of the decision, however, was primarily a conflict of laws approach based solidly on the notion of international comity.2 9 Holmes was quite clear: "the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done."30 This jurisdictional conflict
of laws, based on the situs of the wrong, has been rarely invoked by the courts which followed. The jurisdictional aspect
has generally been either distinguished 31 or greatly minimized. s2 For example many cases which followed American
Banana in the "foreign-non-party" line generally ignored the
33
conflict of laws rationale in favor of international comity.
On the other hand, in the antitrust cases which followed, the
courts managed to clear the jurisdictional obstacle by not applying judicial restraint if the act "brought about forbidden
3 4
or where "the conspiracy
results within the United States,
was laid in the United States, and was effectuated both here
and abroad, 3 5 or for acts by "persons not within its allegiance,
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
' 36
or most recently by
its borders which the state reprehends,
"the test which determines whether the United States law
213 U.S. at 358.
"For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place
where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference- with authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations, which the other states concerned justly might resent." Id., at 365.
so Id. Holmes had used a similar rationale in a previous cause where an act
of the U.S. governor of Cuba was brought into question. See O'Reilly do
Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908). See also H. ZWARENSTEY, SOME
28

29

ASPECTS

LAws

OF THE EXTRATERRIToIAL REACH OF THE AMERICAN

ANTITRUST

124-125 (1970).

United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927); Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
32 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 289 (1918); Ricaud v. American
Metal Co.. 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
33 Justice Clark in Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. at 309 declared
that application of the doctrine "rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit the validity of
the acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned
by the courts of another would very certainly 'imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.'"
34 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 276.
35 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. at 706.0
36United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945).
31
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is applicable . . . focus[ing] on the nexus between the parties
87
and their practices and the United States.
As long as the cases which arose presented ways to avoid
application of the jurisdictional doctrine, American Banana
remained intact. But when Occidental appeared, with a factual
situation so similar to American Banana, the court had to choose
between completing the evolution of American Banana by taking the "foreign-non-party" cases out of the act of state doctrine
altogether, or attempting to bring the two lines of cases together under one doctrine based on the separation of powers
approach developed in Sabbatino.
Clearly, the court chose the latter. The thrust of this decision is exemplified by the endorsement of the "instructive
precedent . . . found in Frazier v. Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, 283 App. Div. 44, 125 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1953). ' '38
The court in Frazier declared that "[p] erhaps our courts should
be even more sensitive to the involvements of a sovereign's
action when the sovereign is not a party to the action and the
adjudication as it affects its prestige and dignity partakes of
3' 9
the nature of an ex parte proceeding.
The Occidental court could have easily avoided the issue by
accepting any of Buttes' other motions to dismiss. 40 Instead it
chose to confront the issue directly. This is especially intriguing
in light of the fact that Buttes structured its motions to dismiss
41
on the jurisdictionalprinciple of the act of state doctrine.
In conclusion, the ultimate consequence of Occidental seems
to be the elimination of the conflict of laws roots of the act of
37

Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).

38 331 F. Supp. at 111.

3"238 App. Div. at 49, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (1953).
40
Besides the act of state doctrine, Buttes moved to dismiss: 1. On grounds
that the court lacked jurisdiction because the act complained of had no
substantial impact in the United States- 2. Because it would mean having
to determine an international boundary dispute which the courts of the
United States may not do; 3. Because under Rule 19(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, joinder of Sharjah, Umm al Qaywayn, Iran
and Great Britain is necessary, (see note 14 infra); 4. Because the complaint attacks activities undertaken to influence governmental conduct,
which is not within the subject matter of the antitrust laws. 331 F. Supp.
at 101-102.
41 "The Buttes defendants in their briefs have contended that this defect of
the complaint is jurisdictional. But it is clear from Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 308 (1918) . . . that this is not so; rather the
questioning of sovereign acts by the complaint results in its failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. American Banana, supra
166 F. at 267. When confronted with this discrepancy of grounds at oral
argument, counsel for the Buttes defendants contended finally that the
court should 'in the exercise of its jurisdiction' dismiss the complaint."
331 F. Supp. at 113.
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state doctrine and the downplaying of the national sovereignty
aspect. If Occidental is followed, the "foreign-non-party" line
of cases will merge with the foreign-party line, with the controlling principle, judicial restraint, based on the separation of
powers analysis developed in the expropriation cases.
The next logical development in the evolution of the act
of state doctrine will come when the courts are confronted
42
with a clear violation of international law by a foreign state.
Meanwhile businesses operating abroad can expect an easier
time invoking the doctrine now that the jurisdictional rule
which proved so easy to avoid or ignore has been replaced by
a more inclusive principle.
Will Ris

42

Such development may soon be forthcoming, see note 23 supra.
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LAw, INSTITUTIONS AND
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
John Lawrence Hargrove, ed. Dobbs, Ferry Oceana/Sitjhoff,
1972
pp. xvii, 394, $20.00
With the growing awareness of the global interdependence
of our environment, this book is a timely contribution. It addresses itself to the essential task lawyers, policy makers and
others must confront: designing institutions and developing
legal principles to control and protect our life-support systems.
Abram Chayes lays down the gauntlet at the outset:
The fundamental message of the environment is that mankind
inhabits a finite planet with finite resources. If the human race
is to survive under conditions that make life worthwhile, it must

devise ways of maximizing the productivity of this finite stock
of resources and of sharing the product in some rational and
equitable way.'

Chayes rejects the suggestions of George Kennan and others
that the global pollution challenge can be met by an elite
organization of the major industrial powers. While the industrial powers are the worst pollutors, the bulk of the world's
people and resources are concentrated in the less developed
countries. In many cases the developed countries depend on
those resources and, therefore, "[t]he need to implicate the
developing countries both in the process of identifying and
combating currefit threats and in the long-term planning and
management clf resources cannot be met in the setting of a
2
rich man's club."
Professor Chayes suggests, probably correctly that there
is no institutional alternative to the U.N. since the developing
countries would not "countenance an effort to bypass the international forum that they regard as peculiarly their own."3
He concludes, however, that neither a new agency outside the
U.N., nor a new one inside it, nor the present fragmented system within existing U.N. agencies can do the job effectively.4
1 LAW, INSTITUTIONS & THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 3 (J.L. Hargrove ed.

1972).
2Id., at 5.
8 Id.
4Id., at 9.
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What is needed is "some form of high level policy, planning,
'
coordination and review unit within the U.N. proper." , However, a global environmental authority, like that envisaged by
U Thant,6 with operating and regulatory authority, is not yet
acceptable to the world community.
Chayes persuasively argues for two environmental institutions. First, he suggests a U.N. environmental advisory unit,
autonomous and prestigious, composed of no more than fifty
outstanding professionals, which would perform policy planning
and review. It, in turn, would be supported by a scientific institute, chartered by the U.N., but organized and operated by
the scientific community itself.
Professor Chayes would remit the actual "execution of international environmental policy primarily to national governments. The power of the U.N. environmental unit vis-a-vis
governments would be essentially the power to persuade, backed
by detailed knowledge of the scientific and other elements of
the problem. That is as it must be in a world still constituted
7
of sovereign and independent states."1
Professor Chayes thus settles for a pragmatic, two-tier approach in a world community which is not yet ready to give
up its sovereign traditions, an approach consistent with the
Stockholm Conference proposal for a U.N. Council for Environmental Programs.
The fundamental question in designing international environmental institutions is how much centralization in policy
making, supervision and enforcement can be placed in the international entity. There is no doubt that unified planning and
administration of common resources is necessary for optimal
utilization, but there is little reason to expect that the nations
of the world are ready to establish such supranational agencies.
For the foreseeable future institutions must continue to be
designed within the context of an international community of
loosely associated sovereign states.
By way of example, Robert Stein, in his chapter on Regional Organizations, surveys the experience of the Danube
and Rhine Rivers. The Commission for the Protection of the
Rhine Against Pollution is largely advisory in competence,'
and Stein concludes that "faced with a serious problem, the
5 Id.
6 Id., at 6.
7Id., at 25.
8Id., at 265.
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four riparian states were not sufficiently willing to internationalize the management functions because their interests were
different, and the impetus for the new commission was largely
the idea of one state." Likewise, although the Danube has
been supervised by an international commission since the Congress of Paris in 1856, "the riparian states coordinate with one
another within their own reach of the river, rather than meeting as a collegial body to consider the problems of the Danube
as a whole."'1
Austria opposes centralization of competence in the commission because she "is one of the major contributors to the
pollution of water flowing into Hungary."" The U.S.S.R. opposes international administration of the Danube, "basing their
position on the concept of sovereignty and sovereign equality.
They consider that international solutions consist only of co'12
ordination of national policies.
Similarly, Richard Builder reviews the efforts of the United
States and Canada to control pollution in the Great Lakes and
concludes that even after the 1972 Agreement, "the concept and
structure is still primarily binational cooperation rather than
international regulation.' 3 There are few countries with as
much commonality of interests, traditions, culture and development as the United States and Canada, yet, based on U.S.-Canadian experience, Professor Builder correctly suggests that "governments will be reluctant to subject their flexibility and freedom of action . . . to international constraints . .. [and] may
often prefer loose cooperative arrangements .... 14
Given such reluctance on the part of nations, truly international administration of many resources such as international
drainage basins and airsheds is not likely in the immediately
foreseeable future. The central question is, therefore, how to
influence states in order to achieve coordination of national
planning and administration of shared resources. The two-tier
approach suggested by Professor Chayes commends itself.
Zdenek Slonka, in his chapter on International Environmental Controls, supports the two-tier approach. He divides
the policy-making into "assessment", which is a cognitive pro0 Id., at 267.

10 Id., at 269.

11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id., at 343.
14

Id., at 348-49.
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cess, and "regulation", which is a political one.'1
He sees "a single two-tier process in which the understandings, apprehensions and goals, continuously articulated,
assessed and reevaluated on the global level, are allowed to
seep down to the second tier of the sub-system and gently
civilize the harsh but unavoidable particular solutions to which
individual states, pressed by technological flux, will increasingly resort."', He asks us
to see the two levels of decision-making as a hierarchical structure in which the global level guides and modifies the lower. In
order to obtain policy action at a speed commensurate with that
of technological change, and at the same time not to end up
with an amorphous mass of inqualities and self-centered practices with low levels of international responsiveness, the action
has to start from below - guided by the light coming from the
global assessment process above, however dim and flickering
17
that light may be.

It is critical that the agency be able to respond to the speed
of technological change, and under the two-tier approach, the
individual national participants must perceive their own selfinterest clearly enough to implement within their own borders
the policy recommendations of the international advisory commission. The commission must be able not only to coordinate
in the traditional sense, but must have authority to initiate
studies and acquire that information base for policy recommendations; it is imperative that its credibility and consequent
prestige be maintained rigorously.
The prime goal of the international commission under the
two-tier approach would be to influence the conduct of states
and private citizens; it would supply the "motive power" to
get national regulatory machinery performing."' The international agency must not only perform the functions of information acquisition and dissemination, but must produce that
information "under circumstances that will maximize the probability of political action."' 9
Tom Mensah provides a helpful insight into the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) experience in developing an international consensus, particularly in
regard to maritime pollution, and Daniel Serwer gives a useful
overview of the technical and administrative processes for the
15 Id., at 229.

16 Id., at 230.
17
'

8

Id., at 230-31.
Id., at 174.

19 Id., at 176.
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establishment of various types of standards and for inducing
compliance through the imposition of sanctions and registration and licensing.
An addition to this exploration into the design of institutions for environmental administration, Fred Goldie provides
balance to the book by contributing to the formulation and
elaboration of principles of international environmental law for
application by the adjudicatory process, in contrast to the administrative process, to which most of the book is devoted.
The development of these legal doctrines is a crucial aspect
of environmental control, and the complementary, yet distinct,
roles of the administrator and adjudicator are essential companions in the overall task. Particularly helpful is Professor
Goldie's appraisal of contemporary public international law
and his dicsussion of liability for environmental damage. He
observes that principles of the international law of environmental accountability and liability should be "viewed as the
means of distributing the loss when breakdowns in the orderly
and regulated conduct of exploration occur. Liability and accountability fit into the total protective context as supplementary to complex regional and international systems of inter-locking regulations through preventive laws and treaties. '2Law, Institutions and the Global Environment makes an
important contribution to the formulation of principles of international environmental law and to the understanding of the
design of international administrative institutions. Not the least
of the book's worthwhile contributions are John Hargrove's
editorial comments which not only serve to provide continuity,
but also thoughtful insight into the problems and prospects
which arise in dealing with the global environment.
Albert Utton*

20

*

Id., at 148.
Professor Utton received his B.A. in 1953 from the University of New
Mexico, his B.A. Juris in 1956 from the University of New Mexico and
a M.A. Juris in 1959 from Oxford University. He is presently Professor

of Law at the University of New Mexico.
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LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR. By John Norton Moore.
Princeton University Press, 1971. 684 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper
$9.50.
This book is an important contribution to the literature
of international law. Although most of its chapters appeared
elsewhere between 1967 and 1971, Professor Moore and his
publishers have rendered a valuable service by making this
collection of his writings available in a single volume. Moreover, Chapter I, dealing with the role of law in the management of international conflict, is new and alone is worth
much of the book's price. With the publication of this work,
Professor Moore's place as one of the leading international law
experts of our time seems .assured.
Even though much of the book focuses specifically on our
involvement in Indo-China, its discussion and analysis far
transcend what has occurred in recent years in that unhappy
land. Indeed, it is in a way unfortunate that the Indo-China
war occupies so central a part of this work, for it is
likely that emotional views concerning the war will color at
least some readers' appraisal of the merits of Professor Moore's
broader legal analysis.' On the other hand, for those seeking
to enhance their understanding of the factual and legal bases
for the military intervention of the United States in IndoChina, this book should be regarded as "must" reading.
Professor Moore's general conclusion is that our intervention in Indo-China was proper under current conceptions of
international law. Whether or not that intervention was wise
as a matter of policy is a separate question, and one that Professor Moore does not attempt to answer, prudently leaving
this complex issue to the judgment of history. As one editorial
writer so aptly has put it, "the final impact of that experience
I In regard to this point, Professor Richard A. Falk finds a discontinuity
between Professor Moore's legal analysis of the Indo-China War
(Falk strongly disapproves of Moore's conclusions concerning the
legality of the war) and his general approach to intervention in
foreign societies (which Falk warmly praises). Falk. Alchemy and
Analysis: The Two Faces of John Norton Moore, 13 VA. J. INT'L. L.
120, 124 (1972). This review by Professor Falk, who frequently has
crossed swords with Professor Moore over the issue of 'Indo-China,
is not nearly so unfriendly as its title would suggest. For another, and
highly instructive review of Moore's book, by an author who agrees
with Moore's conclusions on Indo-China, see Rusk, Reflections on Law
and the Indo-China War, 13 VA. J. INT'L. L. 107 (1972).
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[Vietnam] is still to be determined, both by events and by
how men see it in their minds."'2 Whatever ones views of this
multi-faceted question, it is difficult to fault Professor Moore's
analysis of the relevant legal issues or the conclusions he draws
therefrom.
Despite the obvious importance of the chapters dealing
specifically with Indo-China, the most enduring significance
of this book lies in its chapters dealing generally with what
Professor Myres McDougal refers to in a Foreword as "con3
ditions of minimum public order in the world of tomorrow.
These include the aforementioned Chapter I, plus Chapters
III, IV, V, and VI which together comprise a major segment of the book subtitled "World Order Perspectives."
The analysis contained in these chapters is intriguing,
impressive, and complex; in a brief review such as this
one cannot possibly provide an adequate summary of Professor Moore's methodology or of the substance of his thought.
He believes, however, that international law can be a significant force in managing international conflict, and he makes
a persuasive case for this point of view, pointing out many
weaknesses of the anti-legalist position, yet cautioning against
overestimation of the role of international law. Throughout,
his approach is balanced, thoughtful and policy-oriented, with
law viewed not merely as rules, judges, and courts, but as a
process for the pursuit of values and the resolution of conflict,
and as a social force that can have constructive uses in the
international arena as well as in the domestic one.
Chapter II is a special bonus and deserves particular mention. Entitled "Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres
McDougal and Harold Lasswell," it contains the best brief
introduction I have seen to the McDougal-Lasswell system.
Every serious student of international law needs to be familiar
with the policy-oriented jurisprudence of these two seminal
thinkers. Those who have not yet gotten their feet wet in this
jurisprudential ocean will find that Professor Moore has made
the water seem much less forbidding if not positively attractive.
In addition to describing the terminology and methodology of
the McDougal-Lasswell system, Professor Moore deals with
several of the most frequently voiced criticisms of the system:
that its terminology is needlessly esoteric, that it depends on
a particular value orientation that not everyone shares, and
2

3

The Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1973, p. 18, col. 2.
J. MooPm,

LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR XIV
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that the system is too cumbersome to be useful in the everyday operation of the legal system. Professor Moore refutes these
criticisms in a most convincing way, using examples of application of the system to major problems of international law
to illustrate the comprehensiveness and the utility of the
McDougal-Lasswell approach. He emphasizes that although this
system does not automatically solve problems (neither does any
other system), it does have great potential as a better way of
analyzing problems, formulating policy alternatives and getting
value judgments out into the open. As one who long has been
an enthusiastic admirer of Professor McDougal, I am pleased to
see his and Professor Lasswell's unique contribution to our
locker of jurisprudential tools presented and demonstrated by
so lucid and competent a craftsman as Professor Moore.
Mention also should be made of the concluding chapters
of the book, which discuss constitutional issues: the proper
allocation of power between Congress and the President to
commit the nation to war, and the role of the courts in dealing
with the constitutional (and international) issues which arise
out of the commitment of military forces to foreign wars. Both
Congress and the President have enormous powers in this
area, and Professor Moore recognizes the importance of cooperation between the two branches if the national interest is to
be well served. With respect to the courts, he points to large
difficulties in judicial review of executive-congressional action authorizing the use of armed forces abroad, but suggests
that certain kinds of war-peace issues may be justiciable. He
does not believe, however, that the basic international and
constitutional questions arising out of the Indo-China war are
properly subject to judicial review, and he asserts that "[t]here
are important systemic policies suggesting that for the most
part the resolution of claims that a particular use of force
abroad has not been constitutionally authorized or is in violation of international law should be left to the interplay of
political forces. ''4 This is perhaps another way of saying that
foreign policy decisions are entrusted to branches of government other than the judiciary and, as a practical matter, that
the intrusion of the courts into these matters would place an
unacceptable burden on the conduct of our nation's foreign
affairs. As Professor Moore points out, to date the courts have
impliedly accepted this limitation on the tradition of judicial

4

Id., at 598.
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review, in that so far no court has held justiciable a challenge
to the commitment of military forces abroad. While apparently
in agreement with that result, he would prefer the courts to
articulate fully the reasons for their decision rather than simply
to invoke the "political question" doctrine or to deny a hearing
without stating a reason.
The book concludes with a valuable set of documents retlating to the American involvement in Indo-China, an excellent
bibliography, and a very adequate index. Professor Moore also
has included a brief analysis of the now famous Pentagon
Papers, which were published by the New York Times after
the completion of his chapters on the Indo-China conflict. His
basic conclusions with respect to the Pentagon Papers can be
summarized as follows: (1) they confirm all the major factual assumptions of his chapters dealing with the legal aspects
of the conflict; (2) they confirm that the principal objective
of the United States was to assist South Vietanm and Laos (and
later Cambodia) in their defense against North Vietnamese
military intervention; (3) the papers provide further evidence
of North Vietnamese participation in the insurgency in South
Vietnam, lending additional support to the conclusion that
U.S. assistance was lawful counter-intervention to offset prior
North Vietnamese intervention; (4) although the papers support the lawfulness of the U.S. military involvement in the
Indo-China war, they also suggest that international legal perspectives were not systematically taken into account in top-level planning; rather, Professor Moore ventures, "[t]he predominant tone of the papers is one of
Realpolitik planning heavily influenced by contemporary decision theory."5 (To remedy this problem, Professor Moore advocates that the Legal Adviser of the Department of State become an Under Secretary of State and that a Special Assistant
for International Law be added to the White House staff).6
The quality of the scholarship and writing found in this
book is excellent from start to finish. I wholeheartedly agree
with Professor Falk's observation that Professor Moore has
managed "to combine the sweep and sophistication of McDougal's work with the clarity of presentation and argument
'7
that one associates with positivist approaches at their best."
5 Id., at xxviii.
6 Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk finds this suggestion unpersuasive: "There s a virus endemic to bureaucracy for which no
vaccine has yet been found. It is the idea that power and influence
are related to titles." Rusk, supra note 1, at 117.
7 Falk, supra note 1, at 133.
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All in all, it is one of the most impressive major pieces of legal
writing I have encountered. I highly recommend this book to
every lawyer, teacher, and student who seeks a deeper understanding of international law, its uses, and its potential in the
management of international conflict.
Pasco M. Bowman*

*Dean and Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.

